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1   Introduction 
 
 
 
China has started to assume a prominent position in the world economy since the 
beginning of economic reform and the introduction of the open-door policy in 1978. 
Be it represented as a miracle or a threat in the media, the fact is that China has not 
only maintained a high growth rate but also successfully integrated into the world 
economy in the past thirty years. From 1979 to 2006, the average annual growth rate 
of China’s real GDP reached more than 9%. Total imports and exports increased 
from US$ 20.64 billion in 1978 to US$ 1760.7 billion in 2006. China’s vivid and 
rapidly growing economy contrasts significantly with those of most other transition 
economies. In this course, foreign direct investment (FDI) has made a significant 
contribution. China has experienced a rapid inflow of FDI and has been the largest 
recipient of FDI among developing countries since 1992. Realized FDI increased 
from US$ 57 million in 1978 to US$ 69.5 billion in 2006. The number of approved 
foreign invested enterprises reached 594,445 by the end of 2006 from virtually zero 
in 1978. Consequently, the proportion of exports from foreign invested enterprises 
in China’s total exports continues to increase, reaching 58.2 percent in 2006; while 
the proportion of imports destined for foreign invested enterprises in China’s total 
imports was 59.7 percent in the same year. China has become the “workshop of the 
world” where foreign firms bring in raw materials and parts, manufacture products, 
and export them internationally. Made-in-China consumer goods dominate shop 
shelves in western countries, while industrial goods are shaping the next wave 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2003). This is best reflected in the acquisition activities 
of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in China’s machinery industry over the past 
three years. By the end of 2005, more than 400 MNCs from the Global 500 have 
invested there, and more than 40 MNCs have established a regional headquarters in 
China. Intel, for example, established a greater China headquarter independent of its 
Asia-Pacific headquarters on 1 January 2007, which reports directly to the global 
headquarter in the US. It is clear that China remains a most attractive destination for 
FDI and that foreign-invested enterprises are one of the major players in the “Made-
in-China” story.  
1 
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There are some interesting features, however, that warrant closer analysis of the 
behaviour of foreign-invested enterprises in China. First, while an increasing 
number of foreign investors establish their businesses in China, the institutional 
environment there is often regarded as uncertain, which is assumed to generate 
higher transaction costs of doing business there (World Bank, 2005). Second, it 
appears that foreign investors, by going to China, attempt to not only explore a huge 
market and exploit low-cost production factors, but also increasingly are amazed by 
the upgraded supply chains within China (Deloitte Consulting, 2003, 2007). While 
these technical factors induce them to enter China and relocate their businesses 
globally, foreign investors have to tackle the complex, idiosyncratic institutional 
environment in order to safeguard their operation’s success (Clissord, 2004; Khanna 
et al., 2005). The economy of China is informed by its long history and rich culture 
and is also characterized by dynamism and diversity within the country today. A 
gradual approach towards the development of a market economy has naturally given 
rise to many transitional institutions (Qian, 2002). At the national level, policies 
concerning FDI have been streamlined with the aim of gradually establishing the 
rule of law as the basis of the relationship between government and business 
(International Finance Corporation, 2000; OECD, 2005). The promulgation of a 
Property Rights Law in March 2007 ensures the protection of property rights for the 
first time since 1949. However, the implementation of central policies is often met 
with local conditions and interests that are sometimes incompatible. As a 
consequence of decentralization, local governments not only have the authority to 
interpret and implement central policies according to local conditions, but also tend 
to expand their duties and focus on rent-seeking activities (International Finance 
Corporation, 2000). The findings, as presented in this dissertation, point out that 
foreign-invested enterprises have learnt to navigate the uncertain waters of economic 
transition in China: (1) Foreign-invested enterprises evolve over time to adapt to the 
dynamic institutional environment in their strategic and organizational choices; (2) 
Their ownership preferences are subject to adjustment both on entry and in operation, 
and entail a learning process regarding local institutions and their interactions with 
local governments; (3) Foreign-invested enterprises, in addition, actively develop 
political strategies at the local level, and collaborate with local governments at both 
macro and micro levels, offering them sufficient cooperation rents (i.e. political 
leverage) that help to mitigate uncertainty and risk in the non-market environment 
and thus facilitate their market-oriented operations.  
These findings suggest that the survival and success of foreign-invested 
enterprises in China is not merely based on their market strategies but also, and 
more so, based on the integration of their market and non-market strategies. They 
17
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have to organize effectively both inside and outside the firm in order to achieve 
harmony with local governments and (informal) institutions. The learning effect 
may have made foreign-invested enterprises more inclined to become embedded in 
local networks, which play a larger supportive role in economic exchanges when the 
formal institutions are weak. Businesses thus hope to survive the uncertainty in 
China’s economic transition. Therefore, localization proves to be the most suitable 
choice for their success and today reflects, not only their attempts to cope with the 
“Chineseness” of the environment, but also their attempt at “going local”. 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
This dissertation is a response to the call for attention from both strategy research 
and international business studies to institutions in China and other emerging 
economies (Child and Tse, 2001; Narayanan and Fahey, 2005; Shenkar, 2004; Tseng 
and Foster, 2006; Wright et al., 2005). The growing importance of emerging 
economies such as China’s is reflected in the upsurge of research on the topic in 
both streams in recent years. Scholars argue, on one hand, that “there is a need to 
consider the extent to which theories and methodologies used to study strategy in 
mature, developed economies are suited to the unique social, political, and economic 
contexts as well as firm characteristics of emerging economies” (Wright et al., 2005), 
and, on the other hand, that focusing on firms operating in such a unique context 
offers the high potential to contribute to the extant body of knowledge (Tsui et al., 
2004). 
   Therefore, scholars suggest that an institution-based view, bringing institutions to 
the analytical window, is needed in studying firms’ strategies (Oliver, 1997; Peng, 
2002; Wright et al., 2005). Strategy research, originating in developed countries, 
largely focuses on Western firms and takes a market-based institutional environment 
for granted (Peng, 2002). From this perspective, industrial conditions (Porter, 1980) 
and a firm’s resources (Barney, 1991) are taken as primary determinants of 
performance. Thus the relationship between business strategy and the institutional 
environment is left at the background. Firms operating in emerging economies such 
as China face a different set of rules from those in developed economies. The 
institutional environment engenders “a set of political, social, and legal ground rules 
that establishes the basis for production, exchange, and distribution” (Davis and 
North, 1970). It is made of both formal institutions (e.g. rules and laws) and 
informal institutions (e.g. socially sanctioned norms of behaviour) (North, 1990; 
Scott, 2001). Recent strategy research identifies a lack of a market-based 
18
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institutional environment in emerging economies, which challenges conventional 
wisdoms in both theory and methodology (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 
2005). As a consequence, strategies based on industry conditions and firm resources 
can not generate expected outcomes in emerging economies where firms operate 
according to a different set of rules (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). As a result, firms 
need to develop strategies that work around an institutional void (Khanna et al., 
2005).  
   To tackle the issue of how institutions matter to strategizing, we need to examine 
firms and behaviours in different institutional settings (Scott, 2001). Previous studies 
show that transition economies in particular provide examples of institutional 
difference. Under such a situation, firms’ behaviour is not as expected according to 
conventional wisdom (e.g. Stiglitz, 1999). Therefore and as “the most foreign of all 
foreign places” (Chen, 2001), the Chinese case is very valuable for the study of the 
interaction between institutions and organizations. Further, China’s economic 
transition has shed much light on institutional complexity and diversity as theorized 
in network capitalism (Boisot and Child, 1996), hybrid market economics (Nee, 
1992) and local corporatism (Walder, 1995; Oi, 1995). This implies that China 
presents an ideal research laboratory of institutions.  
   The above features of China in transition suggest that a focus on China will 
improve our knowledge about international business as well. Internationally, 
competitive advantage is found “in the synergetic combination of global and local 
knowledge”, but regrettably, “the field as a whole has come to play down the value 
of such expertise” (Shenkar, 2004). Location-specificity plays a critical role in 
international business as economic integration in reality falls far short of the ideal of 
total integration (Ghemawat, 2003). In order to avoid “running out of steam” 
(Buckley, 2002), the field needs to re-embrace its own competitive advantage 
(Shenkar, 2004). While the field’s focus is on international business success and 
failure, context-specific research needs to be reemphasized much more in order to 
bring local knowledge into analysis and feedback further into theory development. 
Previous theoretical probings into transition economies have shown the significance 
of institutions to the strategizing of foreign-invested enterprises in those economies 
(e.g. Child and Tse, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 2005). Empirically, scholars have made 
greater attempts to study organizations in China; however, according to the number 
of scholarly articles published, China remains one of the least studied regions in the 
world (Tsui et al., 2004).  
   Why study foreign-invested enterprises? China’s economic transition is 
characterized by the development of organizations and more organizational diversity. 
Ownership proves to be an illuminating and promising variable for strategy research 
19
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(Peng et al., 2004). Different ownerships are subject to different institutional 
constraints, leading to different strategic and organizational choices (Peng, 2003; 
Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng et al., 2004). Previous studies show that collectively-
owned enterprises (such as township and village enterprises) and private enterprises 
attempt to seek collaboration with the government in one way or another, such as 
getting local governments involved in corporate governance (Che and Qian, 1998) 
and seeking a “red hat” (a kind of political status or linkage) for the firm (Chen, 
2007) in order to cope with complexity in the institutional environment. In 
comparison, the experience of foreign-invested enterprises is arguably more 
enlightening, since they enter the market with their own routines and norms, but 
must cope with local institutions particular to China if they hope to succeed (Boisot 
and Child, 1999; Peng, 2003). Their strategizing deeply reflects the interaction 
between institutions and organizations. Taking foreign-invested enterprises (foreign 
firms hereafter) as our research object, we refer to the subsidiary level, since foreign 
subsidiaries, instead of their home corporations, are the most appropriate level to 
study their interactions with local conditions in China (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002). Given the growing importance of China in the world 
economy, improved knowledge about international business strategy thereof has 
enormous practical applications for foreign firms entering and operating in China 
(Child and Tse, 2001; Peng et al., 2004). 
 
 
1.2 Major Theoretical Issues 
 
The substantive purpose of this dissertation is, from an institution-based perspective, 
to address various theoretical issues of international business strategy regarding the 
interaction between institutions and foreign firms in China, i.e. dynamics of 
isomorphism in foreign ownership, a process approach to ownership choice, and 
managing the firm-government relationship.  
 
     Dynamics of isomorphism in foreign ownership. Recently, scholars have used 
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) to explain the 
ownership choices of foreign firms in host countries. Empirical studies show that 
foreign firms tend to converge in their ownership modes under isomorphic pressures 
from the institutional environment in order to gain legitimacy (Lu, 2002; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002). These studies take institutions as a given. However, institutions may 
be “less evitable than institutional theory suggests” (Oliver, 1992), and therefore, 
changes in organizational patterns often occur “when legal or other rule-maintaining 
20
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boundaries are relaxed” (Powell, 1991). In addition, firms may not be as passive as 
institutional theory suggests. From a strategic perspective, an ownership form is 
deliberately selected to enhance efficiency and competitiveness (e.g. Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart, 1988). While institutional 
constraints represent external forces influencing organizational choices, the strategic 
perspective provides the additional logic of internal managerial discretion. When 
institutional changes occur, firms often seek new forms to achieve competitiveness 
and deviate from established conformity, leading to dynamics of isomorphism in the 
organizational population. Yet, little attention has been devoted to this dynamic 
phenomenon with a few exceptions (e.g. Haveman and Rao, 1997; Kraatz and Zajac, 
1996). Do foreign firms in China present dynamics of isomorphism in their 
ownership pattern? This dissertation aims to answer this question by integrating the 
strategic perspective into institutional theory. 
 
     A process approach to ownership choice. Ownership choice is one crucial 
element of foreign firms’ strategy in a host country. From an individual perspective, 
firms select an ownership mode based on transaction costs, values, and/or 
institutional constraints. However, empirical studies return inconclusive findings 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Guillén, 2003; Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Malhotra, 2003; Yiu and Makino, 2002). This is largely due to the weakness 
of the variance approach adopted in these studies. A few studies have demonstrated 
the variety of possible trade-offs (costs vs. values and efficiency vs. legitimacy) in 
ownership choice (e.g. Luo, 2001a). However, a variance approach is unable to 
specify the interplay among different determinants and thus the underlying process 
therein. In practice, what we observe as the ownership form of a firm may not be 
what they desire to have, which may (partly) cause the inconsistent or inconclusive 
empirical findings. Therefore, Gomes-Casseres (1990) suggest a need to consider 
“what a foreign firm desires to have” and “what a foreign firm can do” separately in 
two phases. A process approach has the merit of identifying the underlying sequence 
of events leading to a decision (Langley, 1999; Mohr, 1982), but few such studies 
have been conducted (e.g. Büchel, 2002). In China, in particular, the ownership 
preference of foreign firms, based on transaction costs and values, is confronted with 
many local constraints other than central regulatory policies (Faure, 2000). This 
dissertation attempts to explore the learning process in which foreign firms adjust 
their ownership preferences through direct interactions with local institutions in 
China.  
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     Managing the firm-government relationship. In practice, strategizing the firm-
government relationship is a challenge for firms (e.g. Watkins, 2003), especially 
foreign firms (i.e. foreign subsidiaries) that operate in transition economies (e.g. 
Peng, 2003). International business studies have attempted to explain the 
relationship between foreign firms and host governments as either conflicting or 
cooperative (e.g. Fagre and Wells, 1982; Dunning, 1998). However, results fall short 
of explaining the behaviour of foreign firms in their attempt to influence the 
institutional environment. Recent developments in the study of political strategies 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Bonardi et al., 2005) provide us with another lens for 
looking at the issue. Political strategists emphasize the attractiveness of a political 
market in which “demanders and suppliers transact over public policies” (Bonardi et 
al, 2006). The demanders include firms and organized interests groups, while the 
suppliers are composed of elected politicians, regulatory agencies and courts. Non-
market performance is influenced by rivalry among demanders or suppliers, and by 
a firm’s ability to mitigate political transaction costs. Therefore, this political 
strategy perspective highlights the significance of government to the non-market 
environment, and helps to explain how firms develop means to influence 
government and public policy decisions thereby mitigating uncertainty (Baron, 1995; 
Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Rugman, 1998). Although international business scholars 
have acknowledged the political behaviour of foreign firms in host countries (e.g. 
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994), firm conclusions remain scant (Hillman and Wan, 
2005). Few studies of the political strategies of MNCs have insightfully begun to 
model the relationship between government and firms with the subsidiary as the 
level of analysis (Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; Hillman and Wan, 2005): these 
studies analyze the national government as the counterpart of foreign firms rather 
than examining the particular role of local governments. Scholars of transition 
economies, especially the Chinese economy, argue that this is inappropriate (e.g. 
Krug, 2004; Walder 1995). This dissertation aims to explain why and how foreign 
firms manage their relationship with local government in China from a political 
strategy perspective. 
 
 
1.3 Methodological Issues 
 
Our substantive purpose is to examine the influence of local context on the 
behaviour of foreign firms in China. It requires contextualizing the existing 
knowledge, i.e. understanding the institutional setting where firms operate 
(Rousseau and Fried 2001; Tsui, 2004). Entering and operating in China, foreign 
22
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firms face not only weakly enforced and transitional market institutions but also 
various specific institutional constraints (e.g. ownership regulations and industry 
barriers) at the national level (Luo, 2002b). In addition, the institutional environment 
appears to be heterogeneous across regions since de facto fiscal decentralization sees 
much political and economic decision-making power delegated to the local 
government level (Krug, 2004; Krug and Hendrischke, 2005; Qian and Weingast, 
1997), beyond which, there are substantial regional differences in language, identity, 
factor endowment and economic development. Interjuristictional competition drives 
local governments to focus on developing and improving the investment climates 
(e.g. Dollar 2003; KPMG 2003) and opening more development zones in their 
jurisdictions to host foreign firms with preferential policies (Qian, 2002).  
 Foreign firms tend to register and locate in such zones in order to capture 
institutional advantage (Zhang and Reinmoeller, 2007; Zhou et al., 2002). 
Development zones are important institutions in the FDI sector in China. After the 
open-door policy was introduced, China established four Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) to host foreign firms and one reason was to isolate the impact of foreign 
ownership in the socialist system. SEZs proved to be successful in attracting foreign 
firms (Park, 1997). In SEZs, foreign firms were subject to more liberalized policies 
than elsewhere. Over time, an increasing number of local governments adopted this 
model and it was (and is) often the case that development zones (including SEZs) 
are endowed with better physical infrastructure. There was also usually less state 
intervention and the additional entitlement to tax privileges. Crucially, local 
governments have tended to develop economic policies through their interactions 
with foreign firms.  
  
 This dissertation uses various methods to address the major theoretical issues 
outlined above. An econometric method is applied to study the dynamics of 
isomorphism in foreign ownership, while a case-study method is used for the other 
two theoretical issues that are more explorative. In our econometric analysis, we 
empirically test how institutions in China determine the dynamics of isomorphism in 
the population of foreign firms. The analysis is based on a panel database including 
data from 15 provinces during the period 1984 – 2003 (300 data points in total). By 
the end of 2003, the total number of foreign firms approved for establishment 
reached 465,277. Our panel database includes 332,062 foreign firms which account 
for 71% of the total number of foreign firms that entered China in the period of the 
study.  
 To explore the behaviours of foreign firms at the local level, we can not simply 
rely on statistics. We therefore select a multiple-case study method to address the 
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issues of ownership choice and firm-government relationship management. A case 
study provides us with a theory-building opportunity: by exploring the business and 
non-business behaviours of firms, it becomes possible to place crucial events and the 
relationships among variables in their context. It emphasizes “developing constructs, 
measures and testable theoretical propositions” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Multiple cases help to establish the “replication” logic (Yin, 2003), by which we can 
examine the robustness of the original findings and thus generate propositions for 
future research. 
 We studied thirty foreign firms in total over a three-year period in six cities in 
eastern China, which were Suzhou, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Wuxi, Shenyang and 
Dezhou (especially focusing on the first three cities). Statistics show that the eastern 
provinces host 82% of foreign firms in China (China Ministry of Commerce, 2005). 
The Yangtze River Delta, where Suzhou, Hangzhou and Shanghai are located, is 
also the location of numerous development zones (China Association of 
Development Zones, 2005), so it is theoretically insightful to select cases from the 
region. Since we aim to draw insights from case studies, we do not describe 
population characteristics along a single dimension; the “local” features of our cases 
do not matter (Manion, 1994). Among the thirty firms we study, twenty-eight 
operate in one of the development zones. 
 
 Data collection for case studies. Data was collected through interviews and the 
examination of archives. To understand the underlying process of strategizing, we 
need to learn about the concerns and perceptions of foreign investors regarding local 
circumstance (formal and informal institutions) and how firms respond to these 
circumstances. In China, in particular, foreign investors usually encounter and 
negotiate the institutional environment at the sub-national level, the understanding 
of which cannot be restricted to generalizations about laws and regulations, but very 
often must include informal institutions as well. For example, as a result of fiscal 
decentralization (Qian and Weingast, 1997), local governments are very concerned 
with the economic performance of their jurisdictions, and thus compete with one 
another for resources. FDI not only provides capital inputs, but has high potential 
spillover effects for the local economy. Therefore, local governments have strong 
incentives to compete with one another for FDI which has become a “window” on 
their political and economic performance. Local governments, as agents of the 
central government, implement central policies, but may circumvent these policies if 
they perceive it to be in their interest to do so; for example, in order to attract foreign 
investment (Peng, 2000). The knowledge regarding these local and informal 
institutions can best be collected through direct observation and conversation (Krug, 
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2004). Interviews prove to be a valid instrument to investigate motives, constraints 
and process-oriented knowledge (Bewley, 2002; Büchel, 2002). Given the Chinese 
economy’s complexity and dynamism, interviews are among the most useful 
instruments to learn about influencing variables and the causality among variables of 
the phenomenon (Roy et al., 2001; Tsui et al., 2004). 
 We conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews during the on-site visits to 
every firm during the periods from September to November 2004 and from July to 
August 2005, and in December 2006. All interviewees except those in three cases 
belong to the top management team of their firms and have been working there since 
the formation, and thus they are knowledgeable enough about the events 
surrounding the ownership mode choices and their political behaviour in managing 
the relationship with local governments. Each interview lasted one to two hours. 
One or two interviewees per firm participated in the interview. Two or more 
interviewers conducted all interviews, recorded notes for each interview with 
permission, and transcribed these notes into a single report per firm later in the same 
day. The answers were often repeated and discussed on the spot. The validity of the 
interview data was thus assured by timely transcription and member check. 
 To assure the validity of our analysis, we additionally conducted face-to-face 
interviews at four MNCs’ regional headquarters in China. These four MNCs operate 
in the electronics, chemical, beverage, and financial services sectors respectively. 
The informants from the first three MNCs were (ex-) general managers of their 
China headquarters, and the informant from the last MNC was a vice-president. 
They confirmed information regarding the ownership mode choices of their 
subsidiaries in China and their political activities. Furthermore, we interviewed six 
government officials in the development zones in order to get “the other side of the 
story” (Peng, 2000). The officials we interviewed included three holding the 
position of deputy director on the development zone administrative committees of 
Suzhou, Hangzhou and Dezhou, and another three holding the position of deputy 
director in the taxation bureaus of Suzhou. Finally, we collected archival data for 
each firm from various sources such as company websites, corporate brochures, 
newspapers and magazine reports. These data provided a backup or blind check to 
the interview data. 
 
 
1.4 A Reader’s Guide 
 
This dissertation proceeds by providing a thorough description of the behaviour of 
foreign firms entering and operating in China in Chapter 2. This description shows 
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the uniqueness and success of China as a destination for FDI. It further explains the 
success of foreign firms by looking into their location choices within China, their 
ownership choices in response to institutional changes, and their local 
embeddedness in governance. This description provides a general picture and 
ecology of foreign firms in China’s economic transition.  
 The main part of this dissertation is formed by three empirical chapters. In 
Chapter 3, dynamics of homogeneity in foreign ownership is analyzed on the basis 
of population. This analysis relies on panel data from foreign firms during the period 
1979 to 2003. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 rely on case data, the methodology of which 
is described above. In Chapter 4, the ownership choices of foreign firms are 
analyzed at a firm level, relying on twenty illustrative cases. This chapter in 
particular looks into the learning process in which foreign firms adapt their 
ownership preference to local circumstance within China. In Chapter 5, the analysis 
is focused on the political strategies of foreign firms in China. This chapter relies on 
twenty-two cases to explore why and how foreign firms engage in collaborations 
with local governments in China. 
 Chapter 6 then summarizes the main findings in three empirical chapters. It 
reflects on using an institution-based perspective to understand the strategies of 
foreign firms in China and its contribution to the extant body of knowledge. At the 
end, it points to further avenues for future international business strategy research. 
 
 Overall, the three empirical chapters develop a deeper understanding of the 
behaviour of foreign firms in China. They echo the concerns of scholars regarding 
the role of institutions in strategizing of foreign firms in host countries not only, but 
raise concerns about institutions at the local level in China as well. A local 
perspective is thus emphasized when foreign firms strategize their choices and 
operations within China.   
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2 Foreign Firms in China: Success by 
Strategic Choices 
 
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Ever since the economic reform started in 1978, China has attracted the attention of 
Western academics and the business world (e.g. OECD, 2005; Prasad, 2004; 
Shenkar, 2006). With average annual growth rates of real GDP 9.4 per cent between 
1979 and 2004 this cannot come as a surprise. Rather unexpected, however, was the 
fact that China outperformed the European transition economies. One reason given 
for this development is the contribution by foreign direct investment (FDI), more 
precisely the establishment of subsidiaries (i.e. foreign firms hereafter) in China (e.g. 
EIU, 2003; Lardy, 1995). China was not only the largest FDI recipient among 
developing countries in 2004, it attracted FDI inflows of 60.63 billion US dollar 
surpassed only by the United States and the UK.  
This development raises some questions. First, to which extent does China’s 
overall development depend on past and ongoing FDI? Second, what actually 
explains the trend? In what follows, an attempt is made to analyse the processes and 
activities of foreign firms investing and producing in China. After all, without 
regarding China as an attractive location for investment and production, the 
observed FDI inflow would not have occurred. If enough foreign firms succeeded in 
China to induce more firms and/or more capital to follow then we assume that one 
or more of the following factors must have played a role. 1. A selection effect: By 
carefully choosing the best suited entry strategy only firms with a high probability to 
succeed invested in China. 2. An integration effect: By acknowledging the 
specificity of the local business environment and developing complementary 
capacities the foreign firms can exploit the business opportunities offered in China. 
It is worth mentioning that once production has started and increasingly more since 
the middle of the 1990s firms are confronted with locally rather than nationally 
designed constraints and opportunities (e.g. Clissord, 2004; Segal and Thun, 2001). 
3. A learning effect: By flexibly reacting to an unfamiliar business environment 
characterised by frequent and sometimes drastic changes firms need to employ 
13 
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structures and routines that allow for smooth adaptation to new chances and 
constraints. These three factors are not independent from each other. In what follows 
they will however be treated separately for analytical reasons.  
The chapter is organized as follows: after a general overview of the FDI 
landscape since 1978 (Section 2.2), our analysis describes the factors which lead 
firms to invest in China (Section 2.3); identifies factors that inform firms of their 
entry choices (Section 2.4); and examines the ideas of local embeddedness and 
adaptation (Section 2.5). This analysis is offered in the context of a generally 
dynamic situation (Section 2.6).  
 
 
2.2 Overview  
 
The economic reform and open door policy in 1978 parted the Bamboo Curtain 
between China and the Western world. At the beginning (realized) FDI increased 
gradually yet remained small. Nevertheless, by 1990 annual realized FDI was about 
four times that in 1983. This picture changed dramatically again in 1990s. In 1992 
alone, realized FDI amounted to eleven billion US dollar, almost three times the 
amount of 1991. In 2004, it reached more than 60 billion US dollar, which is almost 
five times the amount of 1992 and 17 times that of 1990. To put these figures in 
perspective it is worthwhile having a look at the cases of Russia (another transition 
economy) and India (another large economy at a similar level of income). 
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Figure 2.1  FDI inflows: China, Russia and India 
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As figure 2.1 shows, FDI inflows in all three economies increased during the 
1990s yet those in Russia and India remained far behind China. In 2004 for example 
China received about nine per cent of the world total FDI inflows, as compared to 
Russia’s 1.8 per cent and India’s 0.82 per cent. 
FDI means more than the transfer of capital and technology. It changes the 
ecology of the Chinese economy when more and more foreign firms operate in 
China (see column 2 in table 2.1), after decades in which China had remained 
outside the international division of labour. By the end of 2004 more than 242,000 
foreign firms operated in China. However, it should be noted that more than 90 per 
cent of these entered the market after 1990. The contribution of these firms became 
considerable. They became a major source for tax revenue (see table 2.1, column 3). 
In 2004 for example foreign firms generated more than one-fifth of the total tax 
revenue indicating their crucial role in the economy and the state’s finances. 
 
Table 2.1  The performance of FDI in China: 1980-2004 
Year 
FDI realized 
amount (billion 
US$) 
No. of foreign 
firms in 
operation 
 
Share of tax revenue 
( percent) p.a. 
1980 - 7 - 
1982 1.82 330 - 
1985 2.0 4912 - 
1990 3.5 25389 - 
1991 4.4 37215 - 
1992 11.0 84371 4.25 
1993 27.5 167507 5.71 
1994 33.8 206096 8.51 
1995 37.5 233564 10.96 
1996 41.7 240447 11.87 
1997 45.3 235681 13.16 
1998 45.5 227807 14.38 
1999 40.3 212436 15.99 
2000 40.7 203208 17.50 
2001 46.9 202306 19.01 
2002 52.7 208056 20.52 
2003 53.5 226373 20.90 
2004 60.6 242284 20.80 
 
Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2004, 2005; China National Bureau of Statistics, 2004, 2005; 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2005 
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Moreover, foreign firms are also the driving force behind China’s integration into 
the international market as can be seen in the foreign trade statistics (see figure 2.2). 
Since the reforms, China’ imports and exports have rapidly increased, well above 
global increases. By the end of 2004, the imports and exports reached 561.38 billion 
US dollars and 593.36 billion US dollars respectively, with an average annual 
growth rate of 17.5 per cent and 17.7 per cent respectively since the beginning of the 
reforms. As a consequence, China’s contribution to world exports increased from 1 
per cent (in 1980) to more than 6 per cent (in 2004). The export success of China’s 
economy is to a great extent the export success of foreign firms in China (figure 2.2). 
While in 1986, foreign firms’ share of total exports was only 1.9 per cent, in 2004 
this share had increased to 57.1 per cent.  
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Figure 2.2   Imports and exports of China 1986-2004  
 
Even more striking is the extent to which the composition of exports changed. 
China’s exports have shifted from natural resource-based products (e.g. grain and oil) 
to labour-intensive products (e.g. garment and textile products), and lately to 
technology-incentive products (e.g. machinery and computer products). In 2004, 
machinery and electronic products amounted to 54.5 per cent of the total export 
values, of which more than 70 per cent were produced by foreign firms (China 
National Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Another example is the emergence of a Chinese 
IT sector in the 1990s, which proved to be so internationally competitive that China 
is one of the top three exporters in the world today (Amighini, 2005). In this case too, 
foreign firms dominate China’s exports: 87.3 per cent of exports of high-tech and 
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new technological products were produced by foreign firms in 2004 (China Ministry 
of Commerce, 2005). 
All in all, the picture summarised above demonstrates the remarkable 
performance of FDI and foreign firms in China at the macro level, and invites a 
more detailed analysis of the underlying processes. The first question is why foreign 
firms would go to China?  
 
 
2.3 Why Invest in China?  
 
Economic analysis of foreign trade and foreign direct investment in China often 
cites determinants such as market size, economic development, labour market 
conditions and infrastructure (e.g. Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Wei, 1995; Wei and Liu, 
2001; Zhao, 2003). Market size (measured by GDP or GDP per capita) in 
combination with economic growth translates into business opportunities for foreign 
investors. Likewise a huge labour force in combination with low (labour) costs plus 
a small but remarkably well trained technical personnel add to the attractiveness of 
China as a factor market (e.g. ATKearney, 2004; Lu and Liu, 2004). China’s 
infrastructure (especially in transportation and communications) is also beginning to 
contribute to its attractiveness as a location for FDI (China National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2005).  
Another group of studies stress institutional factors, i.e. institutional incentives 
for FDI. The reforms were accompanied by liberalization in the foreign trade sectors 
such as the establishment of Special Economic Zones, special tariffs and tax rates. 
These were designed to attract FDI (e.g. Fu, 2000; Ng and Tuan, 2002; OECD, 2000; 
Wei and Liu, 2001) by keeping the operating costs within China low (e.g. Kim and 
Lau, 1994; Krug, 2004; Krugman, 1994). Corruption and regulatory burden though 
ubiquitous have so far only started to deter investors from North America and 
Europe (e.g. Khan, 2001). Investors closer to China or her culture do not seem to be 
worried (e.g. Wei and Liu, 2001), as exemplified by the fact that Asian investors 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, Singapore, South Korea and Japan, still dominate 
FDI inflow in China (e.g. Chen and Chen, 1998; Lu and Zhu, 1995; Li et al., 2001; 
Wei, 1995; Yang, 1997; Zhang, 2000, 2005).  
All in all, these studies suggest that both economic advantages and institutional 
incentives attract FDI to China. However, studies at the macro level dismiss two 
crucial aspects. First, China cannot be modelled as a unified economy, let alone one 
integrated market. Thus foreign firms need to respond to local rather than national 
boundaries of markets and institutions (e.g. Demurger, 2001; Dollar et al., 2003). 
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Second, the success of FDI in China depends crucially on the strategic decisions of 
foreign firms: what and where they produce, in particular; how they manage their 
business relationships; and how they deal with local jurisdictions. 
Thus it is assumed in what follows that a firm-level analysis is needed to identify 
(systematic) factors by which the performance of the FDI sector can be explained in 
relation to its specificity. Studies in international business and strategy addressing 
this issue point to the importance of choosing the “right” entry strategy, responding 
flexibly to the local environment while developing the capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1977; 
Ghemawat, 2003; Peng, 2003). In the following, we discuss entry choices and local 
embeddedness of foreign firms in China respectively, attempting to sort out the 
major underlying considerations and their dynamic features in order to understand 
the behaviour of foreign firms in China.  
 
 
2.4 Investing by Strategic Entry Choices 
 
2.4.1 Perspectives from International Business and Management  
 
One promising starting point for explaining why China has been chosen by foreign 
companies or MNCs is Dunning’s widely accepted “eclectic approach” (1977, 1988, 
2003). At the core of the eclectic approach lies the question why foreign companies 
establish subsidiaries instead of exporting their products. Internalizing production 
refers to the decision to invest in subsidiaries and is assumed to depend on two 
further considerations. The first consideration is location advantage, which 
according to this approach is not limited to different resource endowments or labour 
costs, but also accounts for transaction costs in cross-border trade, which can be 
circumvented when production is localized. The second consideration is ownership 
advantage when companies that need to keep control over their firm-specific assets, 
such as intellectual property rights, brand names, or research and development will 
forego contracts with Chinese partners but insist on subsidiaries.  
In other words, the approach suggests that firms will sooner establish subsidiaries 
the higher the value they attach to their firms-specific assets; that firms will sooner 
establish subsidiaries when the locational advantages offered by a host country are 
higher; and that firms will sooner establish subsidiaries when transaction costs in 
conventional foreign trade are higher. In the case of China, as described earlier, the 
decision where to locate needs to take into account the costs and benefits of various 
locations within the Chinese economy. Therefore, firms will establish subsidiaries in 
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that part of China which offers the best comparative advantage with respect to 
location. Risk diversification arguments, while not part of the original Dunning 
model, are useful in this case. They suggest that investors or MNCs benefit from 
locational diversification when doing so offers scale and scope economies, more 
flexibility, and learning opportunities (e.g. Hall and Lee, 1999; Rugman, 1979). 
Thus, it can be assumed that firms will diversify risks by investing in different 
locations selected according to their respective advantages.  
What is, however, not explicitly addressed by the Dunning model is the question 
of how exactly production in China (or any other place) gets organised. Entry mode 
studies offer further insights by drawing attention to different forms of ownership 
and collaboration with local partners. These studies show that the three dominant 
foreign ownership modes, i.e. contractual joint venture (CJV), equity joint venture 
(EJV) and wholly foreign owned subsidiary (WFOE) can be explained by three 
considerations: transaction costs, exploitation/exploration capability and institutional 
constraints.  
Transaction cost considerations will cause foreign investors to seek more shares 
and control when confronted with asset specificity and/or opportunism; and 
conversely, to seek less when facing uncertainty such as political or economic risks 
(e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Hennart, 1988; 
Meyer, 2001). Exploitation/exploration capability considerations will cause foreign 
investors to opt for an EJV when they expect additional returns from broadening 
their resources and knowledge base (exploration) via a Chinese partner’s 
distributional networks or local knowledge (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Madhok, 
1997). On the other hand, firms will insist on a WFOE when they expect higher 
returns from exploiting their firm-specific resources and capabilities (e.g. Agarwal 
and Ramaswami, 1992; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Luo, 2001a). Institutional 
considerations remind firms that often enough the envisaged ownership form 
depends not only on (Chinese) regulations, but also on perceived political risk (e.g. 
Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Xu et al., 2004; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
In what follows it is assumed that both streams of literature, the eclectic approach 
and entry mode studies, together provide a fruitful guideline for investigating the 
behaviour of foreign firms in China.  
 
2.4.2 Choosing the Right Location in China 
 
We next look for the reasons behind locational choice within China. The statistics 
shows that foreign firms unevenly spread within the country. As can be seen from 
Table 2.2, when listed according to province the ten most favoured locations are all 
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to be found in the Eastern region3. The Eastern region hosted 82.43 per cent of the 
total foreign firms that had been established by the end of 2004. This has to be seen 
in contrast to the twelve provinces called the Western region, seven of which are 
found at the end of the list. The Western region altogether hosted 6.53 per cent of 
the total foreign firms up to 2004. That leaves the eight provinces that are called the 
Central region hosting 11.04 per cent of the total foreign firms up to 2004 (China 
Ministry of Commerce, 2005). This pattern has not changed much since the 1980s 
(OECD, 2002).     
Empirical studies analyzing the reasons for patterns of locational choice in China 
point to factors such as openness for trade, different economic growth rates, 
manpower, infrastructure and preferential investment policies at the sub-national 
level (e.g. Broadman and Sun, 1997; Chadee et al., 2003; Gao, 2005; Wei et al., 
1999; Zhou et al., 2002). However, these patterns also reflect the investment climate, 
which is often generated locally (e.g. Dollar et al., 2003; Demurger, 2001; Li et al., 
2000).  
Thus, for example,  many consulting reports and empirical studies attribute the 
high concentration of FDI in the Eastern region, i.e. the Pearl Delta and Yangtze 
areas, to the general investment climate, based on higher GDP per capita, higher 
concentrations of modern small and medium enterprises, higher educational levels, 
advanced transportation infrastructure, good shipping connections, and proximity to 
major international ports such as Shanghai and Hong Kong (e.g. Chadee et al., 2003; 
KPMG, 2003, 2005; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; Wei et al., 1999).  
A closer look, however, points to another determinant, namely the institutional 
advantage offered by special economic zones (SEZs), “open” coastal cities and 
development zones. Since the early eighties, China has opened certain jurisdictions 
to foreign investors (such as SEZs, open coastal cities and open coastal regions), 
mostly found in the Eastern region. These jurisdictions are often endowed with 
better infrastructure, less state intervention and better developed legal systems. 
Empirical studies confirm that foreign firms positively respond to these institutional 
advantages by deliberately locating their investment in these locations (e.g. Li and 
Park, 2006; Ng and Tuan, 2002; Zhou et al., 2002).  
In a second step, sub-national administrative levels were allowed to establish 
their own development zones. This did not lead to a wider geographical spread 
however, instead the new development zones closely followed the locational choices 
of FDI (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2   Geographic distribution of foreign firms by province (up to 2004) 
Rank Province (Region) 
Proportion of foreign 
firms  in total 
Number of development 
zones4
1 Guangdong (E) 21.95% 31 
2 Jiangsu (E) 12.64% 30 
3 Shandong (E) 9.29% 29 
4 Shanghai (E) 7.14% 22 
5 Fujian (E) 7.04% 17 
6 Zhejiang (E) 6.35% 22 
7 Liaoning (E) 5.84% 15 
8 Beijing (E) 4.27% 5 
9 Tianjin (E) 3.37% 6 
10 Hebei (E) 2.32% 10 
11 Hubei (C ) 1.98% 10 
12 Hainan (E) 1.89% 4 
13 Guangxi (W) 1.62% 7 
14 Jiangxi (C ) 1.54% 6 
15 Hunan (C ) 1.50% 5 
16 Henan (C ) 1.50% 5 
17 Jilin (C ) 1.43% 9 
18 Heilongjiang (C ) 1.41% 5 
19 Sichuan (W) 1.34% 15 
20 Anhui (C ) 1.21% 8 
21 Shaanxi (W) 0.81% 6 
22 Chongqing (W) 0.72% 4 
23 Yunnan (W) 0.51% 6 
24 Shanxi (C ) 0.48% 5 
25 Inner Mongolia (W) 0.39% 4 
26 Guizhou (W) 0.33% 9 
27 Gansu (W) 0.32% 4 
28 Xinjiang (W) 0.25% 5 
29 Ningxia (W) 0.14% 1 
30 Qinghai (W) 0.08% 1 
31 Xizang (W) 0.02% 1 
 
Notes:  E in the bracket indicates that the province is found in the Eastern region; C in the bracket 
indicates that the province is found in the central region; and W in the bracket indicates that 
the province is found in the Western region in China.  
 
Source:  China Ministry of Commerce, 2005; China Association of Development Zones, 2005. 
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Within these jurisdictions, industrial sites are parcelled out, roads and public 
utilities are provided. Most crucial however is the fact that foreign firms in the 
special zones enjoy tax privileges. Thus, for example, (manufacturing) firms pay 
only half of the usual rate of 30 per cent; but only after the first two profit-making 
years, during which they are tax exempted and after another three years during 
which they pay only 50 per cent of the preferential rate (15 instead of 30 per cent). 
Technologically advanced firms and export-oriented firms can expect even further 
tax reductions after these five years. Harder to assess is the effect of regulation and 
state intervention in these zones. As empirical studies have shown, the zones have 
enough leeway to design their own “industrial policy”, often enough in consultation 
with the foreign companies already operating in the zone. As a consequence the 
special zones together offer a comparative advantage when compared with the “rest 
of the country”. As different special zones offer different sets of rules and 
regulations foreign firms will decide on location not only according to (short term) 
cost advantages, or infrastructure, but also according to the best “fitting” regulatory 
regime.  
To sum up, investment patterns point to the influence institutional factors have on 
the investment decision of foreign firms, which diversify their total investment 
across different localities. That this is a response to regulatory arbitrage is one 
reason. Another reason is that by doing so “confiscation risk” and the risks 
associated with weak contractual enforcement (e.g. Clissord, 2004; OECD, 2005; 
Stuttard, 2000) can be reduced. These considerations explain the following feature 
of foreign investment in China: An overview of the global 500 MNCs shows that 
most of those who are present in China have invested in two or more locations, with 
Mitsubishi as the extreme having established 131 subsidiaries in 31 locations (Wang, 
2004). A detailed case study of Coca-Cola (Mok et al., 2002) finds that Coca-Cola, 
facing regulation and contractual risks in different locations, had set up bottling 
plants in 21 locations to diversify the risk and exploit the regulatory arbitrage.  
 
2.4.3 Ownership Choice 
 
So far it has been shown that firms reduce their investment risk or improve their 
expected returns by carefully selecting location or spreading total investment across 
different locations. The next question is to which extent firms attempt to mitigate 
risk or ensure best use of their capabilities by choosing an appropriate ownership 
mode. 
That there has been a striking change in the relationship between foreign firms 
and domestic economic actors is underlined by the fact that by 1982, 86 per cent of 
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foreign investors had set up a contractual arrangement or contractual joint venture 
(CJV) with Chinese companies, yet this dropped to only 3 per cent by 2004 (see 
figure 2.3). Since then most foreign firms opt for equity joint ventures (EJV), or 
wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE). The percentage of EJVs in the total 
foreign firms reached its peak (72.5 per cent) in 1992 and dropped to 26.5 per cent 
in 2004. While up to 1982 only 3.6 per cent of foreign investors established WFOEs, 
the percentage jumped to 70 per cent in 2004, when a change in law (1986) allowed 
the establishment of completely foreign affiliates. The question is therefore, why do 
foreign companies prefer to establish subsidiaries instead of opting for joint ventures 
with Chinese partners who could be expected to provide valuable (market) 
information and business related knowledge.  
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Source:  China Ministry of Commerce, 2004, 2005. 
 
Figure 2.3  Ownership choices of foreign firms in China by year 
 
On a more general level, what considerations determine the ownership choices of 
foreign firms in China? Once more, transaction cost, capabilities and institutional 
considerations play a role. Empirical studies reveal that both asset specificity (plus 
risk), firm-specific capabilities and government regulations have been crucial for 
foreign firms to choosing between contractual arrangement and EJV (e.g. Pan and 
Tse, 2000; Tse et al., 1997) as well as between EJV and WFOE (e.g. Guillén, 2003; 
Luo, 2001a; Pan, 1996). When firms possess specific assets such as R&D, 
proprietary product information and marketing expertise, an EJV is preferred to 
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contractual arrangement, and a WFOE to an EJV. When foreign investors seek local 
knowledge or capabilities (such as distribution networks and local technologies), 
they prefer EJV over WFOE. Once again, government regulations interfere with 
economic considerations. Not only does the perceived risk and opportunism of 
domestic partners matter, but also the degree of liberalization for choosing the best 
organizational form.  
The further question is whether all three considerations determine the decision 
equally. An analysis of the dynamics of interaction with government regulation and 
agencies provides further insights. Empirical studies point out that ownership 
choices are based on rational calculations, institutional constraints in a host country, 
and its localities. Under strict, but weakly enforced government regulations, foreign 
firms are less able to implement their rational choices but need to compromise 
instead (e.g. Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Thus, for example, in the 
early 1980s, foreign firms continued to opt for CJVs although the EJV Law had 
already been promulgated in 1979. The ambiguity of the new law made contractual 
arrangements more attractive as these offered more flexibility in changing the terms 
of the business relation with the Chinese partner. The amendments to the EJV Law 
in 1983 which clarified specific rules and signalled the seriousness of the policy 
changed the picture: an increasing number of foreign firms opted for EJVs, as this 
organisational form offered more effective ways to protect their China investment 
and promised a higher co-operation rent. After the WFOE Law was promulgated in 
1986, the institutional environment changed again allowing investment that left 
firms “exclusively” in the hands of foreigner. The shift to WFOE promised better 
control over the operation of a company and its assets to foreign investors, in 
particular patents and product-specific know-how. For example, Johnson & Johnson, 
although running some successful pharmaceutical EJVs, shifted to WFOEs in 1992 
claiming better monitoring capabilities and less government restrictions 
(Vanhonacker, 1997). Gradual movement in response to institutional changes 
reveals that foreign firms’ ownership choices are responsive to the institutional 
situation, selecting that alternative which promises the best protection of their 
investment and more freedom for their operational strategies.  
In addition, the decentralised structure of the Chinese economy and the 
differences between economic zones allowed some foreign firms to be proactive in 
their choice. Thus, a total of 120 WFOEs had been established in several locations 
before the WFOE Law was enforced in 1986 (Fu, 2000). The reason given was that 
only by granting investors the right to establish a WFOE would they introduce their 
advanced technologies; as was the case with 3M in Shanghai, for example (Brown, 
1986).  
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As the example shows, the protection of property rights, especially of intellectual 
property rights, remains one of the major concerns of foreign investors (Pearson, 
1991; Roehrig, 1994). The Chinese government’s response was the promulgation of 
a set of laws, such as the Trademark Law, Patent Law, Contract Law and Copyright 
Law. In addition, China has subscribed to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works and the Universal Copyright Convention. 
Nevertheless the general feature of weak protection of property rights and weak 
enforcement of contracts cannot be argued away (e.g. Krug, 2004; Michael and 
Rivette, 2004). This explains why foreign firms prefer WFOEs, though they forego 
the comparative advantage of having a Chinese partner in particular in industries 
where intellectual property rights are at stake (Michael and Rivette, 2004).  
On the other hand, foreign firms prefer EJVs when they use standardised 
technology, and when they depend on local complementary resources including 
local networks. One such an example is Phillips’ EJV with Neusoft, one of China’s 
leading software companies, to jointly develop medical information systems. 
Another example is 3COM’s EJV with Huawei to utilize Huawei’s advantages in 
data communications. 
All in all, foreign firms are involved in an interactive process where they respond 
to changes in Chinese law, while trying to negotiate further changes. It is this 
interaction which once more points to the significance of locational choice. On one 
side “endowments” such as good infrastructure, a cheap labour force or a transparent 
regulatory regime are linked to different locations, thus offering incentives for 
foreign firms to search for the best fitting place. On the other hand, as was shown 
above, these features are not stable but change over time due to market development 
and policy change. Moreover, foreign firms do not need to remain “institution 
takers” (to use the analogy with “price taking” firms). Instead they can actively 
search for ways to directly (via negotiation) or indirectly (via “exit” and investment 
of new firms in other locations) influence further institutional change. As will be 
seen in what follows this situation is not China-unique but reflects strategic choice 
by foreign firms.   
 
 
2.5 Foreign Investment and Local Embeddedness 
 
The institutional business context of firms has long been recognized as crucial to 
firm’s performance (Galbraith, 1973) and gained new prominence with globalisation 
and the emergence of transition economies (Child and Tse, 2001; Henisz, 2000; 
Peng, 2003). Thus, it is argued that the more “foreign” a potential host country the 
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more important it is for a foreign firm to gain legitimacy (e.g. Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999; Xu and Shenkar, 2002) particularly in China’s case (Khanna et al., 2005). One 
way to do so is to closely cooperate with local business communities and local 
governments, by jointly searching for an organizational ‘fit’ with the overall, i.e. 
national institutional environment. The ‘fitting’ strategy helps foreign firms to gain 
access to and better understand local business routines and government regulations. 
By doing so, foreign firms build up resources and abilities to better cope with 
institutional idiosyncrasies, which in turn increases the value of their business 
relations in China (Frynas et al., 2006; Henisz, 2003).  
In short, local embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) becomes a business strategy 
which offers high returns in particular in a country such as China where the business 
context differs widely across the country. In what follows we describe the specific 
feature of the heterogeneous business context and provide evidence that foreign 
firms do indeed take the advantage of local embeddedness into account when they 
invest and when they operate in China.  
 
2.5.1 Local Governments and Transaction Costs 
 
To understand the local embeddedness feature of foreign firms in China, it is 
important to understand the decentralized character of the Chinese government 
which facilitated the emergence of different business environments.  
Previous studies, especially in international business and management, do not 
acknowledge the wide ranging effects of the reforms in the 1980s which led to 
decentralization. Decentralization in China does not refer to the legislative or 
regulatory power of provinces. Instead it refers to shifting resources (such as land) 
and regulatory power to the local (i.e. sub-provincial) administrative level (e.g. EIU, 
2003; Lau et al., 2000; Nee, 1992; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Walder, 1995). While, 
on the one hand, local governments are expected to implement and/or interpret 
central policy, on the other hand, they enjoy considerable leeway to design their own 
policies. The local sources of income whether alimented by tax revenues, profit from 
still not yet fully privatised companies, or land deals, severely limits the central 
government’s ability to control the localities via a budget constraint. In short, the 
Chinese economy is characterised by a weak central state, with local government 
agencies as the primary economic actor for economic development. This form of 
local autonomy explains why foreign firms have a variety of commercial 
experiences depending on the locality they operate in, or more precisely, the local 
government they are confronted with. Local governments are the key actors, the 
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main institutions foreign firms have to reckon with when they intend to build up 
local knowledge. 
Lacking local knowledge or local protection generates transaction costs for firms 
(e.g. Wei, 1996; Zhao and Zhu, 2000, Clissord, 2004). The transaction costs refer to 
those institutional obstacles to doing business in China, such as economic and policy 
uncertainty, arbitrary interpretation of policies, weak enforcement of regulations and 
corruption etc, as the enterprise survey of World Bank shows (see table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3  Perception of foreign firms on obstacles to do business in China 
(percentage of firms indicating indicator as an obstacle to business) 
Indicator China Russia Indonesia Philippines 
Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty 
(%) 31.54 32.85 48.25 28.35 
Macroeconomic instability (%) 28.06 28.74 50.07 39.66 
Business licensing and permits (%) 18.81 14.53 20.48 12.45 
Consistency of officials’ interpretations of 
regulations 68.43 25.18 44.04 49.90 
Senior management time spent dealing with 
requirements of regulations (%) 20.24 10.04 5.47 8.24 
Unofficial payments for firms to get things 
done (% of sales) 1.99 1.50 1.76 1.73 
Gifts requested by government officials 100.00 .. 5.61 0.00 
Time firms spent in meetings with tax officials 
(days) 14.55 .. 1.97 3.75 
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with 
tax inspectors (%) 45.93 53.62 11.22 28.15 
Value of gift expected to secure government 
contract (% of contract) 2.31 1.62 0.75 1.92 
Confidence in the judiciary system (%) 82.87 34.89 59.19 64.80 
 
Source:  World Bank, 2005. 
 
Yet, these transaction costs can be lowered by actively searching for ways which 
turn local governments into co-operating economic actors (Krug and Hendrischke, 
2005; Segal and Thun, 2001). As the example of the TVEs and other private 
companies in China shows, a formal or informal co-operation with local government 
agencies offers an effective way for not only lowering transaction costs, but also for 
getting access to more business opportunities (Che and Qian, 1998; Li, 1996; Wong 
et al., 2004).  
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2.5.2 Alliances and Networks as Governance  
 
As discussed above, it is assumed that foreign firms will invest into relation building 
at the local level in China. Indeed, empirical studies on foreign firms’ success in 
China emphasize cooperation with local institutions and the ability to manage 
cultural distance or understand local knowledge, while pointing also to traditional 
firm-specific advantages such as quality input of technology, management skills, 
control rights over operation, and support from parent corporations (e.g. Child and 
Yan, 2003; Isobe et al., 2000; Luo, 2002c; Luo and Park, 2004; Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Shenkar, 1990; Yan and Gray, 2001). Such cooperation with local institutions allows 
the firm to be embedded into the local institutional environment. 
Cooperation provides advantages such as reducing the complexity of the 
institutional environment, characterized by ambiguous property rights, incomplete 
transmission of information, uncertainty, inconsistent government policies (e.g. 
Boisot and Child, 1999; Krug and Pólos, 2004; Shenkar, 1990). At the local level 
additional factors, such as regulatory and policy inconsistency (in interpretation), 
corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, capital controls, local protectionist policies 
(entry and exit barriers), and cultural adaptation (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; 
International Finance Corporation, 2005), add to the amount of problems firms need 
to learn to cope with. Investing in good relations with local governments is as 
necessary a strategy as investing in business networking for reducing transaction 
costs and acquiring market (and political) information in China (e.g. Lau et al., 2000; 
Luo, 1997; Peng, 2003; Qian, 2002). 
First, foreign firms deliberately embark on an alliance or coalition with local 
governments to safeguard their operation. Local governments in China are actively 
involved in shaping the local institutional environment and the business activities 
that take place in this environment (Nee, 1992; Oi, 1995; Walder, 1995). In the 
interaction with foreign firms, local governments play a double role. On the one 
hand, local governments collaborate with foreign firms in bargaining with the 
central government to change regulations (locational competition effects); and on 
the other hand, local governments implement and reinforce national and local 
policies and regulations that affect foreign firms. Therefore, cooperation (or alliance) 
with local governments becomes the best choice, providing foreign firms with both 
the political leverage and strategic resources to their operation (e.g. Krug and 
Hendrischke, 2005; Peng, 2000; Yeung, 2000). In an information poor environment 
like China, it provides advantages in both information costs and transaction costs. 
Peng (2000a) notes that Beijing Jeep, Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou 
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Peugeot all benefited from the coalition with local authorities which helped them to 
bargain with the central government to get preferential treatments. 
In practice, secondly, foreign investors do not have to directly interact with local 
authorities, but can rely on partners who have knowledge of local culture, language 
and institutions (e.g. Henisz, 2000). A cross-sectional analysis demonstrates the 
significance of choosing the right local business partners (Luo, 1997). The right 
local partners can help foreign firms to boost market expansion, obtain insightful 
information, mitigate operational risks and obtain context-specific knowledge. In 
this sense, overseas Chinese enjoy an advantage over western investors, who know 
better and learn quicker about the local context or doing business in China. In 
addition, overseas Chinese have also an advantage over local agents who lack 
international experience. Therefore, besides local partners, Hong Kong firms are 
often sought by western investors for partnerships (e.g. Pan and Tse, 1996). These 
studies show that such cooperation provides leverage in an uncertain environment 
and hence has a positive effect on firm performance. 
Developing a formal business alliance certainly is not the whole story. In the 
context of China, business is often done through interpersonal networks (guanxi in 
Chinese)5. Guanxi networks are regarded as an information and resource pool (Park 
and Luo, 2001; Tsang, 1998). In an environment where formal economic institutions 
are ill-functioning, guanxi networks, as informal institutions, are often decisive for 
foreign investors in capturing local knowledge, enforcing business deals and 
increasing the efficiency of private exchanges (e.g. Krug and Hendrischke, 2005). 
Local partners (or personnel), including overseas Chinese partners, often act as 
agents of foreign investors to access local guanxi networks which are cultivated 
through a trust-building process (e.g. Yang, 1994). This aspect of guanxi building 
demonstrates that successful foreign firms are often locally embedded while 
capturing social capital. One revealing fact is that foreign firms gradually tend to 
hire local managers to replace expatriates in management. Partly this is due to low 
costs and improved quality of local managers, but more importantly, it is due to the 
advantage of local managers in local knowledge and local (business) networks (e.g. 
Kamis, 1996). Yeung and Li (2000) confirm that, in Shanghai, the managerial 
structure has been highly localized, as most of the foreign firms have locally 
nominated chairmen and vice-general managers and more than half of the 
managerial staffs are local. Even in the more conservative Japanese subsidiaries a 
high degree of control has been ceded to local managers (Taylor, 1999). 
To conclude, foreign firms in China adopt both formal alliances and informal 
guanxi networks (e.g. Peng and Luo, 2000). These interrelated mechanisms facilitate 
foreign firms to obtain access to local authorities, gain tacit information on policies, 
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explain their policy concerns and negotiate on regulations, mitigate official 
arbitration, and avoid government intervention (e.g. Child, 1994; Luo and Park, 
2001; Peng and Luo, 2000; Shenkar, 1990). In other words, local embeddedness 
helps a firm to get an understanding of, and subsequently leverage of, the local 
institutional environment in order to mitigate transaction costs. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter describes the strategic choices of foreign firms on entry and in operation, 
by which to provide an interpretation of the success of foreign firms and FDI 
performance in China. The description reveals that institutional factors play a 
significant role in the choices of foreign firms, which require “fit” and adaptability. 
In a dynamic view, these choices change over time in response to institutional 
changes (for an overview, see appendix).  
First, location choices reflect institutional differences across the country. Foreign 
MNCs deliberately choose coastal regions to establish subsidiaries, where the 
overall investment climate is better than other regions. It is highly consistent with 
theoretical prediction and other similar observations of international investment (e.g. 
Dunning, 1986; Henisz, 2000; OECD, 2002). With the expansion of open regions 
into the inland area, more foreign firms gradually invest or re-invest in the central or 
western regions of China to exploit the low-cost production factors (labour, land and 
resources), but the institutional momentum is not strong enough to alter the 
geographical imbalances of uneven distribution. In addition, the first-mover 
institutional advantage of the eastern region can not be played away by overall 
openness.  
Second, ownership choices demonstrate dynamism over time, with preferences 
changing in response to the process of institutional liberalization. While the 
contractual arrangement was mostly opted by subsidiaries in the early 1980s, 
WFOEs have become the preferred option since ownership restrictions were lifted 
and the protection of property rights has become more assured. In the current 
landscape, EJVs and CJVs still exist along with WFOEs. In other words, ownership 
choice was highly constrained by the regulation, but now mainly reflects foreign 
MNCs’ consideration regarding capability/market exploitation and exploration.  
Third, local embeddedness has always been crucial to the success of an operation, 
which helps them to deal with the complexity and uncertainty of the local 
institutional environment in China. Foreign firms learnt to form alliances with local 
governments and build up guanxi networks (through local managers or other 
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personnel) at the local level. It makes them closely linked to local institutions, the 
advantage of which is economizing on transaction costs and information costs 
involved (Wei, 1995; Zhao, 2003). The choice of blending formal alliance with 
informal guanxi networks has been widely acknowledged by foreign firms in China, 
which provides them with the capability to manage institutional deficits in the 
context.  
 As was shown, the behaviour of foreign firms is a response to institutional 
conditions and changes in China. To better absorb the above findings, it is 
worthwhile reviewing the process of institutional liberalization and its effects on 
firms, as shown in the Appendix. The process takes place in both time and spatial 
dimensions. Over time, the changes liberalize foreign firms’ ownership choices in 
China and access to locations (from SEZs to open coastal cities then to inland cities), 
reduce tariffs, and provide improving legal supports for contractual issues and 
protection of (intellectual) property rights. It has been an interactive process through 
which Chinese governments also learn, by monitoring the behaviour of foreign 
investors, to improve the legal systems and clarify policy ambiguity (e.g. Pearson, 
1991).  
 By interacting, foreign firms learn to understand the context and develop “fit” 
strategies for success. This chapter shows that, perhaps the most striking feature of 
the experience of foreign firms in China is that an entry strategy is much less 
important than was assumed 20 years ago. Once operation started, whether the entry 
mode was contract or joint venture, no concern was more pressing than the question 
of negotiating the local business environment. In this sense, localizing seems to be 
the most promising strategy. It is worth stressing that unlike 25 years ago, when 
foreign firms negotiated with representatives of the ministries in Beijing, 
localization today refers not only to attempts to cope with the “Chineseness” of the 
environment, but also the attempt at virtually “going local”. Firms meet 
representatives of local governments which also are the major agents for 
establishing and running SEZs or any other lower-level jurisdiction. To invest in the 
accumulation of local “knowledge” promises high returns in particular in the cases 
where local governments invite the business community in the jurisdiction to 
participate in the operation of the zone. By doing so foreign firms can influence the 
tax and regulatory framework to the effect that the environment looks more familiar 
and allows more familiar business practices. The high concentration of foreign firms 
in specific places points in the same direction: proximity between foreign firms 
allows knowledge-sharing and joint “lobbying” for favourable local policies.  
 All in all, the behaviour of foreign firms seems to confirm the following: firms 
react more strongly to transaction costs generated in the external environment than 
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to contract-specific transaction costs that characterise their interaction with other 
foreign or Chinese firms. Localization proves to be the most suitable choice for their 
success (see chapter 4 and 5).  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The amount indicated to 1991-1996 is the average annual FDI inflows in this 
period.  
2. This amount is the sum of the period 1980-1982. 
3.Three regions are separated in China. The eastern region includes: Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and 
Hainan. The central region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The western region includes Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang and Xizang.  
4. The data are as of September 2005 when the website was searched. The number is 
counted for development zones at the provincial level and above. 
5. Though some studies show that larger firms with greater level of 
internationalization are more likely to have capabilities to leverage on the 
uncertain environment (e.g. Gaba et al., 2002), the preponderance of overseas 
Chinese firms proves that guanxi networks do play a greater role in China in 
reducing information costs and transaction costs, which facilitate the entry and 
operation of smaller firms but with higher level of local knowledge (e.g. Gao, 
2003; Li et al., 2001; Wang and Ellis, 2002). In addition, the diversity in local 
cultures implies that guanxi networking is eminent and crucial in business (e.g. 
Tse et al., 1997).  
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Appendix  
 
Institutional Changes in the FDI Regime in China1  
Phases Year Law Year Spatial ‘Opening’ 
1979–1985:  
Permitting 
FDI 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
 
1983 
 
1984 
1985 
EJV Law 
Income Tax Law of EJVs  
Economic Contract Law 
Trademark Law; Income Tax Law 
of Foreign Enterprises  
Exchange control for foreign 
enterprises 
Patent Law 
Accounting Law; Imports and 
Export Duties 
1980
1984
 
1985
 
 
4 SEZs. 
14 coastal cities; 
Hainan Island 
Yangtze River Delta;  
Pearl River Delta; 
‘Golden Triangle’ 
1986–1991: 
Selective 
incentives 
for FDI 
1986 
 
1987 
1988 
 
1989 
1991 
WFOE Law; HR liberalisation; 
Bankruptcy Law; 
Tariff reduction 
CJV Law; Procedural rules for 
arbitration 
Administrative Litigation Law 
Integrated Income Tax Law;  
Copyright Law 
1988
1990
Liaodong, Shandong . 
Pudong . 
 
 
1992–1996:  
FDI 
liberalisation
1994 
 
 
1996 
Arbitration Rules; Consumer 
Protection Law; Labour Law; 
Foreign Trade Law 
Litigation law 
1992 21 cities (including border 
cities and most provincial 
capitals) 
 
From 1992, special economic 
zones could be established by 
local jurisdictions (called 
‘development zones’)  
1997–on: 
Routinisation 
of FDI 
1999 
 
2000 
2003 
Individual Wholly Invested 
Enterprises Law 
Liberalisation of Labour Market 
Mergers and Acquisitions by 
foreign investors; Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
1997 Inland regions  
 
 
Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2005; Huang, 2001; Van Den Bulcke et al., 2003:23–24. 
 
 
1. What open cities or regions and SEZs have in common is a more positive attitude toward 
domestic and foreign entrepreneurship. The difference is that SEZs’ explicit purpose is to 
attract FDI and firms.
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3 Dynamics of Isomorphism:  
An Empirical Study of Ownership Choice 
of Foreign Firms in China 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines organizational changes in a dynamic institutional 
environment by looking into foreign direct investments (FDI) in China. China’s 
economic reform and open door policy has led to the emergence of new firms. In 
particular, foreign firms allow involvement of foreigners in ownership. Foreign 
ownership means that foreign firms can choose one from three distinct ownership 
forms, i.e. a contractual joint venture (CJV), an equity joint venture (EJV) and a 
wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) (Li et al., 2007; Wang, 2006). Foreign 
ownership choice converged to CJVs (homogeneity) in 1982. The relative 
composition of three forms in the population changed over time however. The most 
important changes include decreasing significance of CJVs, increasing significance 
of WFOEs, and a reversed “V” shape of the importance of EJVs. As a consequence, 
the ownership choice made by foreign firms demonstrates more heterogeneity in 
2005 than in 1982. This provokes the question as to what determines the shift of 
ownership choice of foreign firms in China from homogeneity towards 
heterogeneity.  
 Ownership choice of foreign firms has been widely investigated in international 
business studies from a strategic perspective. Theoretical approaches used include 
transaction cost theory (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1988) and the 
learning perspective (e.g. Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
These approaches emphasize that ownership form is deliberately selected by firms to 
enhance efficiency and competitiveness. Recently, institutional theory has been 
introduced to explain the ownership choice of foreign firms in host countries (e.g. 
Lu, 2002; Yiu and Makino, 2002). This theory posits that ownership choice is a 
response of foreign firms to isomorphic pressures from the institutional environment 
in order to gain legitimacy. Previous studies show that contextual factors from 
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institutional environments play a significant role in ownership choice (Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). We therefore argue that combining 
strategic and institutional perspectives provides a better understanding of the 
ownership choice of foreign firms in host countries.  
 Although some studies have considered both strategic factors and institutional 
factors (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999; Lu, 2002; Luo, 2001a; Yiu and Makino, 
2002), they have focused on analyzing entry choice at an individual level, rather 
than at the population level. These studies have demonstrated the effect of various 
factors on the ownership choice of an individual foreign firm, but they fall short in 
explaining the dynamics of ownership choice in a population over time. 
Nevertheless, we take institutional theory (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977) as a starting point. Institutional factors matter to foreign firms 
much more in transition economies than in developed economies (e.g. Makino et al., 
2004; Vanhonacker, 1997). While institutional constraints represent external forces 
influencing organizational choices, the strategic perspective provides additional 
logic of internal managerial discretion. Both strategic and institutional perspectives 
suggest that dynamics of isomorphism can be expected from organizations that face 
with institutional changes in the environment. Yet, this kind of dynamic 
phenomenon has remained under-explored in institutional theory with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Haveman and Rao, 1997; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996).  
 We contribute to this research gap in both institutional theory and international 
business by investigating the longitudinal development of an organizational 
population – foreign firms in China. The FDI sector in China provides us with a 
particularly relevant setting where foreign firms choose an ownership form for 
certain strategic goals but their choices are substantially constrained by institutional 
pressures that are changing over time (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Vanhonacker, 1997). The 
unit of analysis is at a population level, examining the homogeneity development of 
foreign firms in China in response to institutional changes. To do so, we rely on a 
panel data of foreign firms in China from 1979 through 2003. From an empirical 
perspective, homogeneity is always a matter of degree. Observing the high degree of 
homogeneity of foreign firms in the beginning of Reform China, we expect to find 
that both institutional liberalizations and strategic considerations by foreign firms 
determine decreasing homogeneity over time. In the study, we assume that both 
strategic and institutional logics work independently. In the empirical models, we 
examine effects of institutional factors and strategic factors separately first, and then 
examine how each set of variables add incremental explanatory power to the 
dynamics of isomorphism. This study enriches our understanding of institutional 
theory, deinstitutionalization and ownership choice of the foreign firm population.  
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 The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces theories 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines the data collection and analysis 
methods. This is followed by a description of empirical results (Section 3.4). In 
Section 3.5, we discuss the results, theoretical and empirical implications and 
limitations that can be addressed in future research.    
 
 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Background 
 
This study was designed to analyze the dynamics of ownership choice of foreign 
firms in China by combining institutional theory and the strategy perspective. 
Ownership forms for entering and investing in China represent different degrees of 
local acceptance, equity control and opportunities of learning local knowledge. 
WFOEs have a lower degree of local acceptance than EJVs and CJVs since they 
“reject” ownership involvement by local partners (e.g. Pearson, 1991). In contrast, 
WFOEs provide foreign investors with full equity control. EJVs provide only partial 
control ensured by equity shares of foreign investors (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; 
Lu, 2002; Luo, 2001a). In CJVs, the control claim must be negotiated (Wang, 2006). 
In addition, WFOEs offer little learning opportunities regarding local knowledge, 
while EJVs and CJVs provide more opportunities for learning in that foreign 
investors possess substantial cognitive distance with local partners (e.g. Gomes-
Casseres, 1990; Harrigan, 1988; Nooteboom, 2004). Therefore, the three ownership 
forms embody varied institutional pressures and distinct strategic considerations.  
 The central premise of institutional theory is that organizations adopt forms that 
are similar to those of other organizations in order to gain legitimacy (Deephouse, 
1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Three kinds of isomorphic pressures have been 
identified as driving forces to isomorphism and homogeneity, including regulative, 
normative and cognitive institutions (e.g. Scott, 2001). While regulative and 
normative institutions refer to external constraints, cognitive institutions refer to 
internal beliefs of organizations. The underlying assumption of institutional theory is 
that institutions and therefore institutional pressures remain unchanged. However, 
Oliver (1992) argues that institutions “may be much more fragile and less evitable 
than institutional theory suggests”. In addition, entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Garud et al., 2002; Dorado, 2005) may seek new ways of organizing instead of 
conforming to established institutions under the conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, 
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Powell (1991) argues that changes in organizational pattern often occur “when legal 
or other rule-maintaining boundaries are relaxed”. 
 Previous studies are particularly focused on domestic organizations (e.g. Dacin, 
1997; Orrú et al., 1991; Singh et al., 1986). Recent studies on cross-border 
organizations with a particular focus on foreign firms show that foreign investors 
face a different institutional setting in the host country which gives rise to 
isomorphic pressures regarding their organizational choice (e.g. Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Lu, 2002; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002). Studies on institutional liberalization and deregulation show that, as 
a result, isomorphic pressures may be released and foreign firms tend to consider the 
efficiency criterion as more important than legitimacy criterion in their ownership 
choice over time (e.g. Contractor, 1990; Vanhonacker, 1997). This is particularly the 
case in China, where legal constraints on foreign ownership have been relaxed (e.g. 
Fu, 2000; OECD, 2005). When institutional changes occur, organizations often seek 
new forms to achieve competitiveness, leading to dynamics of organizational pattern 
(e.g. Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Haveman and Rao, 1997). Therefore, we expect that 
the degree of homogeneity of foreign firms in China was high in the early years of 
the Reform and that it has been decreasing over time as a response to institutional 
liberalizations.  
 The strategic perspective, on the other hand, posits that ownership choice is 
based on an efficiency criterion, which reflects the strategic goals of the organization. 
Previous studies have highlighted two different strategies, control and learning, 
determining ownership choice of foreign firms in host countries. A control strategy 
is generally based upon transaction cost theory (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart, 
1988). It argues that foreign investors may perceive a high degree of contractual 
uncertainty in host countries, in which case they prefer to have full control over the 
operation (WFOE). A learning perspective, on the other hand, suggests that foreign 
firms prefer to choose joint ventures when they aim at learning local knowledge, but 
prefer to choose WFOE when they have already mastered local knowledge (e.g. 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart, 1991; Kogut and Singh, 1988). It can be 
argued that at the early stage of entry, foreign firms prefer to establish joint ventures 
in which they rely on local partners to learn local knowledge; once they have 
accumulated the necessary local knowledge, their reliance on local partners become 
less critical and they may go for full control. If more foreign firms choose the same 
ownership form, we may observe a higher degree of homogeneity among them. 
Changes of foreign firms in their ownership strategies over time may lead to 
dynamics of isomorphism as well.  
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 Institutional theory and the strategic perspective thus provide different, but 
complementary, explanations for ownership choices of foreign firms in host 
countries. In what follows we develop hypotheses about the effects of institutional 
changes and strategic considerations on the organizational dynamics of foreign firms 
in China. 
 
3.2.2 Hypotheses  
 
Institutional Forces 
 
 Regulative institutions refer to rules and laws that define what is allowed and 
what not. Enforcing a relevant law or rule can significantly change the behaviour of 
entrants and thus the organizational pattern of a population (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 
1993). Liberalization of host government regulations has substantial influence on 
ownership choice of foreign firms in host countries (e.g. Contractor, 1990). In China, 
the open door policy has established the FDI sector since 1978. In order to embrace 
foreign firms, Chinese government enforced the EJV Law in 1979, specifying the 
scope and conditions of establishing EJVs in China but leaving the specification of 
WFOE vacant. The Chinese government addressed her preference of joint ventures 
with the goal of learning advanced technologies from foreign investors (Pearson, 
1991). In order to better attract foreign investors, the government enforced the 
WFOE Law in 1986, which is regarded as an important institutional breakthrough 
that allowed foreign capitalist firms in socialist China (Fu, 2000; Fang and Tang, 
1988). Learning from the past, the Chinese government realized that promoting 
WFOE would not threaten her sovereignty, especially when the government would 
still hold the authority to approve WFOE projects. Empirical studies on other 
countries showed that foreign firms established joint ventures when the regulations 
were more restrictive, while they tended to choose WFOE when the host 
government regulations were more liberalized (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Fagre 
and Wells, 1982; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lecraw, 1984; Meyer, 2001; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002). Therefore, we expect more joint ventures than WFOEs before the 
WFOE Law was enforced, and since then an increasing adoption of WFOEs. 
Considering the adaptation inflexibility of established foreign firms (e.g. Haveman 
and Rao, 1997), we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: With the deregulation of ownership restrictions in China, the 
homogeneity of foreign firms in entry-mode decisions has decreased. 
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 Normative institutions refer to values and norms that define socially acceptable 
economic behaviours. Previous studies focusing on domestic organizations often 
emphasize norms of professionalism and social culture (e.g. D’Aunno et al., 1991; 
Dacin, 1997; Singh et al., 1986). Entering a different institutional context, 
organizations must conform to social expectations. Studies focusing on foreign firms 
(i.e. cross-border organizations) have pinpointed normative forces such as normative 
distance (Xu et al., 2004), cultural distance (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002) and social acceptance by the host country (Li et al., 2007). While 
normative distance emphasizes norms of professionalism, cultural distance and 
social acceptance draw the attention to societal norms of host countries regarding 
foreign investors. China’s acceptance of foreign investors and foreign ownership is 
arguably related to the progress of economic reforms. In the infant period of the 
reforms, the Chinese central leadership and the society at large were very cautious of 
the negative effects of foreign presence and capitalist activities on China. This 
attitude could be traced back to the Opium War and ideological tensions between 
socialism and capitalism in the pre-reform era (e.g. Brown, 1986; Pearson, 1991). 
Therefore, societal norms against capitalism and foreign ownership prevailed. In 
particular, WFOE had a low degree of acceptance. With the progress of economic 
reforms, market-conforming values such as competition, risks, profits and private 
property rights have gradually become more accepted, leading to the entry of private 
and capitalist firms (e.g. Howe et al., 2003; Liang, 2004). These market-conforming 
norms have been established within China through media, leading to a higher degree 
of acceptance of WFOE (Li et al., 2007). Empirical studies have shown that, when 
normative institutions are more restrictive, foreign investors tend to achieve social 
acceptance by entering through CJVs or EJVs with socially legitimate local partners 
(e.g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; Yiu and Makino, 2002). When normative institutions 
become less restrictive and thus represent more market-conforming values, foreign 
investors tend to enter through WFOEs (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Vanhonacker, 1997). 
Therefore, we expect more joint ventures when market-conforming values are weak, 
but an increasing adoption of WFOEs when these values are well established. 
Considering the adaptation inflexibility of established foreign firms, we hypothesize 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The more market-conforming norms are established to accept 
foreign ownership in China, the lower the homogeneity of foreign firms in 
entry-mode decisions has become. 
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 Cognitive institutions refer to taken-for-granted beliefs or shared mindsets of 
organizations in a field. Under the conditions of high uncertainty, organizations seek 
models set by other organizations in the same field, because prior decisions by other 
organizations increase the cognitive legitimacy of similar decisions (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). In this sense, new entrants imitate 
prior decisions that are regarded as taken-for-granted or appropriate. For example, 
firms follow leaders in the new market entry decisions (Haveman, 1993) and in 
adopting multidivisional form (Palmer et al. 1993). Studies in international business 
also show that foreign firms often decide on their ownership form by imitating other 
foreign firms that have already been established in host countries (Guillén, 2003; Lu, 
2002; Yiu and Makino, 2002). The more a form is adopted, the more likely it is built 
in the mindsets of new entrants as appropriate. New foreign firms thus tend to 
imitate the dominant ownership form in China. When the dominant form remains 
the same over time, we expect a high degree of homogeneity of foreign firms. 
However, when the dominant form changes over time, we expect a decreasing of the 
homogeneity of ownership choices in the population. Considering the adaptation 
inflexibility of established foreign firms, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: With changing of the collective mindsets regarding appropriate 
ownership form, the homogeneity of foreign firms in entry-mode decisions has 
decreased. 
 
Strategic Considerations 
 
 A control strategy entails that foreign firms capture as high as possible a degree 
of equity shares. From a transaction cost perspective, ownership choice of foreign 
firms depends on transaction costs associated with various forms (Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Hennart, 1991; Williamson, 1985). These transaction costs are generated by 
contractual risks. Empirical studies show that when foreign investors invest product-
specific knowledge, they are strongly concerned about hold-up risks by contractual 
partners (e.g. Child and Yan, 1999; Hennart, 1991; Luo, 2001a). By forming a 
WFOE, foreign investors keep operations under their own control and avoid hold-up 
risks by partners. But in an EJV, foreign investors obtain only partial control 
ensured by equity shares. The opportunism of partners would lead to inefficient 
operations. In a CJV, the foreign investor relies to a large extent on partners in 
operation (Wang, 2006). The higher investment value that these partners commit, 
the more likely it is that foreign investors want to control. We expect that when 
investment values are low, foreign investors become more likely to choose CJVs or 
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EJVs; when investment values are high, they become more likely to choose WFOEs. 
When the average investment value of all foreign firms is small, it is likely that joint 
ventures dominate in the population. Given the dominance of joint ventures in the 
beginning of the reform era, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the average investment value per foreign firm 
increases, the lower the homogeneity of foreign firms in entry-mode decisions 
has become.   
 
 In contrast, learning refers to acquiring local knowledge and local resources. A 
learning strategy entails that foreign firms collaborate with local partners. From a 
learning perspective, ownership choice of foreign firms is in line with their 
strategies on capability exploitation and exploration (e.g. Madhok, 1997; Teece et al., 
1997). Empirical studies show that foreign firms choose WFOE when they possess 
local knowledge, while they choose joint ventures when seeking local knowledge 
and resources controlled by local firms (e.g. Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; 
Hennart, 1991; Luo, 2002a). Entering in a new institutional setting, foreign investors 
need to learn local business routines and institutions. In collaborating with local 
partners, foreign investors benefit from their complementary capabilities. This 
learning effect will be greater when the cognitive distance between partners is 
moderate (e.g. Nooteboom, 2004). In a WFOE, the foreign investor minimizes the 
cognitive distance by imposing its own routines, but in a CJV, the foreign investor 
maximizes the cognitive distance by adopting local routines. Therefore, these studies 
suggest that foreign firms are in favour of CJV when their dominant goal is 
acquiring local knowledge in China. In the same vein, EJV will be favoured over 
WFOE in that EJV provides foreign investors with more opportunity of learning 
local knowledge than WFOE does. Once foreign investors have obtained sufficient 
local knowledge, they may go for WFOE. Before the open door policy was initiated, 
foreign firms were virtually absent in China. Therefore, foreign investors had very 
high demands of learning local knowledge in the early years of the economic 
reforms. With the development of FDI and foreign firms, the population FDI 
experience in China will be accumulated over time. New entrants can easily obtain it 
from other established foreign firms and more and more new entrants will desire to 
establish WFOE (Li et al., 2007). Therefore, the strategic perspective suggests that a 
learning strategy and thus joint ventures may dominate in the early stage of reforms 
in China. Considering the adaptation inflexibility of established foreign firms, we 
hypothesize that:  
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Hypothesis 5: The more population FDI experience of foreign firms is 
accumulated, the lower the homogeneity of foreign firms in entry-mode 
decisions has become.   
 
Complementarity 
 
 Institutional theory emphasizes external forces that shape the ownership choice 
of foreign firms. However, conforming to external regulations may not necessarily 
be the passive response of firms but can be a deliberate choice by firms (e.g. Oliver, 
1988; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition, firms always need to achieve 
efficiency and competitiveness through their organizational and strategic choices 
(e.g. Barney, 1991; Porter, 1985). The strategic perspective explains internal 
considerations of the organization in response to external environments. When legal 
constraints limit the options of firms to pursue their financial goals, managers need 
to standardize their strategies with options similar to those of their competitors. 
However, deregulations challenge managers to explore new ways to achieve 
superior performance and deviate from the established conformity (Pope and Ma, 
2005; Rugman and Verbeke, 1998; Tucillo, 1985). Therefore, institutional theory 
pinpoints a selection process, but the strategic perspective suggests an adaptation 
process. Scholars propose that organizational choices are interdependent outcomes 
of both selection and adaptation processes (e.g. Lewin et al., 1999; Haveman and 
Rao, 1997). We thus argue that the institutional and strategic perspectives are 
complementary in explaining ownership choices of foreign firms in China. 
Considering the hypotheses 1 to 5, we propose that:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Combining institutional factors and strategic factors has higher 
explanatory power to the decreasing homogeneity in entry-mode decisions 
than either of them alone. 
 
 
3.3 Research Method 
 
3.3.1 Data 
 
To explore the effects of institutional change and strategic objectives on entry-mode 
decisions by foreign firms, statistical data were collected in China over the period 
1979 – 2003. China was selected as the context of this study, because China 
provides a dynamic environment where institutional complexity and uncertainty 
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constrain ownership selection by foreign firms. On the one hand, China has been 
very successful in attracting FDI. It was one of the largest recipients of FDI in 2004, 
only surpassed by the US and the UK (UNCTAD, 2005). On the other hand, the 
establishment of foreign firms in China is subject to high constraints on ownership 
(Fu, 2000; Luo, 2002b; Pearson, 1991). In the early years of the open-door policy, 
Chinese government accepted FDI as “experiments” only in purposefully 
established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in order to manipulate the possible 
impact of foreign ownership on China’s economy and society at large. Due to the 
bitter history in the Opium War and the ideological tensions with the West, Chinese 
government explicitly preferred of joint ventures in order to learn technologies from 
the West and prevent foreign dominance. Economic transition and deregulation have 
significantly reshaped the regulatory framework regarding foreign ownership, 
leading to acceptance of WFOEs. Nevertheless, ownership restrictions still exist in 
certain sectors such as pharmaceutics, insurance and telecommunications, as 
revealed in the Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment Industries (1995). Therefore, 
conforming to legitimate entry-forms is of critical importance, and changes in 
institutional constraints and strategic considerations are expected to determine the 
dynamics of homogeneity in ownership decisions.  
 The main sources of data were the annual editions of Yearbook of China’s 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1984-2004) and China’s Commerce 
Yearbook (1984-2004). The data were cross-checked against Annual Statistical 
Bulletin of China’s Ministry of Commerce and China’s Statistical Yearbook (1984-
2004). These sources list the number of foreign firms approved for establishment, 
their ownership forms and contracted amount of FDI capital, realized amount of FDI 
capital and the distribution of their national origins by year. The final data contain 
aggregated observations on the total number of CJVs, EJVs and WFOEs as of the 
end of each year and the contracted amount of FDI capital associated with each 
observation. A panel database was developed, including data of 15 provinces in the 
period 1984 – 2003 (300 data points in total). In the panel, we include only those 
provinces that have complete data, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Yunnan, Qinghai, 
Ningxia and Xinjiang. At the national level, a total of 922 foreign firms were 
approved until 1982. By the end of 2003, the total number of foreign firms approved 
for establishment reached 465,277. Our panel database includes 332,062 foreign 
firms which account for 71% of the total foreign firms that entered China in the 
period of the study. The composition of ownership forms has significantly changed 
over time, as revealed in table 3.1. In addition, data on institutional changes were 
collected from government archival and documents and other published materials.  
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Table 3.1   Distribution of the total foreign firms by ownership form 
Forms 1982 1985 1987 1990 1992 2003 
CJVs 87% 61% 52% 32% 19% 12% 
EJVs 9% 37% 46% 56% 65% 51% 
WFOEs 4% 2% 2% 12% 16% 37% 
 
Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2005. 
 
3.3.2 Homogeneity of Entry Modes 
 
The dependent variable of our analysis is homogeneity of entry-mode decisions by 
foreign firms in China. Homogeneity is always a matter of degree (Powell, 1991). 
To gain insights into homogeneity of the FDI population in China, the Herfindahl 
Index is applied. The Herfindahl Index (HI) has been widely used and has proved to 
be effective in strategy research for measuring industrial concentration (e.g. Acar 
and Sankaran, 1999). A higher HI refers to a higher degree of concentration. By 
replacing the market share of a firm in an industry with the proportion of foreign 
firms taking different ownership forms, we calculate the degree of homogeneity 
(denoted by DH):  ( )∑ ++= 222 wfoeejvcjv PPPDH  
Where ,  and  are respectively the proportion of CJVs, EJVs cjvP ejvP wfoeP
and WFOEs in the population. The DH ranges from 31  to 1. One of the properties 
of the Herfindahl Index is that it can be used to measure heterogeneity as well by 
simply reversing it. As homogeneity here is measured as a state, we calculate DH 
based on density of each community in the population (Carroll and Hannan, 2000; 
Kuilman and Li, 2006), i.e., the cumulative number of foreign firms by ownership 
form as of the end of each year.  
 
3.3.3 Independent Variables and Measures 
 
To model the development of homogeneity/heterogeneity, a number of independent 
variables were introduced. Degree of deregulation of ownership restrictions was 
operationalized as the progress of law enforcement (deregulation) in China. Previous 
studies often operationalized regulative institutions as state intervention (e.g. Yiu 
and Makino, 2002). We argue that the progress of law enforcement regarding 
foreign ownership is more appropriate, as the liberalization in the progress leads to 
less restrictive regulative institutions, thereby having substantial influence on 
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organizational choice (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 1993; Contractor, 1990), which. 
Since the open-door policy was initiated, the regulatory framework regarding 
ownership constraints has been substantially liberalized in China (e.g. Fu, 2000; 
Pearson, 1991). The progress was embodied by two influential laws, i.e. the EJV 
Law in 1979 and the WFOE Law in 1986. Not until the enforcement of the WFOE 
Law has the government officially accepted WFOEs. Therefore, the government 
imposed strong ownership restrictions in the period prior to 1986, but deregulated 
the restrictions since 1986. We coded the variable as 0 in the period of 1984 – 1986, 
and as 1 in the period of 1987 – 2003.  
 Level of the local acceptance of foreign ownership is represented in established 
market-conforming norms, which was operationalized as the official endorsement of 
market economy in China. We argue that the endorsement of the market economy 
better reflects local acceptance of foreign investment and foreign ownership as it 
embodies many market-conforming values (e.g. Child, 1994; Liang, 2004). Since 
the economic reform, the normative domain regarding market-conforming values 
has been shaped in three stages (e.g. Liang, 2004; Howe et al., 2003). China had 
insisted on a socialist planed-economy till 1984 when the 3rd Plenum of 12th CCPCC 
(China Communist Party Central Congress) endorsed a socialist planned commodity 
economy. It was not until 1992 that the central leadership had endorsed a socialist 
market economy. In 1997, the 15th CCPCC decided to convert state-owned 
enterprises into entities with western-type corporate governance. Therefore, we 
coded this variable as 0 for the years prior to 1984, 1 for the period of 1985 – 1992, 
2 for the period of 1993 – 1997, and 3 for the period of 1998 – 2003.  
 The collective mindsets of foreign firms regarding appropriate ownership form 
are operationalized as the dominant ownership form that receives the highest entry 
rate per year. The highest entry rate of one form reflects that the cognitive mindsets 
associated with it were widely shared by new entrants, which drove them to imitate 
others (e.g. Lu, 2002). This was measured per province. Each of the three forms, i.e. 
CJV, EJV and WFOE, can be the dominant form of a year. Therefore, we used three 
dummies, C-dummy, E-dummy and W-dummy, to code the collective mindsets of 
foreign firms. The C-dummy was coded as 1 for a year when CJVs were the 
dominant choice of new entrants, and otherwise, as 0. The E-dummy was coded as 1 
for a year when EJVs formulated the highest entry rate, and otherwise, as 0. The W-
dummy was coded as 1 for a year when WFOEs achieved the highest entry rate, and 
otherwise, as 0. In addition, we used a fourth dummy, S-dummy, to reflect the 
change of the collective mindsets. We coded the S-dummy as 0 for the first year of 
the observation window. For each of the subsequent years, we then compared the 
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dominant form of a year with that of the previous year. If they were the same, this 
variable was coded as 0, and if not, it was coded as 1.  
 Investment value was operationalized as contracted capital value of a foreign firm 
(Zhao and Zhu, 1998). This variable represents firm size which was used to capture 
the effect of a control strategy when transaction costs are considered (e.g. Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2003; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988). Average investment value was 
calculated as that of all foreign firms by the end of each year per province. 
Population FDI experience was operationalized as the (realized) cumulative FDI 
capital per province by the end of each year (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Li et al., 
2007). When foreign investors lack local knowledge of the host country, they are 
more likely to choose joint ventures, but when they have accumulated local 
knowledge, they are more likely to establish WFOEs (e.g. Chang and Rosenzweig, 
2001). Realized FDI capital is thus a means of generating local experience. We 
calculated this variable as the logarithm of the cumulative amount of FDI.  
 To control for the effect of economic factors, we further introduced geographical 
openness, which has substantial influence on the inflow of FDI and ownership 
choice of foreign firms (e.g. Meyer, 2001; Zhou et al., 2002), and market size which 
has a positive relationship with the adoption of WFOEs (e.g. Zhao and Zhu, 1998). 
Geographical openness was measured with the trade value, represented as the sum 
of imports and exports per province per year. Market size was operationalized as 
annual provincial GDP (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lu, 2002).   
 To control for possible temporal effects, we used a set of time dummies for each 
year. A time dummy was set as 1 for the year it was controlled and as 0 for other 
years. To control for possible spatial differences across provinces in China, we 
introduced another set of province dummies for each province. A province dummy 
was set as 1 for the province it was controlled and 0 for other provinces. 
 All variables except time dummies and province dummies are summarized in 
Table 3.2.  
 
 
3.4 Analysis and Results 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of OLS models with White cross-section test. In the 
panel analysis, we take model 1 as baseline model where only control variables are 
used. Models 2.1-2.5 are established to test the influence of institutional changes on 
the degree of homogeneity in entry-mode choices of foreign firms in China. Model 
3.1 and 3.2 are used to test the effect of strategic considerations on the degree of 
homogeneity. In addition, we develop models 4.1 – 4.3 to examine the interactive 
  
62
Chapter 3 48 
effect of combining both institutional and strategic factors on the degree of 
homogeneity. Comparing these models with the baseline, all variables add 
incremental explanatory power to the degree of homogeneity. 
   In line with Hypothesis 1, the deregulation or liberalization of foreign ownership 
constraints appears to have been strongly related to the decreasing homogeneity of 
foreign firms’ ownership forms (negative effect) (Model 2.1). As predicted, with the 
deregulation of ownership constraints, new foreign firms tend to choose WFOEs, 
which dilutes the density of joint ventures in the population, leading to decreased 
homogeneity. In addition, Hypothesis 2 was strongly supported (Model 2.2). As 
predicted, the increasing local acceptance of foreign ownership, as a result of the 
adoption of market-conforming norms in China, leads more adoption of WFOEs by 
new entrants. The increasing number of WFOEs among new entrants dilutes the 
density of joint ventures in the population, leading to decreased homogeneity as well 
(negative effect). These findings support previous studies on regulative and 
normative institutions (e.g. Barnett and Carroll, 1993; Contractor, 1990; Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Li et al., 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that changes of the collective mindsets (taken-for-granted 
beliefs) lead to decreased homogeneity of entry-mode choices by foreign firms in 
China. It was weakly supported (Model 2.3). The dummy for changes of the 
collective mindsets (S-dummy) captured this negative effect. A change occurs when 
the collective mindsets regarding the appropriate ownership form shift from one 
form to another. The results show that the mindsets associated with CJVs (C-dummy) 
is positively related to the degree of homogeneity, while the mindsets associated 
with WFOEs (W-dummy) is negatively associated with the degree of homogeneity. 
Provided that joint ventures were dominant in the beginning of the observation 
window, it implies that less new entrants imitated CJVs over time and more imitated 
WFOEs, which weakens the established homogeneity. The finding is in line with the 
results of previous studies (e.g. Guillén, 2003; Li et al., 2007; Lu, 2002; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002) that there is a mimic process in ownership choice. The weak 
significance of this relationship is probably due to a different approach we took. The 
previous studies are comparative static while ours is to examine dynamics of the 
mimetic process. It might be possible that the mimetic process is dominated by other 
forces in the course, which will be discussed later. However, the adjusted R-square 
shows that this variable has more explanation power to the degree of homogeneity 
than deregulation and the level of local acceptance do. 
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 In Model 2.4, we tested the effect of combining deregulation and the change of 
the collective mindsets on the homogeneity. In Model 2.5, we tested the effect of 
combining the local acceptance and the change of the collective mindsets. 
Hypotheses 1-3 are still supported. But, interestingly, the adjusted R-squares show 
that the variables of deregulation and the local acceptance do not add more 
explanatory power to that of the cognitive variable (the collective mindsets) in entry 
mode choices (in comparison to Model 2.3), while the cognitive variable (the 
collective mindsets) increases the explanatory power of both deregulation and the 
local acceptance variables slightly only (in comparison to Model 2.1 and 2.2 
respectively).  
 The estimate of average investment value and population FDI experience 
appeared to have the expected negative relationship with the degree of homogeneity 
(Model 3.1 and Model 3.2). This relationship is significant (P<0.01). These two 
variables added more explanatory power to control variables as the adjusted R-
square increases. It demonstrates that foreign firms in China invested with a small 
scale investment value in the early stage of Reform by which they aimed at learning 
local knowledge by sharing control rights with local partners (in a form of joint 
ventures), and over time, foreign firms in China tend to capture full control over the 
operation by increasing their investment values since they have accumulated enough 
local knowledge (FDI experience) and therefore shifted their strategic goals to 
control. This findings is in line with previous research (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Li et al., 2007; Vanhonacker, 1997) and with Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
 In order to test the value added of combining institutional theory with a strategy 
perspective, we developed Models 4.1-4.3 which demonstrate support to Hypothesis 
6. In Model 4.1, we tested the explanatory power of combining the degree of 
deregulation and strategic factors (average investment value). The adjusted R-square 
is increased as compared with Model 2.1, which suggests that this combination 
reinforces the explanatory power to the dynamics of isomorphism. In Model 4.2, we 
tested the explanatory power of combining the level of the local acceptance of 
foreign ownership and strategic factors (average investment value). The adjusted R-
square is increased as compared with Model 2.2, which suggests that this 
combination increases the explanatory power to the dynamics of isomorphism as 
well. The same holds for Model 4.3 (in comparison with Model 2.3) in which we 
tested the explanatory power of combining the change of the collective mindsets 
regarding appropriate ownership mode and strategic factors. These findings imply 
that combining a strategic perspective into institutional theory adds more 
explanatory power of institutional forces to the dynamics of homogeneity. However, 
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comparing the adjusted R-squares of Models 4.1-4.3 with that of Model 2.2, this 
value-added is only marginal to the explanatory power of the strategic perspective. 
This asymmetric effect needs more investigation. 
 In sum, we find strong supports for our predictions. First, changes in institutional 
forces lead to the dynamics of isomorphism. The deregulation, the level of local 
acceptance of foreign ownership and the change of the collective mindsets regarding 
appropriate ownership mode all lead to decreased homogeneity of foreign firms in 
China (Hypotheses 1-3). Second, strategic considerations of control and learning by 
foreign firms in a host country also influence the dynamics of isomorphism. Shift in 
their considerations between control and learning leads to decreased homogeneity of 
foreign firms in China (Hypotheses 4-5). More importantly, combining institutional 
forces and strategic considerations indeed provides us with a better understanding of 
foreign ownership choice and subsequently the dynamics of isomorphism 
(Hypothesis 6). These findings explain that it is the complementarity of institutional 
liberalization and changes in strategic consideration by foreign firms over time that 
determines the shift of the ownership pattern of foreign firms in China from more 
homogeneity to less homogeneity. The ownership choice of foreign firms in China 
reflects both legitimacy and efficiency criteria all the time in our observation 
windows.  
 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The dynamics of isomorphism determined by institutional changes and strategic 
considerations has received only scant attention in previous organizational choice 
studies based on institutional theory and studies on ownership choice of foreign 
firms in a host country. This study investigated how dynamics of organizational 
homogeneity are related to institutional liberalization as well as strategic 
considerations of firms entering new contexts. Several hypotheses were tested using 
data on a population of foreign firms in China. The findings show that the degree of 
organizational isomorphism is negatively related to deregulation or liberalization of 
ownership constraints and the level of local acceptance of foreign ownership. This 
finding is in line with the predictions by Oliver (1992), Powell (1991), and Scott 
(2001). When entering host countries, foreign firms face institutional constraints 
which generate isomorphic forces. If institutions change over time, this weakens 
established isomorphic forces and gives rise to heterogeneity.  
 The findings of this study also show that the degree of organizational 
isomorphism is negatively related to the change of taken-for-granted 
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beliefs/mindsets regarding appropriate ownership form, a finding that did not appear 
in any other study. Previous studies from a static view were unable to tackle this 
phenomenon (e.g. Haveman, 1993; Lu, 2002; Yiu and Makino, 2002). However, 
these studies imply that firms may choose different models to imitate depending on 
which group or community they feel more associated with. In addition, competition 
among different ownership forms may also lead to different entry rates of each form 
(e.g. Li et al., 2007). Therefore, cognitive forces may be more complicated than 
empirically tested in shaping the dynamics of isomorphism. This finding needs more 
exploration.  
 In addition, this study investigated how the dynamics of homogeneity are related 
to strategic considerations by foreign firms. This study examined the population 
pattern of foreign ownership which goes beyond previous studies that were focused 
on individual choices (e.g. Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart, 1988, 1991; Luo, 2001a). Our findings 
confirm those studies from a dynamic view. In the early years of the Reform, foreign 
firms had no choice but to take a learning strategy to establish joint ventures in 
which they conceded their control to local partners; over time, after the population 
FDI experience of foreign firms in China had accumulated sufficiently, more new 
entrants came to establish WFOE to exercise a control strategy. This suggests an 
additional underlying logic of isomorphism, strategic isomorphism, as termed by 
Oliver (1988). Our findings demonstrate that dynamics of isomorphism occur as a 
result of changes in both institutions and strategic considerations. This finding is in 
line with the results of past studies by D’Aunno et al. (2000), Kraatz and Zajac 
(1996) and Palmer et al. (1993) that both market and institutional forces matter in 
explaining organizational changes. It is also in line with the results of Haveman and 
Rao (1997) and Rodrigues and Child (2003) that organizations co-evolve with 
institutional environments.  
 Our study contributes to institutional theory as well by testing the interaction 
between institutional factors and strategic factors. The findings show, first of all, 
that combining institutional factors with strategic factors is better off in explaining 
dynamics of isomorphism. It suggests that both institutional logic and strategic logic 
of isomorphism reinforce each other as an explanation for isomorphism, and that 
they must work together in determining the entry-mode choice. It is in line with the 
theoretical development in strategy and organization studies (Oliver, 1997; Roberts 
and Greenwood, 1997). Second, in line with Powell (1991) and Scott (2001), the 
findings demonstrate that three institutional forces may have heterogeneous 
influences on organizations. Both regulative and normative forces, as external 
pressures, are highly related to one another. As Roland (2004) suggested, normative 
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institutions often change along with regulative (political) institutions, though with a 
lagging step. However, cognitive force may work in a complicated manner since 
firms’ beliefs may be shaped by different experiences and associated communities. 
The dominant beliefs may change as a result of competition among different forms. 
It leads to the third point that the mimetic isomorphism under the cognitive force 
may not necessarily be a passive process as often assumed in studies based on 
institutional theory. Our findings show that the cognitive force has (slightly) more 
explanation power to the dynamics of isomorphism than the regulative and 
normative forces do. Firms may not necessarily be blinded in imitation. Their taken-
for-granted beliefs may reflect just those regarding which strategy is more efficiency 
in the similar situations to that of others, or those regarding what regulative or 
normative institutions are determined to conform. In this sense, the cognitive force 
works at a different level from other forces and is also dominated by other forces, 
which may reflect the idea of overlapping institutions in Sewell (1992), Whittington 
(1992) and Seo and Greed (2002).  
 From the perspective of international business, our study confirms that 
institutions matter in particular in influencing strategic formulation of foreign firms 
in transition economies (e.g. Peng, 2003). In such a situation, external legitimacy is 
crucial for foreign firms to gain for their entry and operation (e.g. Xu and Shenkar, 
2002). However, the fact that institutions matter does not turn firms into “institution-
takers”. Rather, firms attempt to develop the trade-offs in their strategies (e.g. Luo, 
2001a), i.e. finding ways to achieve constrained efficiency (e.g. Roberts and 
Greenwood, 1997). Over time, the deregulation and liberalization in transition 
economies open more space for foreign firms to practice diverse choices.  
 One potential limitation of this study is that we use aggregated data instead of 
data on individual firms, which limits us to use other indicators in the measurement, 
for example, R&D intensity for control strategy and firm-level experience in the 
host country for learning strategy. However, we argue this does not matter since our 
concern is on the aggregated pattern of firms. Another limitation is that we did not 
consider the adaptation of foreign firms, i.e. whether they change their ownership 
form after entry. In our study, we assume that the adaptation of foreign firms is 
inflexible and thus is not considered. This assumption is established for two reasons. 
On the one hand, foreign firms, once established, can not change their ownership 
form without costs; and on the other hand, the selective process often dominates the 
adaptation process in organizational changes (e.g. Haveman and Rao, 1997).  
 Future research should attempt to explore the interaction between the cognitive 
force and other forces in depth. The mimetic process due to cognitive pressures is 
often observed in organizational behaviour (e.g. Haveman, 1993; Lu, 2002; 
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Mizruchi et al., 1999). Yet, there are also observations that organizations do not 
follow the dominant form or others, but struggle for a new form in the conditions of 
uncertainty instead (e.g. Rowan, 1982; Fu, 2000). In the particular context of our 
study, it is useful to explore further the adaptation process of foreign firms in 
organizational and strategic choices once they have entered the country. It will 
provide additional insights to the dynamics of isomorphism and the co-evolution of 
foreign firms with the institutional environment in China.  
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4 Ownership Choice of Foreign Firms in 
China: A Process Approach 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The ownership choice is one crucial strategy of foreign firms in a host country. This 
chapter deals in particular with the ownership choice of foreign firms in China by 
addressing the difference between an observed ownership choice and ownership 
preference. We focus on the ownership choice between wholly foreign owned 
enterprise (WFOE) and equity joint venture (EJV) since these two forms account for 
more than 90 percent of foreign ownership choices in China. In the pre-entry stage, 
foreign investors have developed ownership strategy (or ownership preference) that 
can have higher returns against possible risks. However, the subsequent 
implementation of ownership choices is confronted with many constraints other than 
the central regulatory policies in China. For example, seeking, evaluating and 
negotiating with local partners for cooperation may not be an easy job (Faure, 2000). 
Foreign investors have also to deal with local governments directly, which often 
have enough leeway to design their own industrial policies as a consequence of 
decentralization. The frustration of foreign investors is that the information of local 
partners and the behavior of local governments cannot be learned ex ante without 
direct interactions (or negotiations). These on-site interactions may force them to 
make adjustment to pre-entry ownership preference. Therefore, the ownership 
choice of foreign firms in China must be a learning process regarding institutions. 
What remains to be answered is: what institutions shape their ownership choices and 
in what kind of learning process are they involved in China?  
 A stream of research has focused on what determines the ownership choices of 
foreign firms in host countries though with inconclusive findings (e.g. Chen et al., 
2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Guillén, 2003; Hensiz, 2000; Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Malhotra, 2003; Yiu and Makino, 2002; Zhao et al., 2004). Strategically, 
foreign firms prefer an ownership mode that involves lower transaction costs or 
generates higher values. Transaction costs are influenced by asset specificity and 
57 
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uncertainty associated with the investment (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985), and moderated by 
industry characteristics (e.g. Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Values are considered by 
comparing the exploitation and exploration of organizational capabilities (e.g. 
Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Madhok, 1997; Teece et al., 1997). However, their 
choices are often constrained by institutional pressures in particular in transition 
economies (Meyer, 2001; Xu et al., 2004). These studies all took a “variance” 
approach, as termed by Mohr (1982). The variance approach is used to examine a 
correlative relationship among dependent and independent variables, but is unable to 
identify the interplay among different determinants (Langley, 1999). Due to this 
weakness of the variance approach, the previous studies demonstrated the correlative 
relationships between ownership choice and transaction costs, transaction values, or 
institutional constraints, and the possible various tradeoffs (costs vs. values and 
efficiency vs. legitimacy) (e.g. Luo, 2001a) in the ownership choices, though they 
were unable to specify the underlying process of the interplay therein. Therefore, 
Gomes-Casseres (1990) suggested that the ownership choice of foreign firms needs 
to consider “what a foreign firm desires to have” and “what a foreign firm can do” 
separately in two phases, which can (partly) clarify the inconsistent or inconclusive 
empirical findings where only the observed ownership choices were considered.   
 The predominant design for this research follows the ‘process’ approach 
(Langley, 1999; Mohr, 1982). The process approach helps explain the phenomenon 
by identifying the underlying sequence of events that lead to the outcome (decision). 
This approach is very insightful in understanding the ‘messy’ field of international 
business (Parkhe, 1993). The process approach has long prevailed in studying 
internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Meyer and Gelbuda, 2006; Reid, 
1981), which highlights the decision process from concern to perception and to 
commitment, and that from knowledge accumulation to expansion. Surprisingly, 
however, few studies on ownership choices took up such an approach. Büchel (2002) 
demonstrated that the divergence and convergence of different factors shape the 
development of a joint venture from formation to ownership change and to 
termination. Tallman and Shenkar (1994) suggested that the formation of 
international joint ventures (IJVs) needs a process to consider different variables at 
different stages. Though few in number and with a particular focus on joint ventures, 
these studies highlighted the insightfulness of the process approach to understanding 
the ownership choice of foreign firms and the necessary tradeoff between preference 
and constraints in the decision. From this perspective, therefore, we propose that 
foreign firms decide on their ownership structure through a learning process in 
which the tradeoff is managed in two phases. Following Child (2002) who 
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convincingly demonstrated the usefulness of combining process and variance 
approaches in studying the configurations of IJVs, we also borrow the fruits of 
previous variance analysis to construct this process.  
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the underlying learning process in the 
ownership choice of foreign firms in China. We have developed this chapter based 
on a case study of twenty foreign firms in 2004 and 2005. Case study (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003) provides detailed process knowledge on ownership choices, which 
helps us fulfill the goal. Based on our fieldwork in China we claim that (1) the 
ownership decision of foreign firms is a dynamic process in which foreign investors 
adjust their preference to the local and circumstantial environment, since (2) ex-ante 
decisions on ownership (preference) cannot foresee all contingencies in the host 
country, preempt moral hazard once they have invested in one location, and 
anticipate the speed and direction of changes in policies; (3) in the Chinese context, 
two factors deserve more attention in the decision: the increasing importance of the 
local as opposed to the national business environment and the importance of 
informal as opposed to formal institutions. Therefore, our study contributes to the 
theory regarding ownership choice of foreign firms by developing a dynamic view 
and a process framework that explains how the interplay of preference and 
constraints leads to an observed ownership structure. In addition, the study 
contributes to the understanding of the phenomenon by adding a local perspective. 
Furthermore, the study illustrates the interplay of transaction costs, organizational 
capability and institutional pressures in the decision-making process, which echoes 
the recent call for theoretically probing into transition economies (e.g. Meyer and 
Peng, 2005; Tsui, 2004; Wright et al., 2005). Our study therefore has implications 
for strategy research in transition economies. 
 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces a preliminary 
conceptual framework from a process perspective based on previous findings. 
Section 4.3 describes the research design and case studies in China. Subsequently, 
the findings present the decision-making of the observed WFOEs vs. EJVs among 
our cases, which, by analytic induction, help transform the conceptual framework 
into a context-based analytical framework (section 4.4). Section 4.5 discusses the 
chapter’s contribution to theory, presented in a set of propositions. Section 4.6 forms 
the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical Background 
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As noted earlier, we adopt a process approach to explore the ownership choice of 
foreign firms in China. To do so, we propose a conceptual framework as shown in 
Figure 4.1 under the assumptions of bounded rationality and sequential stages 
(Simon, 1960). The framework suggests that the observed ownership of foreign 
firms is conducted in a dynamic process in which ownership preference is evaluated 
prior to entry in phase 1, and is adjusted subsequently in phase 2 of on (and post-
)entry. The adjustment is particularly necessary in the context of transition 
economies such as that of China. Institutions not only influence the evaluation of 
preference but also determine the learning process that leads to the adjustment.  In 
what follows, we develop the meaning of the constructs, i.e. preference and 
constraints, and provide justification of the process from preference to adjustment or 
synthesis.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1   Theoretical model of ownership choice of foreign firms 
 
4.2.1 Preference for Ownership Modes 
 
Ownership preference refers to what a foreign firm desires to have regarding the 
ownership structure, i.e. WFOE vs. EJV, to achieve organizational efficiency and 
competitive advantages (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Researchers have identified the 
determinants of ownership preference from two different perspectives, i.e. 
transaction cost theory (TCT) and organizational capability approach (OC). It is 
suggested that the strategy of a foreign firm in ownership preference is to manage 
the cost-value tradeoff.  
 From the TCT perspective, a foreign firm prefers an ownership mode that 
involves the minimum transaction costs, i.e. those of establishing and running the 
Shape 
Phase 1: pre entry 
Learning 
Preference Constraints  
Transaction costs and 
capability values Institutions  
Adjustment / 
synthesis 
Phase 2: (post-)entry 
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firm (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1988). Empirical studies have 
examined both firm-specific factors and context-specific factors that determine the 
transaction costs (e.g. Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers, 2002; Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Luo, 2001a; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Pan, 1996). The 
firm-specific factors are those associated with the concepts of asset specificity and 
contractual hazard, represented with proxies of technology intensity (or proprietary 
knowledge) and costs of making/enforcing contracts respectively. The context-
specific factors are those representing external uncertainty in the institutional 
environment of the host country, in particular in the context of transition markets 
(e.g. Meyer, 2001; Williamson, 1991). These factors include the perception of 
political risk and cultural distance. From this perspective, the conventional 
arguments are as follows: (1) a foreign firm prefers WFOE over EJV when a higher 
degree of asset specificity and contractual hazard is involved; and (2) a foreign firm 
prefers EJV over WFOE when a higher degree of external uncertainty is perceived. 
However, service firms may respond to these transaction cost factors differently in 
some aspects (e.g. Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Due to 
people intensity in service sectors, for example, a service firm prefers EJV when a 
higher degree of contractual hazard is involved, because the integration gain may not 
be higher than the internal organizational costs.  
 In another vein, the OC perspective suggests that a foreign firm prefers an 
ownership mode that can realize the maximum values for the firm, either in the 
deployment of existing capabilities or in the development of new capabilities (e.g. 
Peng, 2001; Tallman, 1991). Empirical studies have examined capability factors that 
determine the ownership choice of foreign firms (e.g. Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Bell et al., 1997; Brouthers et al., 1996; Chang, 1995; Delios and Beamish, 
1999; Luo, 2002a; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Pan, 1996; Shenkar and Li, 1999), which 
pointed to factors such as capital commitment (firm size), technology or service 
intensity, international knowledge, and the need for local knowledge (such as local 
distribution networks). Therefore, the OC perspective predicts that (1) a foreign firm 
prefers WFOE over EJV when the investment involves a larger size of capital 
commitment and a higher degree of knowledge intensity; and (2) a foreign firm 
prefers EJV over WFOE when it has higher demand for local knowledge and local 
complementary resources.  
 Both perspectives, while stressing the opposite side of the same coin, are quite 
complementary to each other (e.g. Langlois and Foss, 1999; Williamson, 1999; 
Zajac and Olsen, 1993). The two perspectives are developed on the same core 
concept, though using different terms, i.e. asset specificity vs. resource/capabilities. 
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In particular, they tend to converge in empirical measurement, for example both 
measured by the proxy of technology intensity. Therefore, Madhok (1997) proposed 
that the ownership decision of foreign firms is actually the tradeoff between 
transaction costs and capability values associated with different modes. From the 
perspective of a foreign firm, it will have its strategic intent, either the exploitation 
of the existing capabilities or the exploration of new capabilities for future use. 
When doing so, it will also evaluate the potential transaction costs of the investment 
associated with different ownership modes. The overall evaluation leads to the 
decision that the chosen ownership mode will be the one that is in alignment with 
the strategic goal (values) AND involves lower transaction costs. In this phase, as 
implied by the TCT- and OC-oriented studies, institutional factors indirectly shape 
the evaluation of preference (constraining effect) through for example the perception 
of political risks and the understanding of the host country regulations, which will 
be addressed later in more detail. 
 
4.2.2 Constraints on Ownership Choices 
 
Constraints on ownership choices refer to those that limit what a foreign firm can do 
regarding the decision (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). These constraints are defined by 
institutions which are either formal (e.g. laws and regulations) or informal (e.g. 
conventions, norms and codes of behavior) in the host country (North, 1990). These 
institutions do not only shape the perception of human beings, as applied in the TCT 
logic, but also directly define the choices that a foreign firm can select from 
regarding ownership modes, for example. This is particularly relevant in transition 
economies such as in China where the host government often imposes strong 
restrictions on foreign ownership (Osland and Björkman, 1998; Poynter, 1985; 
Vanhonacker, 1997). Therefore, advocates of institutional theory (IT) argue that 
foreign firms tend to conform in their choices to “what they can do” in the context of 
facing high institutional pressures, which helps establish the external legitimacy for 
their survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Peng, 2003; 
Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Scott, 2001).  
 Empirical studies have examined institutional determinants that force foreign 
firms to concede their ownership preference (e.g. Contractor, 1990; Davis et al., 
2000; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Henisz, 2000; Lecraw, 1984; Lu, 2002; Xu et al., 2004; 
Yiu and Makino, 2002). Determinants associated with regulative and normative 
institutions were argued to be most effective in reflecting the institutional 
environment and tested widely. Regulative institutions are rules and laws that 
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govern foreign firms in the host country, and thus the regulative pressures are 
effectively reflected by the host government restrictions and regulative distance 
between the home and host countries. Normative institutions refer to norms and 
values that govern the behavior of people in the host country, and thus the normative 
pressures are empirically measured by the normative distance between the home and 
host countries, market infrastructure and business routines in the host country. The 
mimic behavior (e.g. Lu, 2002; Yiu and Makino, 2002) and the bargaining behavior 
(e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lecraw, 1984) of foreign firms under high institutional 
pressures demonstrate that the constraints directly shape their ownership choices, in 
which the external legitimacy is valued higher than efficiency (which can be realized 
by the calculation of costs and values). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how 
foreign firms synthesize this direct effect of institutions with the preference 
evaluation, where an indirect effect of institutions exists, in ownership choice.  
 
4.2.3 Ownership Choice as a Process 
 
It can be concluded that the ownership choice of foreign firms entails various 
tradeoffs, including costs vs. values and efficiency vs. legitimacy, or more generally, 
preference vs. constraints (e.g. Hill et al., 1990; Luo, 2001a). They reflect the 
multiple dimensions of internationalization uncertainty, which require foreign firms 
to strategically manage them in a synthetic way (e.g. Miller, 1992; Shrader et al., 
2000). The reduction of uncertainty in one dimension may lead to the increasing 
uncertainty on another dimension. Empirical studies have shown that foreign firms 
indeed decide on their ownership choices by managing the tradeoffs of costs, values, 
preference, and constraints (e.g. Luo, 2001a).  
 The tradeoffs involved demonstrate the complexity of the choice. Thus, it is quite 
hard to accept that foreign firms manage them simultaneously, as the previous 
integrated approach suggested (e.g. Luo, 2001a; Shrader et al., 2000). Note that 
people are bounded in rationality and information is incomplete and allocated 
asymmetrically. Therefore, we argue that the tradeoffs are managed in a phased 
process, more accurately. It can be justified by previous studies on bargaining, 
partner selections, and experience.  
 The bargaining approach, while emphasizing the confrontation of foreign firms 
with constraints regarding ownership choices in the host country (Fagre and Wells, 
1982; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Lecraw, 1984), implicitly suggests that foreign firms 
have evaluated their ownership preference prior to the bargaining (e.g. Gomes-
Casseres, 1990). The negotiation determines to what extent the firm has to adjust 
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their preference to the local requirement. Studies on partner selection in IJVs look 
into traits of local partners that can best match the strategic goals of a foreign 
investor in the IJV (e.g. Hitt et al., 2000; Luo, 1997) with an implicit assumption of 
EJV preference prior to entry. Note that there may be many local firms having 
similar traits. Therefore, the establishment of an IJV needs to find the right partner 
and involves “intense bargaining among prospective partners as well as other 
stakeholders” in the host country (Tallman and Shenkar, 1994: 99). In addition, 
experience is also powerful in explaining the ownership choice of foreign firms (e.g. 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Delios and Beamish, 1999). Studies on 
internationalization process suggest that experience with institutions (country- and 
industry-specific) must be acquired by means of learning by doing (e.g. Eriksson et 
al., 1997; Meyer and Gelbuda, 2006; Shaver et al., 1997). It implies that the working 
knowledge of local institutions cannot completely be anticipated ex ante but needs to 
be “absorbed” through direct interaction with local institutions.  
 To summarize, as shown in Figure 4.1, the ownership choice of foreign firms 
entails a two-phase process to manage various factors in the decision-making. In the 
pre-entry phase, ownership preference is evaluated based on transaction costs and 
organizational capability values. The evaluation is moderated by the perception of 
the institutional environment in the host country (constraining effect). In the on- 
(and post-) entry phase, ownership adjustment or synthesis is necessitated when 
foreign firms learn actual constraints by directly confronting (local) institutions. We 
argue that this process model is particularly applicable in China where formal 
institutions are weak and informal institutions prevail in doing business (e.g. Boisot 
and Child, 1996; Krug, 2004; Peng, 2003). The recent survey on investment climates 
(World Bank, 2005) shows that, although China has made commitments to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) by streamlining the FDI regulations at national 
level, foreign investors still frequently encounter problems, such as ambiguous 
policy implementation, times and gifts needed for networking with officials, when 
conducting business at local level. It implies that foreign firms cannot rely on 
scanning the national-level institutions prior to entry only, but have to interact 
directly with these local institutions on site in China. It is therefore very likely that 
this interaction generates the working information on local institutions and 
eventually leads to ownership adjustment on entry or in the post-entry phase. In 
what follows we develop a case study in China to flesh out our theoretical model. 
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4.3 Research Method 
4.3.1 Case Study 
In this study, we are concerned with the ownership choice of foreign firms in China. 
Therefore, we are interested in the process of the ownership choices, from pre-entry 
evaluation to entry adjustment and further to possible readjustment in operation. We 
sampled cases for ownership mode (WFOE vs. EJV) and changes in decision-
making. Twenty cases were selected in six cities. Table 4.1 presents the 
characteristics of cases studied in the chapter. Our cases include eight EJVs and 
twelve WFOEs according to current status. One of the EJVs is between a foreign 
parent and a Hong Kong partner, and others are all between a foreign partner and a 
local (mainland Chinese) partner. According to the original status of the 
establishment, our cases include twelve EJVs and eight WFOEs. It means that four 
foreign firms (Case 2, 14, 18 and 20) changed their ownership mode from EJV to 
WFOE in the post-establishment stage. One EJV increased its foreign shares from 
51% to 80% after three years operation (Case 5). In addition, two EJVs were 
negotiating on ownership changes when the fieldwork was carried out, one for 
increasing the foreign share in the EJV (Case 11) and the other for decreasing the 
foreign share (Case 12). All foreign firms studied except Case 2 and Case 3 operate 
in one of the development zones.  
   Our cases are diverse in terms of size, country of origin, and formation year, 
which permits a cross-case analysis. Eleven cases are large in size in terms of 
employment or initial investment capital, while the other nine cases are either small 
or medium in size. The variation in size provides the possibility of examining the 
effect of using size as a proxy of organizational capabilities, for example. All twenty 
cases operate in fourteen industries at 3-digit code level, among which sixteen cases 
are from the manufacturing sector and four from the service sector. Though western 
firms (12 cases including one Japanese firm) predominate in our sample, which is in 
contrast to the landscape of foreign firm population in China (Asian firms are 
dominant), this would not be a problem from the perspective of case study since we 
are not providing the base for a representative survey but exploring insights from a 
particular kind of experience (Child, 2002). All of our cases are foreign firms 
established in a time span from 1992 to 2004, roughly matching the period after 
1990 in which 90% of foreign firms started. Lacking cases of foreign firms 
established in the 1980s might limit the scope of exploration regarding the 
regulation effects. However, we have one case (Case 5) in which the negotiation for 
the formation started in 1986, and two cases (Case 7 and Case 15) in a regulated 
sector. These three cases to a certain extent make up the deficiency.  
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4.3.2 Data Analysis 
 
We followed a synthetic strategy (Langley, 1999) to analyze the case data, 
attempting to construct the process from detailed case data. It involved an iterative 
process of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). From the raw interview data 
(transcripts), we first generated a series of minicases (Eisenhardt, 1989). Secondly, 
based on these minicases, we coded “events” (such as preference and adjustment) 
and variables that described them according to the proposed theoretical framework. 
Our interview data are highly consistent with archival data. In doing so, we aimed at 
establishing a general pattern of the decision-making process regarding ownership 
mode choices in China.  
 The cross-case analysis followed the method of analytic induction (Cressey, 1953; 
Yan and Gray, 1994). We started with one case study and the findings were 
reviewed with regard to whether the proposed process pattern was confirmed or 
rejected, and then the theoretical model is modified in the view of the findings. The 
comparison was repeated for all cases. This iterative analysis made the findings 
better grounded and thus improved the reliability of the findings. The findings of the 
study are described in what follows. 
 
 
4.4 Towards a Two-phase Learning Process 
 
The cross-case analysis demonstrates that ownership adjustment is often necessary 
when foreign investors come to establish their subsidiaries in China. On the basis of 
this cross-case analysis, we develop a context-based analytical model, shown in 
figure 4.2, which summarizes our findings regarding the ownership choice of 
foreign firms in China. The consistent evidence generated from all cases suggests a 
two-phase (preference-adjustment) learning process which can better describe what 
institutions influence the ownership choice of foreign firms and what learning 
process they have to deal with in China. This analytic model extends and fleshes out 
the proposed framework. In the following, we describe the model with empirical 
findings generated from the twenty foreign firms in China.  
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Figure 4.2   Two-phase process of ownership choice of foreign firms in China 
 
4.4.1 Pre-entry Ownership Preference Evaluation 
 
We observed twelve EJVs and eight WFOEs (see Table 4.2) that were established 
on entry in the formation. However, the ownership structure was not necessarily the 
same as what they had desired prior to entry. Essentially, foreign partners having 
strong capabilities or a higher degree of asset specificity desire to establish a WFOE 
in order to capture all returns generated. This preference may be moderated by 
considering the institutional environment (such as ownership regulations and policy 
uncertainty) in China, thus leading to a pre-designed mode of EJV with a dominant 
or majority share.  
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Table 4.2   Ownership preference and on-entry adjustment in the cases studied 
 Pre-entry choice On-entry adjustment 
Case Ownership preference Constraints Ownership choice 
1 EJV 
z Dominant share 
z One Beijing partner as 
priority  
z Weak competence of preferred 
partners. 
z Strong competence of Shenyang 
partner and seeking for joint 
ventures. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
z JV with Shenyang  
partner. 
2 EJV 
z Dominant share 
 
z Seeking of the local partner for 
joint ventures. 
z Involvement of the local 
governments in negotiation 
EJV 
z Lower equity share 
(75%) than expected.  
3 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
z With partners in the 
electronics field in a 
coastal city. 
z No satisfied partners available in 
a preferred city. 
 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
z JV with a Dezhou partner 
in book retail sector. 
4 WFOE 
z Location in Suzhou. 
 
z Strong competition for preferred 
treatments in Suzhou. 
z Locational competition between 
Suzhou and Wuxi. 
WFOE 
z Location in Wuxi. 
 
5 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
z One Nanjing partner as 
priority. 
 
z Unwillingness of Nanjing 
partner for cooperation.  
z Willingness of Suzhou partner 
for cooperation. 
z Local assets over-valued by the 
local government. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
z JV with Suzhou partner. 
6 EJV 
z Target at a Guilin 
partner. 
 
z Poor financial performance of 
the Guilin partner. 
z Recommendation by a trade 
partner to Suzhou. 
z Friendly investment climate in 
Suzhou. 
WFOE 
7 EJV 
z Target at a Chongqing 
partner. 
 
z Weak competence of the 
Chongqing partner. 
z Friendly investment climate in 
Suzhou. 
z Brand building of the local 
government to promote FDI. 
z Special promise of the local 
government in Suzhou.  
WFOE 
8 WFOE 
z Location Suzhou or 
Shanghai.  
 
z Friendly investment climate in 
the development zone in 
Suzhou.  
z Brand building of the local 
government to attract Taiwanese 
firms. 
WFOE 
z Location in Suzhou.  
 
9 WFOE 
z Location in Wujiang or 
other development 
zones.  
 
z Less competition in the 
development zone for special 
treatments.  
z Brand building of the local 
government to attract Taiwanese 
firms. 
WFOE 
z Location in the Wujiang 
development zone.  
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Table 4.2   Ownership preference and on-entry adjustment in the cases studied 
(continued) 
 Pre-entry choice On-entry adjustment 
Case Ownership preference Constraints Ownership choice 
10 WFOE 
z Location Wujiang or 
other development 
zones.  
z Less competition in the 
development zone for special 
treatments.  
z Brand building of the local 
government to attract Taiwanese 
firms. 
z Supportive role of the local 
government.  
WFOE 
z Location in the Wujiang 
development zone.  
 
11 EJV 
z Dominant share.  
 
z Strong competence of the local 
partner in technology.  
z Willingness of the local partner for 
cooperation. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
12 WFOE 
z Location in Shanghai,  
Shenzhen or 
Hangzhou. 
z Less competition in Hangzhou for 
special treatments.  
z Brand building of the local 
government to promote FDI. 
WFOE 
z Location in Hangzhou. 
 
13 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
 
z Monopoly status of the local 
partner in local market access.  
z Willingness of the local partner for 
cooperation. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(55%). 
 
14 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
z Willingness of the local partner for 
cooperation. 
EJV 
z Equal equity share 
(50%). 
15 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
 
z Strong competence of the local 
partner in technology. 
z Cooperation seeking by the local 
partner. 
EJV 
z Minority share (49%). 
16 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
z Target partners in 
Shanghai. 
z Unsuccessful partner seeking in 
Shanghai.  
z Investment opportunity seeking of 
the Hangzhou partner. 
EJV 
z Minority share (40%). 
z JV with the Hangzhou 
partner. 
17 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
z Willingness of the local partner for 
cooperation. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share. 
18 EJV 
z Target at a local bank. 
z Unavailability of qualified local 
partners according to international 
standards. 
WFOE 
19 EJV 
z Dominant share. 
 
z Strong competence of the local 
partner in distribution channels. 
z Willingness of the local partner for 
cooperation. 
EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
 
20 EJV 
z Target at a local 
partner in mainland 
China. 
z Availability of partners that have 
strong networks with high-level 
officials in the sector.  
EJV 
z JV with a Hong Kong 
partner. 
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  TC and OC shape Preference: Evidence showed that both transaction costs 
(TC) and organizational capabilities (OC) were presented in the preference 
evaluation of all cases. The measures of both TC and OC referred to technology 
intensity, capital commitment, brand and international market access, which 
represent asset specificity and in-house capabilities. These factors have been widely 
examined in previous empirical studies (e.g. Delios and Beamish, 1999; Luo, 2001a) 
and have also been taken into consideration by foreign firms we studied. Possessing 
these resources or assets, foreign investors preferred to have a WFOE or an EJV 
with a majority share. For example, Case 1, Case 4, Case 5, Case 6, Case 7, Case 8, 
Case 9, Case 10, Case 12 and Case 13 explicitly emphasized their strength in 
technological advance and brand, as the informant in Case 5 stated, “We are a 
leading producer in this sector in the world, with advanced technology and a famous 
brand. We had long considered establishing our own subsidiary in China before the 
firm was established.” For the foreign partners in Case 14 and Case 15, their 
international market networks had much higher values when they considered 
investing in China. When foreign investors perceive higher behavioral uncertainty 
(contractual hazard), they also tend to choose WFOE (Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; 
Kim and Hwang, 1992). In Case 10 and Case 12, the foreign investors concerned the 
potential conflicts in the EJV operation, and therefore explicitly expressed their 
preference of WFOE. In Case 2 and 3, the foreign partners preferred an ownership 
mode with higher control providing the higher risks they encountered in both 
technology and capital commitment.  
 In addition, our cases showed that a foreign investor might desire an EJV in order 
to capture the higher returns from local complementary capabilities, such as local 
market access, local production capability, and local technology capability, by 
giving up full control over the firm. The following quote is revealing:  
 
Case 1: “The foreign partner, though having advantages in technology and being a 
major player in the global market, had very bad performance in China which is the 
largest potential market especially for middle- and low-end products. The foreign 
partner used to import the products. In order to get access to the market, it desired to 
have a local partner which is active in the market and has advantages in production 
and low-end products.” 
Case 18: “Though we established as WFOE, we originally desired to have an EJV in 
which we can build on capabilities to expand into the domestic market quickly.” 
 
 
87
Ownership Choice of Foreign Firms 73 
 Similarly, the foreign investor in Case 13 sought local market access where the 
Chinese partner dominated in one regional market within China. In Cases 11 and 19, 
the foreign investors sought local distribution networks in China. In Case 14, the 
foreign partner, having international market networks, sought a local partner who 
had production capability for cooperation. For the foreign partner in Case 15, it was 
more important to build up technological advantages through cooperation, thus the 
local production and technology capability supplemented their international 
marketing capability. Indeed, when foreign investors aim at capability exploration or 
building in a foreign country, they tend to favor EJV over WFOE (e.g. Luo, 2002a; 
Madhok, 1997) 
 
 Constraints Moderate Preference: No doubt these foreign investors had 
scanned the institutional environment in China earlier. They knew the establishment 
of a foreign firm would have to face constraints, such as ownership restriction and 
local market access imposed by the central government. Therefore, foreign firms 
tend to formulate the ownership preference which realizes constrained efficiency. 
Case 17 and Case 20 are typical provided that they entered the sectors where 
WFOEs were not allowed. In such a situation, foreign investors tend to comply with 
regulations in order to gain legitimacy (e.g. Fu, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Peng, 
2003; Vanhonacker, 1997). Both informants mentioned that “we knew that we can 
only establish an EJV by law. So we take it”. Similarly, the informant of Case 7 
echoed that “we entered into a sector that is highly regulated. Therefore, we 
originally attempted to negotiate on an EJV in another locality”. From this 
perspective, Case 5 is more revealing. The EJV was negotiated just before the 
WFOE Law was issued by the government. The foreign partner knew it would be 
hard, if not impossible, to establish a WFOE in China. The informant expressed,   
 
“We were welcomed by the central government for investing in China. However, the 
central government was restrictive in the approval of foreign firms. In order to increase 
the credibility, we promised to establish an EJV, transfer technology to the local, and 
develop exports. After the establishment, the central government once came to check 
the status of technology transferring…” 
 
 In sum, our cases confirm that ownership preference is shaped by transaction 
costs and capability values, and constraints in the institutional environment as well. 
In China, the constraints come particularly from the perception of ownership 
regulations and sector regulations. The intelligence regarding the institutional 
environment may moderate the preference shifting from WFOE towards EJV, for 
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example when entering a regulated sector. These findings were verified by our 
interviews with the regional headquarters of MNCs in China. The informants from 
the headquarters confirmed that they do not always insist on WFOE, and sometimes 
prefer to establish EJVs. As one informant remarked, “why should we establish a 
WFOE if the local partner has more, e.g. technology and market access, to offer.” 
Another informant confirmed the regulation effect in the remark: “we originally 
considered an EJV in insurance sector since WFOEs are not allowed according to 
the central policy.” 
 
4.4.2 On-Entry Ownership Adjustment 
 
The on-entry ownership adjustments in our cases are summarized in table 4.2. 
Though foreign investors had considered the constraints of the institutional 
environment when they formulated their entry strategy and ownership preference, 
evidence showed that the preference is always subject to adjustment on entry when 
foreign investors come to China. The synthesis or adjustment was arrived at by a 
learning process in which foreign investors directly interacted with local institutions 
(see Table 4.2). Most revealing is Case 5 in which the establishment of the EJV had 
to adapt to local circumstances such as government intervention, availability of local 
partners and their motivation for cooperation. In this case, the implementation of the 
EJV was finally done with adjustment in local partner and equity shares. In addition, 
Case 20 proved that the establishment of the EJV succeeded only when the foreign 
investor found a local partner that had networks with the government which helped 
to obtain the operation license in the regulated sector. In other words, the 
implementation of foreign firms’ ownership preference is constrained practically by 
(local) governments, potential partners, and informal institutions, which entails 
intense on-site negotiations with various parties, making foreign investors concede 
their ownership preference to the circumstances (e.g. Büchel, 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994).  
 The direct learning process generates useful working knowledge on local 
institutions, which goes beyond the perception based on economic intelligence. In 
Case 1, Case 3, Case 5 and Case 18, the foreign investors all preferred to establish 
an EJV prior to entry, but encountered the problem of finding partners when they 
came to implement entry strategy, leading foreign investors to adjust their choice in 
terms of preferred partners. As a result, foreign investors may find a partner that was 
not most desired prior to entry (Case 1 and Case 5), or find an alternative (which 
was not considered at all prior to entry) unexpectedly (Case 3), or find no one at all 
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(Case 18). In Case 1, the foreign partner established the EJV with the current partner 
who is one of the leading players in the domestic market, only after negotiating with 
many other small and medium enterprises. In Case 5, the foreign partner 
encountered the unwillingness of the most desired partner to cooperate, leading to 
the EJV with the current partner. The story went differently in Case 3 and Case 18 
where the availability of qualified partners forced the foreign investors to adjust 
their original preference. While the foreign investor in Case 3 finally selected a 
partner without any desired experience of electronic device production but with 
good political networks, the foreign investor in Case 18 had no choice but to 
establish a WFOE, as is demonstrated in the quotes:  
 
Case 3: “The foreign investor wished to establish an EJV in one of the coastal cities, 
and had spent time investigating and negotiating with many potential partners there. 
The result was disappointing. On his way back, he dropped by Dezhou. One of his 
Chinese friends asked his friend, who was general manager of a book shop in the city, 
to have a dinner with him. This friend invited a few city officials together to have dinner 
with the foreign guest. Through conversations at dinner, the foreign investor was 
impressed by his managerial capability, networks and personality, thus decided to 
establish an electronic device factory in cooperation with his shop.”  
Case 18: “We originally desired to establish an EJV. However, on entry when we 
sought partners, we realized that there were no qualified partners available according 
to the international standard. Therefore, we had to change our mind and established a 
WFOE. In the future, an EJV is still an option.” 
 
 In addition, evidence showed that many EJVs were established through a mutual 
search process. It pointed to the importance of motivation of local partners for 
cooperation (e.g. Shenkar and Li, 1999). For example, in Case 1, 2, 13, 15 and 16, 
the local partners were also seeking cooperation either for new investment 
opportunities or advancing their own capabilities. In Case 1 and Case 15, local 
partners desired to have access to the global market (in a rapid fashion). In Case 13, 
the local partner wished to learn new technologies through cooperation with a 
foreign manufacturer. In Case 16, the local partner was looking for new investment 
opportunities. Very often, those local firms seeking foreign partners for cooperation 
are local winners in terms of economic performance, and their pursuit is encouraged 
by local governments. As a result, when foreign investors encountered this kind of 
local partner, they had to negotiate hard and compromise on control in order to make 
cooperation happen (e.g. Büchel, 2002), as suggested by the following quote:   
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Case 15: “Both partners were looking for cooperation on the market in order to 
increase the competitiveness. Both partners are complementary with respect to 
resources and capabilities. The foreign partner has a well-known brand and 
international market networks, while the local partner is strong in technology and 
products. At the beginning, the foreign partner desired to have dominant control in the 
firm. However, when it negotiated with the local partner, the local partner insisted on 
at least having a majority share in the EJV given its technology advantage. Hard 
negotiations led to a compromise by both partners. The local partner captured control 
through a majority ownership (51%), but promised that the foreign partner has the 
right to buy out some shares after two years.” 
 
 For those observed WFOEs except Case 18, evidence showed that their 
establishment benefited from the motives of the local governments, location 
competition and networking effects. Local governments often work on “two legs” to 
attract and compete for FDI, building up the investment climate on the one hand and 
actively contacting desired investors by means of the investment promotion office 
on the other hand. The three WFOEs (Case 6, 7, and 12) were established just after 
the development zones where they registered were officially opened. At the early 
stage of the development zones, the local governments often urged the provision of 
high incentives to attract FDI in order to generate an agglomeration effect for the 
future (e.g. Ng and Tuan, 2001). Therefore, the foreign MNCs with higher profiles 
(such as good brand, high technology) were often targeted as potential entrants. 
They often received preferential treatment (e.g. Peng, 2000) such as approval of 
WFOE status which is otherwise hard to fulfill, as is shown in the following quotes:  
 
Case 6: “We originally negotiated on an EJV in another locality. It failed because we 
found that the local partner had serious financial problems. In 1997, one Singaporean 
trading partner recommended to us to establish a firm in the zone. We came to 
investigate the investment climate and learnt that the local government is supportive 
and provides high incentives for desired entrants as well. Therefore, we decided to 
establish a WFOE in the zone, the approval of which was facilitated by the local 
government. At that moment, we were the first mover, among our global competitors, to 
invest in China in the sector.”  
Case 12: “The local government desired to have high-tech foreign firms established in 
the newly-opened development zone, which would help promote the zone for FDI. We 
are the first foreign firm in the development zone. In particular, we have a well-known 
brand and produce high-tech products. In the interaction with the local government we 
also knew that we could enjoy more beneficial treatment when there were still only a 
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few foreign firms. Therefore, when we became established as WFOE the local 
government facilitated approval.” 
 
 The WFOE in Case 4 was the result of production expansion of the parent’s first 
subsidiary in Suzhou, but was established in the development zone in Wuxi. Its 
establishment was benefited from the location competition between development 
zones. The informant pointed out that “Our firm size is relatively large in the current 
zone, but it is not significant in the previous zone. Therefore, our requests can be 
easily fulfilled here.” 
 The story is more striking in Case 7. In this case, the foreign investor entered a 
regulated sector where WFOEs are not allowed. However, with the help of the local 
government and networking, the WFOE was approved by the central government as 
a special arrangement. It is evidenced by the informant’s words:  
 
 “We originally considered an EJV in another locality. But later we moved to the 
development zone. The reasons are multi-faceted. First, the zone attempted to attract 
large FDI, especially those from well-known MNCs by offering better treatment. 
Second, and more importantly, the local government promised to help us establish a 
WFOE when we promised to commit a large capital investment. The zone is one 
window of China to attract FDI. Therefore, the central government is also concerned 
with its performance with respect to the quality and amount of realized FDI, especially 
at the early stage of the development. The local government consulted with and 
contacted the central government for this project, and finally the project was specially 
approved by the ministry as the first WFOE in the sector in China”.  
 
 In China, indeed, the fiscal decentralization drives the location competition, and 
hence local governments have incentives to bargain with the central government 
regarding policy implementation that meets their local conditions (e.g. Peng, 2000; 
Segal and Thun, 2001). Only through direct interactions can foreign firms make 
better sense of the local context and learn how to leverage on local governments, 
very likely leading to subsequent ownership adjustment.  
 
4.4.3 Post-entry Ownership Readjustment 
 
Learning is an ongoing process (e.g. Büchel, 2002). During the operation, investors 
may encounter policy changes in the dynamic economic transition or partners may 
prove to be unsustainable (e.g. inability of one partner to continue making its 
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commitment or opportunism in cooperation). These experiences trigger the related 
parties to reevaluate the selected ownership mode, which may lead to re-adjustment 
of the choice. This readjustment may not often occur in many firms, but it does shed 
light on the learning process regarding local institutions. The post-entry ownership 
readjustments in our cases are summarized in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3   Post-entry ownership readjustments in the cases studied 
 On-entry choice Post-entry readjustment 
Case Ownership mode Constraints Ownership mode 
2 EJV 
z Majority equity share 
(75%).  
z Inability of the local partner 
to make further financial 
commitment. 
z Suggestion of the local 
government. 
WFOE 
5 EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
z Opportunism of the local 
partner in profit allocation. 
 
EJV 
z Dominant share (80%). 
 
11 EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
z Conflicts in operations and 
about investment decisions.
 
WFOE 
13 EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(55%). 
 
z Complaints by the local 
partner about opportunism 
of the foreign partner.  
z Tension between two 
parties in investment 
decision making.  
Negotiation on possible 
decrease of foreign equity 
shares. 
14 EJV 
z Equal equity share 
(50%). 
z Inability of the local partner 
to make continuous 
financial commitment. 
Negotiation on possible 
increase of foreign equity 
shares  
17 EJV 
z Non-dominant share. 
z Changes in policy allowing 
WFOE in the sector. 
WFOE 
19 EJV 
z Non-dominant share 
(51%). 
 
z Conflicts about product 
brands. 
z Neither party wished to 
compromise.  
WFOE 
 
 We observed ownership changes in operation in five cases. Case 2, Case 11, Case 
17 and Case 19 changed from an EJV to a WFOE, and in Case 5, the foreign 
ownership share was increased. Additionally, we observed two potential changes 
that were under negotiation. In Case 13, the foreign ownership share is likely to 
decrease, and in Case 14, the foreign ownership share will be increased. Evidence 
showed that the re-adjustment can be achieved in response to policy changes (Case 
17). Policy changes frequently take place in China as a result of the pragmatic 
approach to economic transition. After the ownership restriction was largely 
released in 1990s, some established EJVs tend to reorganize into WFOEs 
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(Vanhonacker, 1997). Evidence also showed that re-adjustment may be a response 
to conflicts with local institutions. These conflicts could not be ex ante anticipated. 
Over time, “the initial conditions may prove to be unsustainable …. [and] the local 
partner may prove unable or unwilling to join in financing subsequent expansion.” 
(Child, 2002) Thus, in response to these changes, EJVs are triggered to restructure 
themselves (Yan and Gray, 1994). 
 In Case 2, the foreign equity share increased from 75% to 100% (WFOE) in 2003 
when the local partner encountered serious financial problems and thus was no 
longer able to commit to the cooperation. Therefore, the local partner, as a state-
owned enterprise, reported to the local government. Subsequently, the local 
government suggested the foreign partner should buy it out. As the informant 
stressed, “The foreign partner has the priority of buying out according to the 
agreement but does not have to do it. However, it is wise to follow the suggestion of 
the local government.” Similarly, in Case 14, the local partner was considering 
investing in other businesses and therefore partly withdrawing from the cooperation 
in order to get additional capital. The foreign partner had accepted it and they were 
negotiating on a renewed agreement.  
 In Case 19, both partners could not agree on the brand name because each party 
desired to stress their own brand. Therefore, in order to reduce the conflict in the 
future, the foreign investor bought the shares out and turned the EJV into a WFOE 
in 2001. The informant in Case 11 also confirmed that conflicts between the two 
partners led the foreign partner to take over full control of the firm by turning it into 
a WFOE. Case 5 is more revealing. In this case, the foreign partner encountered 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the local partners, which created conflicts 
among them. Therefore, the foreign partner urged the capture of more control over 
the operation in order to safeguard the business. The readjustment is evidenced by 
the quote:  
 
“In the first two years of operation, the local partner was not satisfied with the low 
performance. It was unexpected for them. Therefore they asked for financial 
compensation. When the firm started to profit in the third year, the local partner 
wanted to both keep the compensation and claim the profit share. We could not accept 
such opportunistic behavior. One solution was to gain a higher control over the 
operation. Therefore, we negotiated with the local partner and local government on the 
possible change in ownership structure. It was not easy. Finally we increased our 
share from 51% to 80% and captured the full control in operation, but on the condition 
that the compensation agreement remained.” 
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 The foreign investor in Case 13 encountered the complaint from the local partner 
about its opportunism. In this case, the local partner was not satisfied with firm 
performance with respect to technology transfer and product development, and 
therefore fought to increase their shares to avoid intervention from the foreign parent, 
which is revealed by the quote:  
 
“The foreign partner was concerned only with local market access by taking advantage 
of us, but acted very slowly in terms of product development and technology transfer. 
When we reported new product plans to the foreign headquarters, they were always 
careless and reacted very slowly, which made us miss a few opportunities. On a few 
occasions, the Headquarters even broke their promises. We, the local side, have the 
management right, but we do not have the final decision right for investment since we 
have only a minority share in the EJV. Therefore, we have been urged to increase our 
shares in the EJV in order to better manage the business. The Headquarters orally 
agreed to it. But the agreement will take time to be implemented.” 
 
 
 Taking the on-entry ownership adjustment and post-entry readjustment in our 
cases together, it is confirmed that a problem of information asymmetry occurs in all 
cases regarding the institutional environment in China at the local level, which is the 
information regarding local institutions (firms and local governments), informal 
institutions (e.g. their attitudes and motives), and policy implementation and 
changes. Therefore, the envisaged ownership preference of a foreign firm often 
encounters difficulty in implementation, which entails adjustment for the 
establishment in the on- (and post-) entry stage (e.g. Büchel, 2002; Tallman and 
Shenkar, 1994).  
 The two-phase process model provides a synthesized approach to the ownership 
choice of foreign firms in China. It not only confirms that the ownership choice 
indeed reflects the various trade-offs (e.g. Luo, 2001a), but it is more insightful 
since it specifies the underlying learning process in the ownership choice. The host 
country institutions of China influence the ownership choice of foreign firms in two 
phases. In the first phase of pre-entry, the national, formal institutions (laws and 
regulations) shape the evaluation of ownership preference by foreign investors. In 
the second phase of on- (and post-) entry, foreign investors would find their 
knowledge of China to be insufficient, in particular those at local level. The 
consistent evidence shows that foreign investors acquire knowledge on site by direct 
interactions with institutions at local level. Only through direct interaction can 
foreign investors learn the attitude and motives of the local government regarding 
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FDI, and only in so doing can foreign investors negotiate on specific arrangement. 
In addition, in the case of establishing EJVs, foreign investors have to make direct 
contact with potential partners in order to learn about their willingness for 
cooperation and their competence. As our cases show, it is the learning process 
regarding information asymmetry at local level that makes foreign investors ex post 
“absorb” the actual constraints for establishment and operation, and subsequently 
adjust their ownership preference to the choices that we observe in foreign firms. 
However, we do not claim that all the factors specified in the model will be 
presented in every ownership choice. Rather, we claim that the model provides a 
pragmatic explanation of the ownership choice of foreign firms in China and 
suggests which factors one may have to consider and when.  
 
 
4.5 Discussions and Propositions 
 
Our findings demonstrate that the process approach is very insightful, which helps to 
identify “events” that lead to the choice. Two “events”, preference and adjustment, 
are recognized as two phases in the ownership choice of foreign firms in China, 
which are shaped or constrained by various variables. These findings distinguish 
between “what a foreign firm desires to have” (preference) and “what a foreign firm 
can do” (what we observed) regarding ownership choices, leading us to reconsider 
the previous studies based on variance approach. From this new perspective, 
previous studies based on a variance approach mainly explained the first phase of 
preference evaluation but were silent and unable to explain the subsequent 
ownership adjustment. It is one reason why the previous findings are often 
inconsistent and inconclusive.  
 Many studies in international business, including those on ownership choices, 
recognize the significance of institutions in the host country or in China in particular 
(e.g. Child and Tse, 2001; Peng, 2003). However, their focus is on the national level, 
which does not fully characterize the Chinese feature. In China, localities and local 
institutions matter very much (e.g. Krug, 2004; Qian, 2002). More striking is that 
informal institutions prevail in doing business (e.g. Boisot and Child, 1996; Krug, 
2004). In addition, domestic firms are not necessarily passive “role takers”, i.e. 
taken into cooperation by foreign investors, and rather they may also be active “role 
makers”, i.e. seeking cooperation with foreign investors (e.g. Shenkar and Li, 1999). 
Our study has fruitfully incorporated the local perspective into the learning process. 
The local perspective calls for attention to the problem of information asymmetry, 
which helps to explain why ownership adjustment is necessary, what institutions 
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matter to the choice, and what choice can be realized. It is this local perspective that 
makes the process dynamic and lively, which also explains from where foreign 
investors gain their knowledge about a host country. Therefore, adding a local 
perspective complicates the process, but has high value for our understanding of the 
ownership choice of foreign firms and of international strategies in general (Ma and 
Delios, 2007; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). In what follows we attempt to incorporate 
existing studies into the two-phase learning process, and subsequently advance 
propositions for the future rigorous test.  
 
 Ownership choice as a process: Our findings explicate the learning process of 
ownership choices of foreign firms in China, which was regarded as a ‘black box” in 
previous studies with the assumption that decision-makers consider all information 
simultaneously. A few studies recognized the complexity in the ownership choice, 
arguing for an integrated approach to the phenomenon (e.g. Hill et al., 1990; Luo, 
2001a). However, these studies did not, and were unable to, explain the difference 
between the observed ownership choice and ownership preference of a foreign firm. 
Gomes-Casseres (1990) suggested that, given the bounded rationality of decision-
makers, the ownership choices may involve two interactive processes, i.e. ownership 
preference and ownership concession. Our findings complement Gomes-Casseres’s 
suggestion, and demonstrate that foreign firms indeed follow these two sequent 
processes in the ownership choice when entering China. Various factors work in 
different phases in different way. Before entry, foreign investors have evaluated 
their ownership preference considering their global strategy, technology input, 
capability values, and the host country regulations. Yet, they may have to adjust the 
preferred ownership mode on site after learning actual institutional constraints 
generated at the local level, the information of which (e.g. enforcement of 
institutions, motives and attitudes) is deeply embedded locally and not possible ex 
ante acquired (Krug, 2004). For example, absence and unwillingness of reliable 
partners would make an EJV impossible (Case 18); positive attitude of the local 
government may make impossible things (WFOE) possible (Case 7). Therefore, it 
can be proposed that:  
 
Proposition 1: The ownership choice of a foreign firm in China is made 
through a process in which the preference evaluated by the Headquarters 
outside of China is likely to be adjusted subsequently on site in China.  
   
 Preference: Previous studies have largely focused on ownership preference by 
drawing on insights from TCT and OC. Though with different focuses, many have 
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argued that these two approaches are more complementary in explaining strategic 
choices (e.g. Williamson, 1999; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Therefore, as Madhok 
(1997) argues, foreign firms tend to balance transaction costs and capability values 
in choosing ownership modes. Our findings confirm these studies, showing that 
when exploiting existing technology with a fear of value erosion, foreign firms 
prefer WFOE (Case 12); when aiming at exploring new capabilities, they prefer EJV 
(Case 1, 11, 15, 19). However, as theorists would argue, preference is often 
developed as constrained efficiency (e.g. Martinez and Dacin, 1999; Roberts and 
Greenwood, 1997). Therefore, preference evaluation must be influenced by external 
constraints. Indeed, as our findings show, foreign firms tend to take EJV as default 
choice when they face high ownership restriction or enter into a regulated sector 
(Case 5, 7, 17, 20), in which the legitimacy demand shaped their preference. 
Therefore, our findings evidence that, in China, ownership preference is evaluated 
on TC, OC and constraints altogether.  
 Over time, the choice of WFOEs has gained legitimacy in China (Li et al., 2007). 
Since 1990s, the ownership restriction has been largely released, leading to the 
increase in the number of WFOEs (China Ministry of Commerce, 2005; 
Vanhonacker, 1997). These observations suggest that foreign investors in general 
wish to establish WFOEs which offer higher returns from operation in China. The 
recent trend of acquisition in China implies that foreign investors do not have to rely 
on cooperation to get access to local market, and instead can make a fast move by 
means of acquisition. It suggests that, with the increasing openness of China after 
the WTO accession, more and more foreign investors formulate their ownership 
preference based on efficiency criteria instead of legitimacy criteria unless the 
external legitimacy is highly demanded in certain regulated sectors such as 
pharmaceutical, insurance, and media. In addition to changes in the FDI policy, 
foreign investors gradually take more consideration of domestic industry 
development in China. Chinese firms have developed their advantages in technology 
as well, especially in electronics and ICT sectors (e.g. Amighini, 2005). Many firms 
in the sector have become globally-oriented, such as Huawei and Lenovo, seeking to 
exploit their technology advance and explore international markets. Their 
technology capabilities may be very complementary to those of foreign investors 
(Case 1 and 15), and thus they seek and are sought for cooperation by foreign 
investors. In this sense, foreign investors do prefer EJVs in certain situations, but do 
not establish an EJV simply for general local knowledge, instead more for specific 
technology-related knowledge that supplements to their technology. In this case, 
EJVs will offer higher values for foreign investors in building new capabilities. 
Therefore, it can be proposed that:  
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Proposition 2.1: In the pre-entry evaluation, foreign investors take EJV as 
default choice in China only when (1) entering into a regulated or 
monopolized sector; (2) entering into a market niche where local firms are 
prospering and globally-oriented, and have the advantage in (complementary) 
technology.  
Proposition 2.2: In the pre-entry evaluation, foreign investors are more likely 
to take WFOE (acquisition or Greenfield establishment) in China when they 
perceive a lower degree of regulatory constraints. 
 
 Adjustment: Our findings highlight the process of ownership adjustment. 
Though previous studies taking a bargaining perspective (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 
1990; Lecraw, 1984) or relying on IT (Lu, 2002; Xu et al., 2004; Yiu and Makino, 
2002) are also concerned about “what a foreign firm can do” in a host country. 
However, they presume an existing preference. On the other hand, they are 
concerned with the host country as a whole, using aggregated information as a proxy 
of constraints. They measure the institutional constraints by state influence, 
regulative distance, normative distance and cultural distance. We argue that this kind 
of knowledge contributes only to the evaluation of preference, does not explain on-
site adjustment. The knowledge such as how institutions are actually enforced can 
only be acquired through direct interactions after entry. In China, in particular, 
formal institutions are weakly enforced and informal institutions prevail (e.g. Boisot 
and Child, 1996), and localities matter in doing business (e.g. OECD, 2005; Krug, 
2004). These issues are nearly absent, or at least not taken to the core, in the 
previous studies on ownership choices. However, studies on IJVs draw attention to 
local institutions such as domestic firms as potential partners, and they imply the 
possible ownership adjustment as a result of partner selection and negotiating with 
partners and other stakeholders (e.g. Büchel, 2002; Luo, 1997).  
 Our findings emphasize the effects of both local institutions and informal 
institutions on the ownership adjustment in China. First, local governments matter 
since they interpret and implement the central policies, and sometimes circumvent 
them to their interests (e.g. Segal and Thun, 2001). Therefore, there is tension 
between formal rules and self-motives (attitudes). Local governments may seek 
leeway to make special arrangements regardless of the formal regulations, which are 
often targeted at desired MNCs (Case 7 and Case 12). In so doing, local 
governments not only facilitate the implementation of ownership preference by 
foreign firms (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), but also reinforce the competitiveness of 
the locality by nurturing agglomeration of well-known MNCs and develop their own 
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(political) performance as well. In addition, foreign investors have to confront 
domestic firms when seeking collaborating partners (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; 
Shenkar and Li, 1999). Criteria may include at least competence and willingness of 
local partners. Finding a match takes time and involves intense negotiations (Case 1, 
3, 5). No match may also be the case (Case 18), more particularly in sectors such as 
banking where there exist only a few state-owned enterprises and their governance 
reform lags far behind other sectors such as electronics and ICT. In contemporary 
China, the presumed technological advantage of foreign investors is often 
challenged by those local firms with technological advantage and actively seeking 
cooperation as well. Therefore, the ownership choice of foreign firms in China is 
often subject to adjustment after direct confrontation of (local) institutions (learning 
effect). Thus, it can be proposed that:  
 
Proposition 3.1: In a non-regulated sector in China, the ownership preference 
of WFOE is only subject to adjustment when local governments are restrictive.  
Proposition 3.2: In a regulated sector in China, the ownership preference of 
WFOE is negotiable when (1) the foreign investor makes large commitments, 
and (2) the investment is desired by the locality. 
Proposition 3.3: The ownership preference of EJV is likely to be changed to 
WFOE when the entered non-regulated sector in China is structurally weak.  
Proposition 3.4: The ownership preference of EJV is likely to be adjusted 
regarding share structures in China when local potential partners have 
sufficient bargaining powers.  
 
 Readjustment: Ownership readjustment may occur and is necessary when the 
previous arrangement is found not to be sustainable (Büchel, 2002; Child, 2002). 
Our findings confirm theirs. However, previous studies departing from a foreign 
perspective often acknowledged the problems associated with local partners who 
may prove to be unreliable or unable to maintain the cooperation. The same was 
found in our cases as well (Case 2, 5 and 19). Our findings suggest that, from a local 
perspective, foreign partners may also create similar problems. In Case 13, the 
foreign partner is concerned with market access only in operation, while the local 
partner is concerned with technology transfer and new business opportunities. The 
diverging interests led to conflicts over time in decision-making which forced the 
local partner to renegotiate on the ownership structure. In addition, foreign firms 
may also seek to establish WFOEs in order to capture the full control once the 
related policy makes it possible (Case 17) (Vanhonacher, 1997). Therefore, it can be 
proposed that:  
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Proposition 4.1: The ownership mode of foreign firms is likely to be 
readjusted from EJV to WFOE in China when (1) the sector regulation is 
released, AND (2) the foreign investor prefers WFOE to EJV.  
Proposition 4.2: The ownership structure of EJVs is likely to be readjusted in 
China when (1) either partner fails to make its commitment, AND (2) the other 
partner has sufficient bargaining power.  
 
 The adjustment and readjustment are related to studies on experience in 
international business. Our findings comply with them regarding the learning 
process. Foreign investors expand from one country to another or increase their 
commitment in one country depending on their direct experience there (e.g. 
Jahanson and Vahlne, 1977; Meyer and Gelbuda, 2006; Meyer and Tran, 2006). 
Previous studies on ownership choices have considered the effect of experiences, but 
more that of the corporate (foreign parent) as a whole in one specific country (e.g. 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Guillén, 2003). We argue 
that the previous experience of the corporate only plays a role in shaping the 
ownership preference. Our findings further illustrate that the direct experience, 
through learning by doing, of the foreign investor when establishing a specific 
subsidiary plays a larger role in the ownership choice, which forces the investor to 
make the necessary adjustment regarding the ownership structure. The direct 
experience of interacting with (local) institutions generates knowledge regarding 
how institutions are actually enforced, what institutions matter, and how local 
governments and firms actually behave in China. Therefore, it can be proposed that:  
 
Proposition 5.1: Foreign investors that are willing to learn about local 
institutions and informal institutions on site are more likely to make ownership 
adjustment when establishing a firm in China.  
Proposition 5.2: Foreign investors rely on others’ experience in China to 
evaluate the ownership preference but rely on direct experience in China to 
adjust the ownership choice.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The findings of this cross-case analysis demonstrate that what we observe as 
ownership choices of foreign firms often differ from what they desired to have prior 
to entry. This study enriches our understanding of the phenomenon and advances the 
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theory of ownership choice of foreign firms, providing a dynamic view of the two-
phase learning process from preference to adjustment by incorporating previous 
findings. The ownership adjustment is necessitated due to information asymmetry at 
local level in China. 
 This local perspective makes the model very China-specific. For example, 
functioning of local institutions and the interplay between formal and informal 
institutions may not be the same in another setting. This feature may be the 
limitation that affects the generalization of the findings. However, we argue that the 
content of the process may be too China-specific, but the structure of the process is 
likely to be generalized to other contexts. A similar process perspective has already 
been implied by the bargaining approach (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kobrin, 1987) 
and studies on IJVs (e.g. Tallman and Shenkar, 1994) in other settings.  
 This chapter helps us clarify one puzzle in the phenomenon, i.e. the difference 
between ownership preference and observed choice, and the propositions will guide 
future investigation into the phenomenon. In addition, this study can be extended 
through several avenues. First, studying the failures of the establishment of foreign 
firms can help reinforce the explanatory power of the process model, by looking into 
whether the failure is due to the lack of learning effect. Second, taking WFOEs 
through acquisition into the analysis and distinguishing them from WFOEs on 
green-field can add additional insights into the process model. Third, a comparison 
between manufacturing and service firms will be needed to sort out the relative 
weight of different factors in different sectors in China. Fourth, the process that 
constructs the interplay between transaction costs, organizational capabilities, and 
institutional constraints can be applied to study other strategic issues of foreign firms 
in China, such as value-chain relationship and governmental relationship. All in all, 
this study calls the attention of foreign firms to local institutions, largely ignored, 
when entering and operating in China. This process approach not only emphasizes 
the significance of (local) institutions in strategizing but also characterizes the 
feature of their interplay with other economic factors in transition economies such as 
in China, which undoubtedly broadens our view of strategy research in transition 
economies in general (e.g. Meyer and Peng, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). 
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5 Managing the Firm-Government Relations 
in China: A Political Strategy Perspective 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Governments’ control of resources and opportunities shapes business and its 
institutional environment (e.g. Baron, 1995; Ring et al., 2005). In practice, 
strategizing the firm-government relationship is a challenge (e.g. Watkins, 2003), 
especially for foreign firms that operate in transition economies, where they face 
weakly enforced institutions (e.g. Caves, 1996; Makino et al., 2004; Peng, 2003; 
Roland, 2000). China is a unique case. The gradual approach to economic transition 
there has led to the development of a hybrid market system where government 
intervention remains substantial (Nee, 1992). Similarly, as a result of 
decentralization, local governments also intervene in local economic activities. 
Behaving as agents of the central government and at the same time as entrepreneurs 
themselves, local governments represent a major source of uncertainty for foreign 
firms. This chapter investigates why and how foreign firms strategically manage 
their relationship with local government in China.  
 Previous research confirms that host governments have gradually shifted from an 
adversarial to a cooperative attitude towards foreign firms (Dunning, 1998; Vernon, 
1998). Traditional international business scholarship usually sees  the relationship 
between foreign firms and host governments as conflicting and adversarial (Fagre 
and Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987), and entailing negotiations between two parties on 
entry, operations and exit (Ramamurti, 2001). Responding to the change in 
government attitudes in many parts of China, foreign firms have adapted to local 
economic demands and the local institutional context (Luo, 2001b). These studies 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship between foreign firms and host 
governments, but fall short of explaining how foreign firms politically engage host 
governments to influence the institutional environment.  
 Recently, a political strategy perspective has been developed which provides 
insights into this question (e.g. Baron, 1995; Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Hillman and 
89 
104
                                                   Chapter 5 90
Hitt, 1999). Acknowledging the significance of non-market factors for firms, 
political strategists argue that firms need to develop means to influence government 
and public policy decisions, thus to reduce uncertainty (Bonardi and Keim, 2005; 
Rugman, 1998). From the political strategy perspective, firms develop either a 
transactional or a relational approach to reach their goals (Henisz and Zelner, 2004; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999). This approach is supported by various strategic actions; 
either reactive (e.g. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994), or proactive (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999). Therefore, foreign firms not only react to but also act upon the institutional 
environment by strategizing their relationship with host governments. Despite this 
acknowledgement of the political behavior of foreign firms (Boddewyn and Brewer, 
1994) however, academic knowledge of the political strategies of foreign firms 
remains scant (Hillman and Wan, 2005). Few studies on the political strategies of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have begun to model the relationship between 
host government and firms’ subsidiaries as the level of analysis (Blumentritt and 
Nigh, 2002; Hillman and Wan, 2005): they analyze the national government as the 
counterpart of foreign firms instead of examining the particular role of local 
governments – this, according to academics of transition economies (in particular 
China), is an unsatisfactory approach (e.g. Krug, 2004; Walder 1995). In addition, 
the assumption of democracy in a developed economy is not applicable to China. 
Meanwhile, omitting the specificity of a firm’s context when examining its political 
behaviour is certainly unhelpful (Brasher and Lowery, 2006; Peng 2002; Rodriguez 
et al., 2006). Few studies have so far been conducted on the political strategies of 
firms in the context of China (Kennedy, 2007; Li and Zhou, 2005). 
 This chapter employs insights from the political strategy perspective to analyze 
the relationship between foreign subsidiaries and local governments. We studied 24 
foreign firms in China in order to understand their political behaviour in this 
particular political context. Our study demonstrates that the specificity of the context 
plays a significant role in shaping the political strategies of foreign firms. Based on 
our field work in China, we claim that foreign subsidiaries are geared to mitigating 
bureaucratic burdens and appropriating rents in their relations with local 
governments, rather than trying to influence public policy at the central-government 
level. Successful firms need to combine technical capabilities (size and technology) 
with social capital (guanxi) to effectively operate in China.  
 While previous empirical studies on political strategies have focused on strategic 
actions, this study contributes to the theory of political strategy by linking incentives 
with both strategic actions and organizational choices (i.e. relations with the 
government). Strategic actions and organizational forms do not necessarily follow in 
sequence (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), but are more likely interdependent. This study 
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expands the political strategy approach by exploring how strategic actions and 
organizational forms affect the non-market performance (rents in the political 
market) of firms in a non-democratic economy. In addition, this study enriches our 
understanding of the political behaviour of foreign firms by adding a local 
perspective (Gets, 1997). Not only does the behaviour of local governments shape 
the different demands of foreign firms in the local political market, but informal 
institutions substantially constrain their political behaviour too. The results of our 
study suggest that MNCs need to explore multiple layers of governance while 
focusing on two main relationships: one with central government, the other with 
local government. Therefore, our study has insightful implications for international 
business and (political) strategy research on transition economies (Shenkar, 2004; 
Wright et al., 2005).  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a 
theoretical framework for studying the political behaviour of foreign firms, followed 
by an outline of our research methods and case studies (Section 5.3). Section 5.4 
presents our findings and is followed in Section 5.5 by a discussion and our 
contribution to extant theories, presented as a set of propositions. Section 5.6 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
 
In this chapter, we attempt to explore why and how foreign firms seek to manage 
their relations with local governments in China. From the perspective of political 
strategy, firms need to integrate their political and market strategies in order to 
perform well (Baron, 1995). Analogous with economic markets, it is assumed that a 
political market exists where firms “demand” policies and (local) governments 
“supply” them (Bonardi et al., 2005). It is further assumed that firms in the same 
competitive environment will perform differently depending on their ability to deal 
with the non-market environment. Figure 5.1 shows a framework for studying the 
political behaviour of foreign firms, pointing to three major components, i.e. the 
non-market environment, firms’ individual characteristics, and the political 
behaviour of firms. These three components are explained in what follows.  
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Political behaviour 
of firms
Firm characteristics Non-market 
environment
 
 • Governance forms
  - Transactional 
 
 
Figure 5.1    Design for the political strategies of foreign firms 
 
5.2.1 Government and the Non-Market Environment 
 
The successful political engagement of governments by firms is arguably 
fundamental to their survival and the implementation of their market strategies (e.g. 
Baron, 1995; Oliver, 1997). Government is the key supplier in this political market. 
Studies on political strategies demonstrate that government matters to firms in 
various ways (e.g. Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Bonardi et al., 2005; Gets, 1997; 
Schuler et al., 2002; Shaffer and Hillman, 2000). For example, government 
determines the rules of economic activity, the structure and scope of markets, and 
the provision of policies and services. In addition, these rules may be corrupted by 
government agents or officials (e.g. Rodriguez et al., 2005). For example, firms may 
fear a particularly unfavorable public policy or regulation that is being implemented 
(Gets, 1997; Shaffer, 1995), especially when salient issues are involved (Bonardi 
and Keim, 2005). This interdependence with the political environment (Cascioro and 
Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) makes it attractive for firms to seek 
ways to influence government and public policy decisions to their advantage 
(Bonardi et al., 2006; McWilliams et al., 2002). 
 When expanding abroad, firms face political uncertainty caused by the 
institutional idiosyncrasies of the host country (Henisz, 2003) and therefore attempt 
to safeguard their operation by engaging the host-country government (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Rugman, 1998). It is particularly important in transition 
economies where governments not only exert considerable influence over firms, but 
z Local government 
z Institutional 
differences 
z Resources - Relational 
z Structure • Strategic actions 
 - Reactive 
- Proactive 
Performance 
 
- Public policy 
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frequently change their policies as well (Khanna et al., 2005; Ramamurti, 2003). 
This is, in China, characterized with weakly enforced hybrid economic institutions 
(Nee, 1992) and policy ambiguity (e.g. Child and Tse, 2001; EIU, 2003; OECD, 
2005). Foreign firms have to seek ways to address the political uncertainty generated 
by these features (Daniels et al., 1985), while exploiting new opportunities in the 
public policy process (e.g. Qian, 2002).  
 The political uncertainty faced by foreign firms in China is directly linked to the 
local level, as decentralization empowers local governments to interpret and 
implement central policies according to their local conditions (Montinola et al., 1996; 
Segal and Thun, 2001). As a consequence, foreign firms face uncertainty not only 
caused by unexpected policy changes over time, but also directly generated by local 
governments as they establish their autonomy (e.g. Krug and Hendrischke, 2005). 
Therefore, it is expected that foreign firms are more likely to engage in political 
activities at the local level.  
 
5.2.2 Firm Characteristics 
 
A firm’s characteristics (resources, structure etc.) shape its willingness and ability to 
engage in political strategizing (Getz, 1997). Organizational resources are identified 
in various measurements, such as organizational slack (Rehbein and Schuler, 1995), 
size (Fligstein, 1996; Schuler et al., 2002), technological level and the occurrence 
(and quantity) of economic spillover (Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman and Wan, 2005). 
Organizational structure refers to a formally established office to follow political 
changes in the host country and lobby for favorable policy enforcement (Rehbein 
and Schuler, 1995).  
     Previous empirical studies argue that organizational slack has a positive effect on 
the ability of a firm to engage in political strategizing, but its effect on the 
willingness of a firm to do so is indeterminate. Taking firm size as a proxy for 
organizational resources, it is argued that larger firms are likely to suffer more from 
political uncertainty and thus have a greater demand (willingness) for favorable 
public policies. In addition, larger firms are likely to have more resources (ability) to 
commit to political engagement.  
     Technology and economic spillover are important resources for foreign firms and 
offer leverage in political negotiations. Technology refers to the degree to which 
firms are technologically advanced. Economic spillover refers to the degree to which 
firms generate additional economic activity in the locality (in supply chains, for 
instance). The higher the degree of technological advancement or economic 
spillover, the more powerful the firm is in its interaction with the host government.  
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Empirical studies also show that the establishment of a formal department to 
manage political strategies is positively related to the willingness and ability of a 
firm to engage in political activities (e.g. Rehbein and Schuler, 1995). A firm with 
an established governmental affairs office often has high demand for political 
actions, and specialists staffed in the office make the firm adept at political activities. 
    
5.2.3 The Political Behaviour of Firms 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, both the political environment and the characteristics of a 
firm influence its political behavior. We identify two aspects of the political 
behaviour of firms, i.e. governance forms and strategic actions. As in the literature 
on supply or contractual relations, two distinct governance forms, transactional or 
relational, can be distinguished (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Henisz and 
Williamson, 1999; Henisz and Zelner, 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). The 
transactional form refers to a short-term, discrete exchange between firms and 
government. The relational form refers to a long-term, close and re-negotiable 
agreement between partners. As has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Krug and Pólos, 
2004; Luo, 2006), the choice between these two forms is influenced by the political 
uncertainty in transition economies where (foreign) firms “internalize” uncertainty 
by choosing a relational form which facilitates quick adjustments to changing 
circumstances and engagement with the institutional environment.  
The choice between transactional or relational forms may also be shaped by the 
behaviour of the host government. Drawing on institutional theory (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001), Hillman and Hitt (1999) argue that countries that 
emphasize personal relations and collective decision-making will opt for a relational 
form; in contrast, more individualistic or legally pluralistic countries opt for a 
transactional form. Studies on China agree that network capitalism (Boisot and 
Child, 1988, 1996), if not local corporatism (e.g. Nee, 1992; Oi, 1995; Walder, 
1995), is the best term to describe the institutional environment there. It can 
therefore be expected that foreign firms will follow the example of domestic firms in 
China (Bruton et al., 2000; Che and Qian, 1998; Li and Zhou, 2005) and also opt for 
a relational form to manage the relationship with local government and to mitigate 
political hazards.  
  In addition, firms will choose between reactive and proactive actions (e.g. 
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Reactive actions include 
compliance, avoidance, and circumvention. Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) argue that, 
in confrontation with the host government, foreign firms may comply with imposed 
requirements by the government, avoid them by leaving the country, or circumvent 
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them through informal activities. Proactive actions include an information strategy 
(lobbying, for example), an incentive strategy (contributions to politicians, for 
example), and a “constituency” strategy (public relations etc.). When adopting a 
reactive approach, firms give up opportunities to bargain for better policies. 
Therefore, Hillman and Hitt (1999) argue that firms are more likely to take proactive 
measures in order to profit in the political market. Empirical studies have shown that 
firms are more proactive than reactive with respect to their political behaviour and 
when attempting to shape public policy outcomes in their interests (e.g. Bonardi et 
al., 2006). In transition economies (and especially in China), proactivity enables 
firms to leverage government support (e.g. Li and Zhou, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Sanyal and Guvenli, 2000), which is crucial for mitigating the political transaction 
costs created in an uncertain institutional environment. Established firms, often 
incurring substantial sunk costs, are therefore often highly network-concerned in 
their dealings with government (e.g. Hendrischke, 2007; Li, 2005) and tend to use 
voice (proactive action) instead of exit (reactive action). when engaging government 
(Zhu et al., 2006). Previous studies in an international setting show that the ability of 
a firm (determined by a firm’s characteristics) positively impacts on its commitment 
to each of the three proactive actions (Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman and Wan, 2005; 
Schuler et al., 2002). Therefore, it is expected that foreign firms in China are more 
likely to take proactive action when they have the higher ability to do so.  
 
 To summarize, the political strategy perspective suggests that political 
engagement leads to potential rents that can be appropriated using a fitting strategy 
in the political market. In order to capture these rents, foreign firms have to manage 
their governmental relations strategically. The political behaviour of foreign firms is 
thus reflected in their preferred governance forms and choices of strategic action 
directed at local government. Preferred governance forms are moderated by political 
uncertainty and the structure of the political system. The choice of strategic actions 
is determined by the willingness and ability of a firm to politically engage. In what 
follows, we develop a case study to investigate the political strategies of foreign 
firms at the local level and the applicability of our proposed framework.  
 
 
5.3 Research Method 
 
5.3.1 Case Study 
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In this study, we are concerned with the political behaviour of foreign firms in China. 
Therefore, as described above, we are interested in motivation, governance and 
strategic action; and to what extent political behaviour is influenced by the non-
market environment and firms’ characteristics. We studied 24 foreign firms in five 
cities from 2004 to 2006. Table 5.1 presents the characteristics of the cases studied. 
Our cases are diverse in terms of size, sector, country of origin, and year of 
establishment - this permits a cross-case analysis. Twelve cases are large in size in 
terms of employment or investment capital, while the other twelve cases are either 
small or medium-sized. All 24 cases operate in 14 industries at a 3-digit code level. 
Thirteen of the cases are involved in production using advanced technology. In 
addition, eleven cases are financed by western investors, while the remaining 
thirteen are financed by Asian investors (including one from the Virgin Islands). All 
of our cases are foreign firms established in the period from 1992 to 2005, roughly 
matching the period after 1990 in which 90% of foreign firms were established. The 
characteristics of our cases do not affect our analysis since we are not attempting to 
provide a representative survey, but rather exploring new insights from a particular 
kind of experience (Child, 2002). 
5.3.2 Data Analysis 
 
We follow a synthetic strategy (Langley, 1999) to analyze the case data, 
constructing the political behavior of foreign firms in China, using an iterative 
process of analysis (Uzzi, 1996; Yin, 2003). From the raw interview data 
(transcripts), we first generated a series of minicases by synthesizing these with 
archival data (Eisenhardt, 1989), which provided narratives of the political 
behaviour of the foreign firms we studied. Second, we individually coded “events” 
(such as uncertainty, the ability of firms, governance forms, and strategic actions) 
and variables that described them according to the proposed framework. Third, 
following the method of analytic induction (Cressey, 1953; Yan and Gray, 1994), 
we started with one case study, the findings of which were reviewed to confirm, or 
reject the proposed behavioural pattern. Our theoretical model is modified in view of 
the findings. This comparison was repeated for all cases, leading to an insightful 
framework for the analysis of the Chinese context. This iterative analysis improved 
the fit of our model and the reliability of our findings, which are described in what 
follows.  
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5.4 The Political Behaviour of Foreign Firms in China 
 
Through cross-case analysis, we develop a context-based understanding of the 
political behaviour of foreign firms in China seeking to manage their relations with 
local government, most likely motivated by incentives at the local level. The choice 
of governance forms and strategic actions is interlinked, and determined by both the 
behaviour of local governments and the organizational resources of firms. 
 
5.4.1 “Rent-seeking” Chinese Style 
 
All cases show that foreign firms indeed engage in political behaviour, which is 
directed at local rather than central government. At the local level, the political 
uncertainty that foreign firms face is generated by the (ambiguous) behaviour of 
local government and weak institutions (as summarized in Table 5.2). Therefore, the 
main motivation of foreign firms in the political market is to seek rents (i.e. to 
mitigate government intervention and capture preferential treatment) favourable to a 
stable local environment, and consequently, to secure their operation in a dynamic, 
transitional market. 
 
Table 5.2   Uncertainty at local level 
Uncertainty issues Evidence from cases 
− Official intervention (by various bureaus) at the local 
level 
− Unpredictable policy change (e.g. labour policy, city 
regulation, electricity usage regulation) at the local level 
− Ambiguous policy implementation (e.g. land usage rights, 
labour union policies, import quotas, intellectual property   
rights, taxation, credit) at the local level 
4, 8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 24. 
 
3, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23. 
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21. 
 
 First of all, our cases show that foreign firms face political uncertainty related to 
official intervention at the local level, as evidenced in seven cases (see Table 5.2). 
Such interventions may come from various government bureaus. Firms can not 
avoid interacting with local government because, amongst other reasons, doing 
business here often requires licenses, permits etc. For example, the tax offices may 
come to inspect a firm’s financial situation without notice (cases 4, 13, and 19); the 
fire prevention office may impose additional requirements on the firm (cases 4, 8 
and 9), as may the public security bureau (cases 9 and 17). In addition, foreign firms 
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may be challenged by local regulatory bodies. The informant in Case 24 stated that 
“The government is very bureaucratic… The local regulator frequently comes to 
visit us and offers advice on business issues. We must show respect for this kind of 
behaviour. Otherwise, we may lose our certificate of operation”.  
 It must be noted that these interventions occur not only formally, where the 
government may have the well-being of society in mind; but also informally 
(unofficially) and with uncertain legitimacy. This point is illustrated in particular in 
Case 9: 
 
Case 9:  “One day, an officer from the fire prevention bureau came to check our 
facilities and subsequently required that we upgrade them. He recommended a shop 
where we could purchase the needed materials. The firm took this officer seriously and 
the general manager asked for another meeting. Through the meeting, we found that 
the person used a ‘black business card’1 upon which there was only his name and 
telephone number. It implied that the person did not necessarily conduct the 
investigation on behalf of his office. However, we could not directly dismantle his 
disguise because we did not know for sure whether he was acting in his own interests 
or otherwise. Therefore, we had to approach the local government in order to settle 
this issue.”   
 
The second source of political uncertainty at the local level is unpredictable policy 
changes, as evidenced in twelve cases (see Table 5.2). For instance, Case 3 reported 
a situation where new city regulations created a serious problem for the firm:  
 
“For a period, the city government attempted to regulate the running of trucks in 
urban areas. All trucks carrying raw materials, such as sand, could not enter or pass 
through urban areas during the day time. Sand is the major raw material we need for 
production. In order to safeguard our regular operation, we reported to the 
Administrative Committee of the Development Zone who could help us to negotiate 
with the city government for a solution.”  
 
 In addition, eight foreign firms (cases 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23) operating 
in the same city reported another situation where they all faced the problem of 
electricity shortages and related government regulations. Accordingly, during times 
of peak usage in the summer, the electricity supply of factories was cut off for 3 
days every week. These firms were concerned about the financial loss caused by this 
regulation and therefore sought to get special arrangements, such as a reduction of 
the number of days “off”, or the provision of a guaranteed electricity supply.  
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 Cases 10, 11 and 12 encountered problems caused by local labour policy changes. 
Frequent changes in policy impose additional costs on firms. For example, an 
increasing bottom-line salary for labour leads to higher production costs; while 
newly established compensation rules for injured labour not only have a cost effect, 
but even put foreign firms at a disadvantage. The informant in Case 11 very 
explicitly stated that “the new policy required that a firm should pay an employee a 
few months’ salary as compensation if the employee proposes ending the labour 
contract after an on-site injury. Such a policy is in accord with that in developed 
countries, but not necessarily in accord with the local conditions. An employee 
could take advantage of this policy. As a result, it impedes the operation of firms”.  
 The third source of political uncertainty is ambiguous policy implementation at 
the local level, as evidenced in sixteen cases (see Table 5.2). In China, as a 
consequence of decentralization, the implementation of central policies is often 
manipulated by local governments. The informant in Case 10 stated that “very often, 
the local government implements the central policies in the way that meets their 
interests”. Such fuzzy policy implementation motivates foreign firms to seek rents 
through political engagement on various issues. For example, firms may seek ways 
to receive more tax holidays (cases 11 and 15), land at a discounted price (cases 7, 
18 and 21), quicker service in the bureaucratic process (cases 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, and 21), 
or the mobilization of capital inputs (case 2).  
  In addition, cases 9 and 16 reported a problem regarding labour union policy. 
According to the law in China, all firms (domestic and foreign) should have an 
established labour union. However, these two firms were not happy with this policy 
and negotiated a solution. Cases 1 and 8 were dissatisfied with their import quotas of 
raw materials, which were assigned by sub-national governments. The informant in 
Case 1 mentioned that “in the first few years, we did not get a quota. Without the 
guaranteed input, it was hard for us to get orders from customers. Therefore, we 
approached the local government for help”. Case 9 pointed to the sensitive issue of 
dealing with pirated products: “Although the central government has made efforts to 
protect intellectual property right, those pirates are often under the umbrella of local 
authorities in the location where they operate. In order to fight against product 
pirates, we have to get along with the local government”. Another four cases (cases 
10, 11, 14 and 15) reported problems regarding the refunding of duty on imported 
duty-free parts. The quote from Case 14 is illustrative:  
 
Case 14: “When the firm imports parts for export-oriented production, those parts are 
duty-free. When products are exported, the local customs office checks and compares 
the volumes of imports and exports. If the difference between these two volumes is 
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beyond a certain range, the firm has to pay duties for the parts that are not used for 
exported products and gets a fine. Not only is the deviation range based on 
approximation, but the size of fine is also not specified clearly. The actual size is 
decided by officials’ discretion, which is in a range of 1 to 20 times of due duties. In 
order to get a smaller fine, we have to rely on the local government to negotiate with 
the local customs office.”    
 
 In sum, as cases 4 and 5 demonstrate, capturing political rents is very necessary 
in China in order to facilitate smooth firm operations because laws and policies are 
often imperfect in definition and implementation. Our findings confirm the necessity 
for engagement of the political market (Bonardi et al., 2005; Boddewyn and Brewer, 
1994) at the local level in China. Our findings are in line with the results of previous 
studies such as Blumentritt (2003) and Shaffer (1995) that firms are all willing to  
work the institutional environment to their advantage. However, at the local level, 
foreign firms do not politically engage to influence the enforcement of public policy 
per se (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2006), but more to seek rents from policy implementation 
at the local level, which help to mitigate government intervention and secure 
preferential treatment regarding various business issues. This reflects common 
international observations on China’s economic transition (e.g. OECD, 2005). 
 
5.4.2 Choosing the Relationship with Local Government 
 
Our cases demonstrate that local government is the key stakeholder in the local 
environment, and therefore, a cooperative relationship with local government is 
necessary to smooth the bureaucratic process and capture political rents. For 
instance, the informant in Case 1 states that “During the operation, the firm develops 
an interactive relationship with the local government. …… Once a good relationship 
is established, the firm can always go for help when it encounters problems”. This 
statement implies the utility of long-term interactions with the local government in 
China. Case 2 makes it even clearer by saying that “A cooperative relationship with 
the local government can help the firm to make sufficient and best use of policies”. 
Therefore, a relational form is preferred over a transactional one by foreign firms to 
manage the relationship with local government, which allows them to re-negotiate 
political risks and mitigate the transaction costs involved in doing business in China 
(e.g. Krug, 2004; Nee, 1992).  
     Our cross-case analysis shows that the selected relational form is structured at 
both macro and micro levels (as shown in Table 5.3). The macro level refers to 
statutory relations between firms as organization and the local government in which 
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official activities take place. The micro level refers to informal relations in which 
social activities take place between firm managers and officials. At the macro level, 
the relational form may be regarded as a partnership or collaboration, which is 
observed in 21 cases. For instance, the informant in Case 5 commented that “The 
relationship between us and the local government is a kind of partnership. It is 
maintained by continuous interactions”. This is echoed by the statement of one 
official interviewed: “The relationship between the government and firms is a 
collaborative one. The government does not attempt to intervene with firms’ 
operation. Firms may experience some conflicts with functional bureaus. We try to 
help them to solve problems”. At the micro level, the relational form is manifested 
in guanxi networks, which are maintained in all 24 cases. The informants admitted 
that guanxi networks of managers with key officials (such as directors, or the party 
secretary of a development zone or city, directors of governmental bureaus, and so 
on), grow out of continuous business contacts. Often, guanxi networks prevail in the 
interaction with local government. As reported in Case 18, “guanxi is embedded in 
the society and the way business is done, and therefore, it is not realistic to try to 
avoid it”. Guanxi networks open opportunities for negotiation and re-negotiation, 
and often supplement, or even substitute formal institutional support (e.g. Xin and 
Pearce, 1996).  
    
Table 5.3   The relationship between foreign firms and local government 
 Macro level Micro level 
Relational 
form 
Collaboration/Partnership  
(21 cases) 
 
Guanxi networks 
(24 cases) 
Government 
actions 
− Official visits to firms 
− Official invitations to firms to 
participate in decision making (e.g. 
regular consultation on policy issues) 
− Official invitations to firms to take 
part in public projects or social 
activities (e.g. New Year celebration) 
 
− Dining/wining with firm 
managers 
− Personal requests for gifts or 
favours (e.g. arranging jobs 
or seeking business 
opportunities for relatives) 
 
Firm 
actions 
− Respect for the government 
− Cooperation with the government by 
providing information on decision 
making 
− Official donations to public projects 
− “Wining and dining” with 
officials  
− Favour-giving by, for 
example, offering jobs and 
business opportunities to 
officials’ relatives 
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     Our findings show that the relational form is shaped by the behaviour of both 
government and firms. At the macro level, collaboration is established on the basis 
of interdependence. Local governments expect tax revenues and technology 
transfers from foreign firms, while foreign firms expect a stable business 
environment. Interactions take place frequently between the local government and 
foreign firms. Local government, behaving as a local corporatist, intends to have a 
close relationship with foreign firms. For example, the local government (or officials) 
often make formal visits, or bring visitors to firms (such as in cases 1, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 
18 and 24), organize regular meetings with foreign firms to consult on their policy 
concerns or encountered problems (such as in cases 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 
23), or invite firms to take part in public projects (e.g. donations) or officially 
organized social activities such as New Year celebrations (such as in cases 4, 6, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 23). As a response, foreign firms “need to show 
respect to the government (or officials) by actively participating in the activities 
organized by the government” (Case 12). For instance, firms often have to spend 
extra time and effort in receiving visits from the government. When financial 
contributions are needed, foreign firms tend to negotiate a solution. When doing so, 
it is very important that “the firm should not make officials lose face”. The quotes 
from cases 8 and 16 are revealing:  
 
Case 8: “A good relationship with the local government is based on reciprocity. The 
firm expects a positive payoff. Therefore, the firm should not confront the government 
but try to establish a basis for mutual communication”.  
Case 16: “We sometime face the request for sponsorship of activities organized by the 
government. We do not reject it but may negotiate the actual size of the contribution 
because rejecting a request would be regarded as a bad behaviour. Cooperation 
further contributes to the development of a positive and sustainable relationship, which 
eventually benefits our operation.” 
 
 Our findings demonstrate that local government pays more attention to large 
firms and high-tech firms, regarding them as crucial players in the development of 
the local economy, implying that large firms and/or high-tech firms are more easily 
engaged in collaboration. The following quotes are revealing:  
 
Case 1: “The firm’s size makes the firm stand out as one of the largest firms in the 
location. The government regards it as a representative foreign firm, i.e. window firm, 
of the location. Very often, the government organizes visits to the firm.” 
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Case 23: “We attract the attention of the government by our brand name and our use of 
advanced technology. We are often invited by the government for meetings to talk 
about our concerns and policy issues. There are more than 1000 hi-tech firms in the 
zone, and only about 20 are often invited. The government selects firms based on their 
scale, technological advancement, and other factors.” 
 
 At the micro level, guanxi networks are established and maintained through 
“wining and dining” and the exchange of favours between managers and officials, as 
evidenced in all cases. While foreign firms are all engaged in guanxi networks, they 
are also well aware of the cost of maintaining them. Therefore, they become 
cautious about being two close in these personal connections. The embedded costs 
of guanxi networks are those related to spending time on socialising and, more 
importantly, those related to giving favours. Very often, these requests are hard to 
meet from the perspective of a firm manager, especially when these requests come 
frequently. This cost-concern creates a paradox for foreign firms in managing 
guanxi networks (see the following quote from Case 4). Therefore, firm mangers 
attempt to maintain “some distance in guanxi networks” (the informant in Case 9).  
 
Case 4: “There are both benefits and costs of maintaining guanxi with officials. The 
firm wishes to grow through guanxi networks and attract attention from the 
government. But, the more the firm grows, the more attention it receives from the 
government. This growing attention may lead to more requirements from the 
government officials such as donations to different kinds of projects organized by the 
government and favours to their own or relatives’ business”.  
 
    In sum, our findings on the choices made by foreign firms regarding the 
relationship with local government are in line with the argument that the relational 
form is positively linked to political uncertainty (Henisz and Zelner, 2004) and to 
the interest of government in acquiring the participation of firms in the policy 
domain (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). However, the findings in our study go further by 
suggesting that the relational form needs to be structured at both the macro and 
micro level. This shows that foreign firms are often network-concerned when doing 
business in China (e.g. Hendrischke, 2007; Li, 2005) and that they attempt to use the 
personal connections of managers (guanxi) to support the organization-level 
relationship with the government (Peng and Luo, 2000). Distance-awareness in 
guanxi connections provides empirical evidence for the strength of business-
government networks (Peng and Zhou, 2005). Guanxi networks, as a form of 
governance, are nothing new to studies on China (Krug, 2004; Yang, 1994), but 
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continue to call for scholarly attention to social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985) 
and local politics (Gets, 1997). To focus purely on the formal institutional setting, as 
in previous studies, is certainly not sufficient (e.g. Xin and Pearce, 1996).   
 
5.4.3 Choosing Strategic Actions 
 
Our theoretical framework suggests that foreign firms may take reactive or proactive 
strategic action in the political market. Table 5.4 summarizes the strategic choices of 
foreign firms. Our cases allow us to identify four strategic actions: compliance, 
information, incentive and “constituency”. The cross-case analysis shows that 
foreign firms regard proactive actions as an appropriate means to seek rents in the 
political market, but proactive actions do not necessarily exclude reactive 
compliance strategies. Through compliance, foreign firms show respect for local 
government, developing a base from which they may proactively engage. No 
evidence was found on avoidance and circumvention actions. The findings show that 
all 24 firms used information and incentive strategies, but only nine out of 24 cases 
used a “constituency” strategy. These actions are context-related. The choice of 
proactive actions is described below in detail.  
     The cross-case analysis shows that foreign firms actively take up opportunities to 
provide information regarding problems they encounter (bureaucratic inefficiency, 
for instance) and policy concerns in order to influence government policy 
implementation (information strategy). Foreign firms often make use of five tactics 
when sharing information (e.g. policy concerns and operation problems). All firms 
combined both office visits and social activities as an opportunity to draw the 
attention of key officials to their interests. As the informant in Case 5 stated, “we 
have to “wine and dine” officials, which plays an important role in facilitating 
communication and information exchange”. In fourteen cases, the managers 
channelled their policy concerns to the government at officially organized social 
meetings (such as New Year and mid-Autumn moon festival celebrations). In 
addition, cases 14 and 18 used telephone calls as another method for sharing 
information. Cases 2 and 14 provided written reports when tackling policy issues 
concerned. The informant in Case 14 mentioned that “after passing on the message 
by making telephone conversation, it is better to provide a written report that can 
provide the information regarding the issue concerned in detail”. 
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Table 5.4   Strategic actions by foreign firms in the local environment 
Strategic actions Tactics Evidence from cases 
Compliance 
 
− Respects for officials and policies All 
Information − Office visits 
− “Wining and dining” 
− Officially organized meetings (e.g. 
festival celebration) 
− Telephone calls 
− Written reports 
 
All 
All  
3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 23 
14, 18 
2, 14 
 
Incentive − Contributions to the local economy 
(taxes, tech-transfers etc) 
− Support for government bureaus 
(e.g. customs, road construction, 
electricity, fire prevention) and 
officially organized activities 
− Favours or gifts to officials 
 
4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 
1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21 
 
 
 
4, 5, 8, 23 
“Constituency” − Donations (e.g. for people suffering 
from natural disasters) 
− Sponsorship of public activities 
− Social services (e.g. the funding of 
public services and amenities) 
− University scholarships 
1, 2, 5, 14, 15, 18 
 
1, 17 
5, 11 
 
16 
 
Foreign firms also influence governments by offering them incentives to 
cooperate (incentive strategy). The most often used tactic here is to make a 
contribution to the local economy (in addition to that created by normal operations) 
– a tactic employed by seventeen firms. According to the informants, a contribution 
to the local economy could be, for example, an expressed commitment to transfer 
technological know-how. The second tactic of the incentive strategy was to offer 
support to governmental bureaus directly, which was evidenced in nine cases. For 
instance, Case 2 contributed 300,000 RMB to improve the electricity supply to the 
area where the firm operates, and also invested in road construction in collaboration 
with the local government. In Case 4, the firm, together with other foreign firms, 
bought one advanced fire truck for the local fire prevention office in order to 
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forestall its intervention. In Case 15, the firm voluntarily participated in a pilot 
project organized by the local customs office to test service procedures, with the 
expectation that they would receive better bureaucratic service in the future. In a 
further six cases (1, 7, 9, 11, 16 and 21), the firms provided financial sponsorship to 
various activities organized by government bureaus, such as a trade fair. The third 
tactic of the incentive strategy was to give favours (such as gifts, paid travel, and aid 
to officials’ relatives) to officials personally, as evidenced in four cases (4, 5, 8, and 
23). The informant in Case 8 stated that, “giving favours to officials is a very useful 
means for the firm to get preferential treatments as a return”.  
Foreign firms can not mobilize voters to develop their constituency, so to 
influence the government in China, because there is only very limited democracy. 
Nevertheless, our findings do show that foreign firms engaged a “constituency” 
strategy in four ways. The tactics used include making public donations (cases 1, 2, 
5, 14, 15 and 18), providing sponsorship for public activities, for example, an 
international basketball match (Case 1) and a garment design competition in a 
university (Case 17), organizing public services, such as public parks and an 
orphanage (cases 5 and 11), and establishing university scholarships (Case 16). In 
this way, foreign firms attempted to establish a positive reputation and good 
standing in the locality, thus capturing the attention of the local government. 
In sum, our findings point to the significance of proactive engagement for 
influencing the government, a finding that is in line with Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
and Hillman and Wan (2005). However, it appears that foreign firms do also comply 
with government policies in certain aspects, as Blumentritt (2003) and Boddewyn 
and Brewer (1994) would suggest. Blumentritt (2003) assumes that reactive and 
proactive actions may take place simultaneously depending on the issues involved. 
Our findings further suggest that foreign firms may leverage their reactions for 
success in their proactive engagements. In China, indeed, firms do not really want to 
bear the sunk costs caused by exit (reactive action) when dealing with the local 
government, but tend to leverage exit for voice (proactive action) in re-negotiation 
for preferential treatment (Zhu et al., 2006). In addition, the tactics used by foreign 
firms in their strategic actions in China differ somewhat from those used in 
developed economies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). This difference suggests that the 
Chinese situation (and that of other transition economies) needs to be better 
integrated into the study of the political strategies of foreign firms.  
 
5.4.4 The Relationship between Performance and Political Behaviour 
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Foreign firms in our study confirm that overall firm performance is dependent upon 
their choosing appropriate political strategies, which in turn reflects what rents 
foreign firms gain in the local political market. Our study allows for the 
identification of three facets of political performance (as summarized in Table 5.5): 
mitigation of government intervention (such as in cases 4, 8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 24), 
achievement of special treatment (in eighteen out of 22 firms that encountered 
policy issues), and no gain in pursuit of special treatments (as in cases 7, 17, 19 and 
20). Four major determinants of performance emerge, which are firm size, 
reputation in technology, economic spillover, and social capital (referring to only 
guanxi here).  
    All seven firms, having succeeded in mitigating interventions, reported that they 
have social capital available. In the event of government intervention, foreign firms 
contacted key officials on the administrative committee of the development zone, 
explaining what had happened to them - mainly during office visits or informal 
meetings elsewhere. This information strategy draws the key officials into the 
solution–building process. In addition, firms regarded their size (in cases 4, 9, 13), 
their high status in technology and large contribution to local workplace and supply 
chains (economic spillover) (in cases 4, 8, 9, 13) as additional performance 
determinants. The factors of size, technology and economic spillover enabled them 
to develop a good relationship with the government and officials, which in turn 
became a very effective channel for the exchange of information. In addition, 
foreign firms leveraged their contribution to the local economy to influence the 
government. In order to settle an issue, foreign firms demonstrated their respect for 
government bureaus or officials (compliance) before becoming proactive. For 
instance, when the firm in Case 9 was required by a staff-member from the fire 
prevention bureau to upgrade their fire prevention facilities, the general manager 
promised to take action, consulting the staff on the one hand, and reporting to the 
administrative committee of the zone on the other. Although the firm in Case 9 did 
not want to upgrade their facilities, the solution was a compromise where the firm 
agreed to upgrade part of their facilities, thus saving the face of the fire prevention 
office.  
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     The same determinants were found in the pursuit of special treatment. Factors 
such as firm size, technology and economic spillover empowered foreign firms 
when they negotiated with the local government. Social capital effectively facilitates 
the exchange of information between foreign firms and key officials. As a result, 
eighteen of the foreign firms studied here were successfully granted special 
treatment. For instance, the firms in cases 9 and 16 did not establish labour unions 
after negotiating with the local government. In Case 11, the firm received more tax 
holidays, as evidenced in the quote:  
 
“…The more the firm is attracted to the local government, the more easily the firm can 
get help in solving problems. For example, our five-year tax holiday has passed. The 
firm attempted to apply for the certificate of advanced technology enterprise in order 
to get more special treatments. The tax office did not agree to further tax holidays. The 
reason was that, in order to receive the special treatments associated with advanced 
technology enterprises, the firm should have applied for the certificate when it was 
established instead of after 6 years. Therefore, the general manger visited the key 
officials in the administrative committee of the zone for help. The local government 
thinks it possible to find a solution and is helping to coordinate with the tax office”. 
 
     Our cross-case analysis shows that social capital is one crucial factor for 
nurturing a cooperative relationship with local government and for facilitating 
information exchange. The quotes from cases 8 and 24 are illustrative:  
 
Case 8: “Whether a firm encounters serious problems in operation, i.e. those issues 
related to the institutional environment, depends on what kind of people the firm 
employs. If the right person is employed to do the right thing, the problems will be 
much less”.  
Case 24: “Considering the political uncertainty, we hired a local general manger, 
which is unusual in our corporation. The advantage is that he has good local guanxi 
and knows how to approach the government”. 
 
   Furthermore, interviews with officials confirm, from the government’s side, that 
once foreign firms conflict with government bureaus, they tend to use their guanxi 
with key officials in an attempt to influence the outcome. One official further 
pointed out that “Those Asian firms, in particular from Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
tend to negotiate on policy issues more often through guanxi networks than Western 
firms do”. This said, our cross-case analysis did not identify a difference between 
Asian and Western firms. One reason is probably that the firms we interviewed all 
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have local general managers or deputy general managers who are dealing with the 
local government.  
Nevertheless, as the informant in Case 18 commented, “the guanxi factor is 
crucial but not decisive in negotiations on special treatments. Instead, the economic 
contribution of a firm has a better say therein”. This is echoed by the informant in 
Case 9 who observed “the government provided us with special treatments because 
we made significant contribution to the local economy in terms of our size, 
technology, and economic performance”. The failures in cases 7, 17, 19 and 20 
inadvertently support this point, stating that, due to the fact that they are of small 
size and/or not large local taxpayers, they did not win land (Case 7) or receive the 
requested supply of electricity (cases 17, 19 and 20). Underling this point, the 
informant in Case 20 said, “facing an electricity shortage problem, we can not get 
the same special treatments as those large or high-tech firms do.”  
    In addition, our findings show that a relational governance form is almost always 
helpful, leading to sound performance in the political market and further reveal that 
information and incentive strategies are most effective when supplemented by 
compliance. In contrast, the “constituency” strategy does not have a direct effect on 
performance. The interaction between compliance and proactive engagement has not 
been examined in previous studies (e.g. Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994). Across all cases, it appears that technical resources and social capital 
have different effects on the choice of proactive actions. This is discussed later.  
 
 To summarize, Figure 5.2 provides an overview of our findings and our 
modifications to the theoretical framework. Our cross-case analysis shows that the 
willingness of foreign firms to politically engage is most likely related to the 
opportunity for rent-seeking (mitigation of interventions, preferential treatments etc.) 
in the local political market. This confirms that political activism occurs when there 
are potential benefits to be reaped in the political market (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2005) 
and extends the previous analysis by going beyond the examination of public policy 
enforcement at the national level (e.g. Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Rugman, 1998). Our 
study draws attention to fiscal decentralization and weakly enforced institutions (e.g. 
ambiguous policy implementation and arbitrary bureaucratic processes) in China’s 
transition.  
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 Further, the performance of foreign firms in the local political market is 
determined by their ability to politically engage, which is positively related to a 
firm’s resources (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2006; Rehbein and Schuler, 1995). Our findings 
do not provide evidence of organizational slack (Rehbein and Schuler, 1995), but 
rather emphasizes technological factors. Since the beginning of reform, China has 
stressed the significance of introducing, learning and absorbing advanced 
technologies from developed countries. Therefore, foreign firms that invest with 
advanced technologies often earn a good reputation, enabling them to successfully 
leverage government support. We do not find the evidence of organizational 
structure either (Rehbein and Schuler, 1995). The foreign firms we interviewed do 
not have a public relation office for dealing with government. Instead, they mostly 
rely on managers and their guanxi to do so, since foreign firms are either small or 
often just a production unit of their parent corporation. Thus, we propose that social 
capital (guanxi) is an additional resource of the firm, a finding that is in line with 
other China-based management studies (e.g. Peng and Luo, 2000; Tsang, 1998), 
which point to the importance of “having guanxi” when doing business there. 
 Finally, the political behaviour of foreign firms needs to be captured in both 
organizational form and action. Our findings suggest that the form of contact 
between foreign firms and local government, in which they engage in long term 
cooperation, may best be described as relational (e.g. Dunning, 1998). This 
relationship is shaped and maintained by the interactions of both parties at both the 
macro and micro levels. From a firm’s point of view, such interactions are 
determined by both technical resources (technology, size, economic spillover etc.) 
and social capital (Luo, 2001b). Therefore, it is suggested that the strategic decision 
of foreign firms may follow their choice of relationship with local government, as 
proposed by Hillman and Hitt (1999), and may further reinforce the relational form 
initially selected.  
 
 
5.5 Discussions and Propositions 
 
Our cases demonstrate that the political strategy perspective is insightful for the 
understanding of the foreign firm-host government relationship. Previous studies on 
the political strategies of foreign firms have focused on cross-country analysis in 
which the national government of a host country is modelled (e.g. Blumentritt and 
Nigh, 2002; Hillman and Wan, 2005). This approach is arguably useful when 
foreign firms operate in a developed economy where economic institutions are well 
enforced and local governments have limited authority over economic activity. Our 
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investigation adds a local perspective, emphasizing the significance of local 
government in China.  
 As shown in Figure 5.2, local government, together with its bureaucracies, is the 
appropriate counterpart for the analysis of foreign firms. As a consequence of de 
facto fiscal decentralization, local governments are granted sufficient authority to 
interpret and implement central policies and thus to intervene in local economic 
activity (e.g. Li, 1997; Qian, 2002; Segal and Thun, 2001; Walder, 1995). Our study 
therefore suggests that, considering the significance of sub-national institutions in 
China (Meyer and Ngyuen, 2005; Osland & Björkman, 1998), MNCs may have to 
manage their host-government relations at two levels: national and local. Detailed 
analysis of layered governance goes beyond the scope of this study. In this chapter, 
we have focused on the localized interactions between foreign firms and local 
government. This perspective fruitfully contributes to our understanding of 
international political strategies (e.g. Gets, 1997; Rodriguez et al., 2006). In the 
following, we bring our findings and recent theoretical development together to put 
forward some tentative propositions.  
 
5.5.1 Political Rent-Seeking at the Local Level 
 
Our findings highlight the different incentives underlying the political behaviour of 
foreign firms at the local level in China. They suggests that the particularity of the 
institutional context in China (or in transition economies in general) must play a role 
in formulating the political objectives of foreign firms (e.g. Brasher and Lowery, 
2006; London and Hart, 2004). Previous studies argue that firms aim to influence 
public policies to manage political uncertainty (e.g. Bonardi and Keim, 2005; Frynas 
et al., 2006). It is assumed that public policy is the major source of uncertainty firms 
have to face in their operations. This assumption works well in developed 
economies (such as the US and the EU), where firms can rely on strong enforcement 
mechanisms in the public policy domain. However, as Hillman and Wan (2005) 
argue, the study of host-country institutions is especially important in developing 
economies and the analysis of these needs to be set in the specific context of the host 
country.  
Entering China, firms have to manage both institutional complexity (Henisz, 
2003) and institutional voids (Khanna et al., 2005; OECD, 2005). Our findings 
confirm that foreign firms in China not only face policy ambiguity but also various 
interventions that may effectively hinder their operations, both of which are major 
sources of uncertainty threatening business, according to the enterprise survey of the 
World Bank (2005). These problems can best be seen at the local level, because it is 
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local governments who interpret and implement central policies and often have 
enough leeway to design their own industrial policy (e.g. Krug, 2004; Segal and 
Thun, 2001). In this process, government bureaus and officials may have different 
interests from the government itself, creating agent problems. Our findings evidence 
that uncertainty at the local level is caused by bureaucratic interventions, 
unpredictable policy changes, and ambiguous policy implementation. Problems at 
the local level may hinder a firm’s operation (e.g. in Case 1 and 3) and may also 
impose additional costs (as occurred in cases 8, 9, 11 and 15). In addition, 
leveraging local policy implementation brings additional benefits (cases 5, 16 and 
23). Therefore, foreign firms have a strong interest in rent-seeking in the local 
political market. It is proposed that:  
 
Proposition 1.1: Foreign firms act politically when they encounter 
interventions from local government bureaus. 
Proposition 1.2: Foreign firms act politically when they have the opportunity 
to appropriate rents from local policy implementation. 
 
5.5.2 Determinants of Political Performance 
 
Our findings identify determinants of the actual political performance of foreign 
firms in China. While previous studies have attempted to explain the determinants of 
political behaviour (e.g. Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999), “little analysis has directly examined the determinants of 
actual performance” (Bonardi et al., 2006). Bonardi et al. (2006) suggests that the 
experience of firms in dealing with government policy makers and the opportunity 
for them to learn from others are positively related to performance. However, our 
findings point to both technical resources (size, technology, and economic spillover) 
and social capital (guanxi) as determinants. In China, social capital embodied in 
guanxi networks plays an important role in managing the external relations of a firm 
(e.g. Peng and Luo, 2000). When managers engage in guanxi networks with officials, 
their firms have the opportunity to learn from officials and to gain easy access to 
their experience and knowledge. Therefore, social capital may be an equivalent to 
experience and opportunity in Bonardi’s argument. Yet, social capital alone is not 
decisive, as evidenced in our cases, especially when foreign firms negotiate for 
preferential treatment. Social capital is better, or more decisively employed to cope 
with bureaucratic interventions. The technical resources of a firm often determine to 
what extent the firm gains from local policy implementation. For instance, when 
eight firms (cases 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23) encountered an electricity 
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shortage problem, all possessed social capital and sufficiently communicated their 
concerns (information) to the city government. However, only five firms, which had 
either invested with advanced technology or had mobilized significant levels of local 
resources (workplace and supply chains) received preferential treatment, i.e. they 
secured either less cut-off days or a guaranteed electricity supply for their operation. 
In so doing, the local government expects a higher return from firms of this kind for 
the local economy. Therefore, firms with more technical resources are more likely to 
appropriate rents successfully from their cooperation with local government (e.g. 
Luo, 2001b). Therefore, it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 2.1: The higher the technology level a foreign firm invests, the 
more leverage the firm has in its relations with local government.  
Proposition 2.2: The more a foreign firm can mobilize local resources, the 
more leverage the firm has in its relations with local government.  
Proposition 2.3: Social capital has a positive effect on the outcome of 
political activities: the effect is stronger when it comes to resisting 
interventions than to appropriating rents. 
 
5.5.3 Relations with Local Government 
 
Our findings suggest that foreign firms tend to choose a relational form when 
approaching government in China, a finding that, while in line with Luo (2001b), 
provides additional evidence at the local level. This choice suggests that local 
governments may best be described as local corporatists (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) in 
that they actively promote certain sectors or opt to cooperate with certain firms by 
supplying production factors, mobilizing all agencies and bureaus and designing 
specific industrial policies (Oi, 1992; Walder, 1995). In addition, China’s 
transitional environment is often represented as a highly uncertain and/or 
unregulated one (Nee, 1992) in which local governments have sufficient authority to 
manipulate the local environment (Che, 2000; Frye and Shleifer 1997). Our findings 
demonstrate that foreign firms positively respond to the behaviour of local 
governments, while a relational form serves as an effective approach for 
“internalizing’ uncertainty (e.g. Henisz and Zelner, 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 1999).  
 Our findings further point out that the relationship between foreign firms and 
local government is structured at both the macro and micro levels. Previous studies 
of both political strategies and political governance only emphasize the macro-level 
(Henisz and Zelner, 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). As it is argued by sociologists, a 
formal relationship is often embedded in social networks (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 
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1996). In particular, in transition economies such as China where formal institutions 
are weak, social networks play a significant complementary role in governance (e.g. 
Krug, 2004; Xin and Pearce, 1996). Previous studies on MNCs in China also 
confirm that guanxi networks with government officials are crucial for them to 
safeguard against uncertainty (e.g. Frynas et al., 2006; Osland and Björkman, 1998; 
Sanyal and Guventi, 2000). As our cases demonstrate, guanxi networks provide 
foreign firms with political leverage and strategic resources (Peng and Luo, 2000; 
Yeung, 2000) to encourage the cooperation of the government. Therefore, it is 
proposed that:  
 
Proposition 3.1: When local government is cooperative, foreign firms choose 
to reciprocate.  
Proposition 3.2:  When local government agencies are not cooperative, 
guanxi is seen as a way to encourage their cooperation.  
 
5.5.4 Strategic Actions and Determinants 
 
Our findings highlight four strategic actions that foreign firms adopt to influence 
local government, i.e. compliance, information, incentive, and “constituency” 
strategies. Previous empirical studies have focused on the last three proactive actions, 
sorting out their determinants such as firm size, technology, and economic spillover 
(e.g. Blumentritt, 2003; Brasher and Lowery, 2006; Schuler et al., 2002). Our study 
not only confirms the effect of firm size, technology and economic spillover, but 
further suggests social capital (guanxi) as an additional determinant of strategic 
action. 
 While previous studies argue that technical resources (size, technology and 
economic spillovers) have a positive effect on the three proactive actions, our 
findings do not find a link to the “constituency” strategy and further demonstrate 
differentiated effects of the determinants. First, our findings show that social capital 
is the most crucial factor influencing the information strategy. Guanxi networks 
enable a firm to channel information quickly and effectively to officials, no matter 
how many technical resources the firm possesses. Guanxi with key officials 
therefore generates higher returns on an information strategy. Secondly, reputation 
in technology is singled out as the most crucial factor in an incentive strategy. 
Similarly, as our cases show, foreign firms provide additional incentives to the local 
government by making a demonstrable commitment to the locality and mobilizing 
local resources as well. Corporate reputation is one crucial resource of value 
creations, which is measured along multiple dimensions, reflecting the perceptions 
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of external stakeholders and interested groups (e.g. Roberts and Dowling, 2002; 
Wartick, 2002). In particular, a reputation for advanced technology makes a foreign 
firm very attractive to local government and creates the possibility of greater rents 
(favourable treatments), since local government continues to urgently seeks the 
transfer of advanced technology to upgrade local industries.  
   Furthermore, little analysis has been done on compliance. Boddewyn and Brewer 
(1994) propose that a firm may comply with the government when the issue 
involved is not of crucial importance to a firm, or if a firm lacks the resources to 
influence government. To the contrary, our findings show that foreign firms regard 
compliance as a means of supplementing proactive engagement. Through 
compliance, foreign firms show respect for government and a willingness to 
cooperate, which builds confidence and establishes a sound basis for further 
negotiation. Therefore, compliance and proactive engagement are not mutually 
exclusive. Compliance does not mean that the issues involved are not salient or that 
a firm lacks resources. Rather, compliance is more a demonstration of a firm’s 
positive attitude to local government.  
   In sum, it is proposed that:  
 
Proposition 4.1: The stronger the guanxi a foreign firm has, the higher the 
returns on an information strategy.  
Proposition 4.2: The higher the reputation a foreign firm has, the higher the 
returns on an incentive strategy. 
Proposition 4.3: Compliance and proactive strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, and foreign firms may pursue both.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines why and how foreign firms manage their relations with local 
government from a political strategy perspective. Our findings show that foreign 
firms are motivated to mitigate interventions and capture more regulatory rents. To 
do so, foreign firms choose a relational form to manage their relationships with local 
government, both with macro-level partnership and micro-level guanxi networks. In 
addition, foreign firms widely adopt proactive engagement (in particular information 
and incentive strategies) to influence local government decision-making. Meanwhile, 
compliance supplements, and facilitates, smooth proactive engagement. Our 
findings also show that both technical resources and social capital empower foreign 
firms in the political market. Our study contributes to the understanding of the 
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relationship between foreign firms and host governments by identifying the strategic 
incentives and actions that underpin the relationship at the local level (e.g. 
Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Luo, 2001b).  
Thus, our findings contribute to the general understanding of the political 
strategy approach by adding a local perspective (e.g. Getz, 1997). All politics is 
indeed local and this perspective identifies the appropriate behaviours leading to 
fruitful outcomes (rents) in the political market. Our findings suggest that 
contextualization is insightful for both international business and political 
strategizing (e.g. Brasher and Lowery, 2006; Jones, 2006; Wright et al., 2005). 
Therefore, context-based strategies must be examined when a survey study is 
conducted in an international setting. In particular, when analyzing the effect of 
informal institutions, it is not sufficient to consider only an abstract concept of 
culture (Wan and Hillman, 2006). Rather, it is insightful to consider guanxi (and 
social networks in general) and its connection with weakly enforced formal 
institutions. In practice, our findings suggest that foreign firms must “think local” 
(Park and Vanhonacker, 2007) and need to have a sensitivity to the local political 
context and respect for local government when formulating strategy. It is perhaps 
difficult for foreigners to engage guanxi networks in China and our findings suggest 
that employing and relying on local management (localization) is an effective way to 
neutralize this difficulty. 
In addition, the political strategy perspective extends our understanding of the 
strategic orientations of firms in the formation of managerial networks in China (e.g. 
Li, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000). While previous studies argue that firms are driven 
by market and technological factors in the formation of managerial networks, our 
study adds that (foreign) firms also seek to capture political rents (beyond market 
information) in the formation of managerial networks. Political rents at the local 
level in China arguably allow foreign firms to achieve their strategic objectives in a 
developing market environment (Baron, 1995).  
We are however cautious about generalizing, though, the diversity of our cases 
provides strong support for our findings. These extend previous studies of political 
strategy and subsequently allow for the formulation of tentative propositions for 
future tests. Furthermore, our study points to a number of worthwhile research 
avenues. First, it would be interesting to develop a comparative study examining 
whether Asian firms (in particular those from Hong Kong and Taiwan) have an 
advantage over Western firms in their familiarity with and experience of guanxi 
networks. Second, it would be interesting to study the collective political behaviour 
of foreign firms in a development zone. Third, a future investigation could examine 
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the relationship between social responsibility and a “constituency” strategy to assess 
the effect of such activities on the political performance of foreign firms in China. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 A black business card is a card that does not indicate the association of the 
person who uses it, but contains only the person’s name and telephone number. 
 
 
136
Chapter 5 122 
 
 
137
 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
From an institution-based perspective, the interaction between institutions and 
organizations is central to the strategic decision-making of foreign firms in China’s 
transition economy. To answer the question of how an institution’s context matters 
to strategy, we conducted three empirical studies in this dissertation. This chapter 
concludes our dissertation by presenting a summary of our main findings and 
theoretical contributions, and suggesting future research avenues.  
 
 
6.1 Summary and Contributions 
 
This dissertation has addressed three theoretical issues in international business 
strategy, namely: 1) the dynamics of isomorphism in foreign ownership; 2) a process 
approach to ownership choice; and 3) management of the firm-government 
relationship. The first issue was investigated using a panel database of foreign firms 
in China from the period 1979 to 2003. The other two issues were explored through 
the use of case studies from six cities in China. Here, we summarize our main 
findings in three points:  
1. An institution-based view is insightful for understanding the strategies of 
foreign firms in transition economies such as China. Institutions, both formal 
and informal, have a direct effect on the strategizing of foreign firms. For 
example, the ownership choices of foreign firms reflect both efficiency and 
legitimacy concerns. In particular, the business behaviour of foreign firms is 
conditioned by the political behaviour of government. Foreign firms need to 
manage their nonmarket environment effectively in order to successfully 
pursue their market strategies. 
2. A learning process takes place, which informs the strategic decisions of 
foreign firms in China. Foreign firms need to be able to sense subtle changes 
in laws and policies and to acquire knowledge about local institutions 
(including informal ones) by direct interactions when they make strategic 
123 
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decisions. A learning process makes smooth adaptation possible. To do so, 
foreign firms need to build on their learning capabilities.  
3. A local perspective is therefore needed to analyze institutional effects. In 
China, the institutional environment is heterogeneous, presenting diversity at 
the local level. Here, formal institutions interact with informal ones, 
determining the features of the local institutional environment, where foreign 
firms usually operate. Therefore, the local perspective is crucial for the 
operationalization of strategy by focusing on the specific conditions foreign 
firms have to deal with locally.  
    
  Chapter 3 investigated how the dynamics of organizational homogeneity in 
ownership decisions are related to institutional liberalization, as well as the strategic 
considerations of firms. Our findings show that the degree of organizational 
isomorphism decreases as foreign ownership constraints become deregulated and the 
level of local acceptance of foreign ownership increases. These findings confirm that 
institutional changes may weaken established isomorphism (Oliver, 1992; Powell, 
1991; Scott, 2001). Another finding is that the degree of organizational isomorphism 
decreases as conventional wisdom (cognitive force) regarding appropriate ownership 
forms changes. While previous studies address cognitive forces in a static way, our 
finding points to its dynamic features (Li et al., 2007). This implies that the effect of 
cognitive forces on (the dynamics of) isomorphism may be more complicated than 
published empirical conclusions suggest. In addition, our findings in Chapter 3 show 
that the dynamics of organizational homogeneity also reflect shifts in the strategic 
considerations of foreign firms, which tended to enter the market through joint 
ventures and followed a learning strategy in the early years of reform, but shifted 
over time to WFOE form, following a control strategy. More importantly, the 
findings in this chapter support the complementarity hypothesis: both market and 
institutional factors matter in explaining organizational changes (e.g. D’Aunno et al., 
2000; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996); each factor has a reinforcing effect on the other and 
both inform the explanation of the dynamics of isomorphism in ownership decisions.  
  Chapter 4 analyzed how foreign firms engage in the interaction with local 
institutions when deciding their ownership mode. The findings of our cross-case 
analysis demonstrate that observed ownership choices often differ from what firms 
desired to have prior to entry (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). This supports the hypothesis 
of a two-phase learning process: identifying preferences, then adjusting to local 
conditions, and illustrates that the ownership choices are not simply made at 
headquarters (preference), but are subject to changes in situ when directly 
confronted by local institutions. Although foreign investors do consider possible 
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constraints when identifying their ownership preferences, on-site adjustment is still 
necessary due to information asymmetry at the local level. Previous studies based on 
a variance approach do not (and are perhaps unable to) explain this ownership 
adjustment. Our proposed learning process synergizes three different theoretical 
perspectives (transaction costs, organizational capabilities, and institutional theory) 
so to create a phased decision-making model in which local solutions are developed. 
This learning process helps to clarify the inconsistent empirical findings in previous 
studies and further draws scholarly attention to the importance of local institutions 
(local government and local business societies). Our findings suggest that a process 
approach to understanding internationalization is not only useful, but is also line 
with recent developments in the field (e.g. Meyer and Gelbuda, 2006; Tallman and 
Shenkar, 1994). While adding a local perspective complicates the process, it adds 
value to our understanding of the ownership choices of foreign firms and of 
international strategies in general (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). 
  Chapter 5 examined why and how foreign firms manage their relationships with 
local governments in China. Our findings point to the particularity of the nonmarket 
environment in China, the uncertainty generated by the policy ambiguity and 
arbitrary behaviour of local governments and the necessity for engagement of the 
nonmarket environment at the local level in China (e.g. Bonardi et al., 2005). 
Therefore, foreign firms are motivated to politically engage in order to minize or 
avoid local interventions, to capture preferential treatment and ultimately to 
safeguard their operations at the local level. The local perspective once again 
enriches our understanding of international political strategies (e.g. Rodriguez et al., 
2006). Our findings show that the performance of foreign subsidiaries in the local 
political market is determined by both technical and social resources (e.g. Frynas et 
al., 2006). In their political behavior, foreign subsidiaries establish a relational 
governance form, blending macro-level partnership with micro-level guanxi 
networks, to mitigate transaction costs. The macro-micro link proves to be an 
effective form for firms seeking to manage their local relations (Peng and Luo, 
2000). In order to maintain their relationships and mitigate political uncertainty, 
foreign subsidiaries adopt proactive strategies, such as information and incentive 
strategy. This is often supplemented by a reactive attitude to compliance, which 
extends the views of Hillman and Hitt (1999) on proactive action. The findings in 
this chapter suggest that, in order to better manage the relationship with local 
governments, foreign firms have to effectively deploy their technical capabilities 
and build up social capital at the local level in China.  
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  Overall, this dissertation has demonstrated that institutions play a crucial role in 
the strategizing of foreign firms in China, providing additional dimensions to the 
calculation of their strategies. This dissertation is a positive response to the calls for 
attention from scholars of institutions in international business and strategy research. 
This is especially the case when studies are conducted on transition economies 
(Child and Tse, 2001; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Shenkar, 2004; Wright et al., 2005). 
In addition, our case-based exploration generates insightful propositions regarding 
the interaction between institutions and organizations, which we believe contributes 
to the extant body of knowledge. Our insights are China-specific, but they may be 
fruitfully applied to other transition economies. 
 
 
6.2 Future Research Directions 
 
This dissertation has outlined the significance of institutions in the strategizing of 
foreign firms in China. From here, the most obvious step, drawing on propositions 
advanced in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, would be to develop a survey for more 
systematic testing. The case-based approach establishes sound propositions, but in 
order to generalize them, large-scale empirical tests are required. In addition, the 
insights in the dissertation point to several avenues along which valuable research 
may be conducted.  
   An institution-based view proves to be beneficial to the body of knowledge about 
global strategies (Peng, 2005). The interaction between formal and informal 
institutions is very much context-embedded. Scholars suggest that, facing the 
institutional complexity of a country such as China, foreign firms face a tension 
between internal and external legitimacy (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002), often chosing either to adapt to local conditions or to maintain their 
own familiar mode of operation (Boisot and Child, 1999). Our findings on 
ownership choices show that foreign firms tend to manage the tension in a hybrid 
way, i.e. developing a tradeoff between internal and external legitimacy, which is in 
line with a recent exploration on IJVs (Lu and Xu, 2006). Therefore, we call for 
further research of other organizational dimensions, such as human resource 
management (HRM) practices, to explore the effect of institutions on foreign firms’ 
HRM choices and social responsibility practices. As localization is often 
emphasized as the most important trend in the management practices of foreign 
firms (e.g. Lu and Bjorkman, 1997), another avenue would be to explore the 
dynamics of localization in response to institutional change.  
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     The interaction between foreign firms and local institutions in China may be 
characterized as a learning process. While previous studies on this issue mainly 
focus on the transfer of knowledge from headquarters to their subsidiaries, recent 
studies have begun to pay attention to the reality of headquarters learning from their 
subsidiaries (e.g. Ambos et al., 2006), which highlights the merit of subsidiaries to 
their parent networks and the advantages in acquiring local knowledge (Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2001). Therefore, a further avenue of future research could be to look into 
what knowledge, and by which mechanisms, foreign headquarters learn from their 
operations at the local level in China; to explore whether (and to what extent) 
knowledge acquired from a specific location can be applied to other locations; and 
to establish how knowledge sharing across subsidiaries in different locations takes 
place. Embarking on a conventional approach (exploitation and exploration) to 
learning (March, 1991), another research avenue may be to investigate what rules 
and knowledge foreign firms explore and what they exploit at the local level. 
   A local perspective draws our attention to local institutions within China. Only 
recently have international business scholars paid much attention to local (or sub-
national) institutions in transition economies (e.g. Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). While 
our findings illustrate the effect of local institutions on foreign firms’ organizational 
choices, what needs to be further studied is how the presence and operation of 
foreign firms influences institutional building at the local level in China. It is argued 
that decentralization and fiscal federalism lead to diversity in the institutional 
environment at the local level and give rise to a variety of local business systems 
(Krug and Hendrischke, 2005). It would be interesting to examine what foreign 
firms have contributed to the formulation of local business systems, and to examine 
the interaction between foreign firms and local supply chains.  
   With the above insights in mind, we identify the study of the coevolution of 
foreign firms in China as yet another worthwhile avenue of future research. Our 
study of the dynamics of isomorphism in this dissertation has implied that foreign 
firms evolve in their ownership choices in response to institutional changes in China. 
Recent studies on network strategies in transition economies propose that network 
strength evolves as institutional transition proceeds (Peng and Zhou, 2005). Recent 
theoretical developments regarding multinationals suggest that a coevolutionary 
perspective has direct implications for competitive advantages when we examine the 
performance of foreign firms (e.g. Madhok and Liu, 2006). From a coevolutionary 
perspective, foreign subsidiaries co-evolve not only with the local environment but 
also with their parent corporations. The speed differential of these two levels may 
impact a firm’s overall performance. Embarking on different theoretical perspectives, 
our dissertation offers insights into the coevolution of foreign subsidiaries, but needs 
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to be extended to consider the coevolution of foreign firms within their own 
corporate webs. Given the increasing significance of China to the world economy, it 
is essential that MNCs and foreign subsidiaries view China as a core component of 
their global strategy. Moreover and inevitably, they must learn to leverage China 
through their operations and strategies (Boston Consulting Group, 2006). Therefore, 
a coevolutionary perspective would enrich our understanding of the success of 
foreign firms and our understanding of the emerging rules of global business that 
China is helping to write.  
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
 
Deze dissertatie is een antwoord op de belangstelling voor instituties in zowel 
strategieonderzoek als in onderzoek naar internationaal zakendoen in China en 
andere opkomende economieën (Child en Tse, 2001; Narayanan en Fahey, 2005; 
Shenkar, 2004; Tseng en Foster, 2006; Wright et al., 2005). Het groeiende belang 
van opkomende economieën zoals China komt tot uitdrukking in de toename van 
onderzoek op dit gebied in de twee genoemde richtingen gedurende de afgelopen 
jaren. Onderzoekers betogen dat, aan de ene kant, “er behoefte bestaat om na te 
denken over in hoeverre theorieën en methodologieën die gebruikt worden om 
strategieën te onderzoeken in volwassen, ontwikkelde economieën geschikt zijn 
voor de unieke sociale, politieke en economische contexten” (Wright et al., 2005). 
Aan de andere kant, aandacht besteden aan ondernemingen die opereren in zulk een 
unieke context biedt de mogelijkheid om belangrijke bijdragen te leveren aan de 
bestaande kennis op dit gebied (Tsui et al., 2004). 
      Startend vanuit een institutie-gebaseerde zienswijze, richt deze dissertatie zich 
op de vraag in hoeverre instituties relevant zijn in de strategiebepaling door 
buitenlandse ondernemingen in China door te kijken naar drie theoretische 
vraagstukken, namelijk 1) de dynamiek van isomorfisme bij buitenlands eigendom; 
2) een proces-benadering van eigendomskeuze; 3) het beheersen van de relatie 
tussen onderneming en overheid. Het eerste vraagstuk is onderzocht door gebruik te 
maken van een paneel database van buitenlandse ondernemingen van 1979 tot en 
met 2003. De overige twee vraagstukken zijn verkend door middel van gegevens uit 
“case studies” in zes steden in China. Deze dissertatie komt tot de volgende 
conclusies: 
     1.  Een institutie-gebaseerde invalshoek is verhelderend bij het leren begrijpen 
van buitenlandse ondernemingen in overgangs-economieën zoals China. 
Instituties, zowel formele als informele, hebben een direct effect op de 
strategiebepaling van buitenlandse ondernemingen in China. Bijvoorbeeld: de 
keuze van eigendom door buitenlandse ondernemingen wordt zowel door 
efficiency als door legitimiteits-criteria bepaald. In het bijzonder wordt het 
153 
168
                                                                                      154
zakelijke gedrag van buitenlandse ondernemingen medebepaald door het 
politieke gedrag van de overheid. Buitenlandse ondernemingen dienen hun 
niet-zakelijke omgeving te beheersen om hun markt-strategieën uit te kunnen 
voeren. 
     2.  Een leerproces vindt plaats in de strategiebepaling door buitenlandse 
ondernemingen in China. Buitenlandse ondernemingen moeten opmerkzaam 
zijn op subtiele veranderingen in wetgeving en beleid en zij dienen kennis te 
verwerven over lokale instituties (inclusief informele) door middel van 
directe interacties en gesprekken bij het nemen van strategische beslissingen. 
Een leerproces maakt geleidelijke aanpassing mogelijk. Om dit te bereiken 
dienen buitenlandse ondernemingen te vertrouwen op hun leervermogen. 
     3.  Een lokale invalshoek is daarom nodig om institutionele effecten te analyseren. 
De institutionele omgeving in China is heterogeen met een grote 
verscheidenheid op lokaal niveau. Lokale overheden en lokale zaken-
gemeenschappen spelen vaak een belangrijke rol in de interacties met 
buitenlandse ondernemingen. Op lokaal niveau treden formele instituties in 
wisselwerking met informele instituties en dit bepaalt de kenmerken van de 
institutionele omgeving. Buitenlandse ondernemingen opereren dus vaak in 
een institutionele omgeving met een lokaal karakter. Een lokale invalshoek 
heeft gevolgen voor de operationalisering van instituties in strategie-
onderzoek, alsook voor diegenen die dit in de praktijk brengen door aandacht 
te besteden aan de specifieke omstandigheden waarmee zij op lokaal niveau 
dienen om te gaan.  
    
      Hoofstuk 3 behandelt hoe de dynamiek van organisationele homogeniteit in 
beslissingen aangaande eigendom gerelateerd zijn aan institutionele liberalisatie, 
alsmede aan strategische overwegingen van ondernemingen die transitionele 
economieën zoals China betreden. De bevindingen tonen aan dat de mate van 
organisationeel isomorfisme afneemt wanneer beperkingen aan buitenlands bezit 
worden geliberaliseerd en wanneer de sociale acceptatie van buitenlands bezit 
toeneemt. Deze bevindingen bevestigen dat institutionele veranderingen gevestigde 
isomorfismen verzwakken (Oliver, 1992; Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001). Een andere 
bevinding is dat de mate van organisationeel isomorfisme afneemt wanneer de voor 
vanzelfsprekende aangenomen overtuigingen (cognitieve kracht) ten aanzien van de 
meest geëigende eigendomsvorm veranderen. Terwijl eerder onderzoek de 
cognitieve kracht op een statische wijze benaderden, benadrukt dit onderzoek de 
dynamische kenmerken (Li et al., 2007). Het gevolg van deze kenmerken is dat het 
effect van cognitieve krachten op (de dynamiek van) isomorfisme complexer is dan 
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empirisch is onderzocht in bestaande publicaties. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3 
tonen tevens aan dat de dynamiek van organisationele homogeniteit in eigendoms-
beslissingen een verschuiving van strategische overwegingen door buitenlandse 
ondernemingen uitdrukken. Zij neigen tot het aangaan van joint ventures met een 
leerstrategie tijdens de eerste jaren van de Hervorming, en transformeren in de loop 
der tijd naar WFOE met een beheers-strategie. Belangrijker is dat de bevindingen in 
dit hoofdstuk de complementaire hypothese ondersteunen: zowel markt- als 
institutionele factoren zijn relevant voor het uitleggen van organisationele 
veranderingen (bijv. D’Aunno et al., 2000; Kraatz en Zajac, 1996). Het combineren 
van beide redeneringen versterkt ieders effect en resulteert in een betere 
uitlegbaarheid van de dynamiek van isomorfisme in eigendoms-beslissingen. 
      Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert hoe buitenlandse ondernemingen omgaan met lokale 
instituties bij hun beslissingen ten aanzien van eigendomsvorm in China. De 
bevindingen die afgeleid worden uit cross-case analyse tonen aan dat de 
waargenomen eigendomskeuzes door buitenlandse ondernemingen vaak afwijken 
van de aanvankelijk door hen gewenste vorm (Gomes-Casseres, 1990). De 
bevindingen ondersteunen daarmee het tweefasige leerproces. Het tweefasige 
leerproces identificeert voorkeur en aanpassing als twee aparte fasen en toont aan 
dat de keuze van eigendomsvorm van buitenlandse ondernemingen niet alleen op het 
hoofdkantoor buiten China gemaakt wordt (voorkeur), maar ook onderhevig is aan 
aanpassingen ter plaatse wanneer men geconfronteerd wordt met de lokale instituties. 
Alhoewel buitenlandse investeerders mogelijke beperkingen door centraal beleid in 
aanmerking nemen bij de evaluatie van de meest gewenste eigendomsvorm, zijn 
bijstellingen ter plaatse nodig vanwege de informatie-asymmetrie op lokaal niveau. 
Eerdere studies die gebaseerd waren op de variantie-benadering waren niet in staat 
om de aanpassingen van eigendomsvorm te verklaren. Het voorgestelde leerproces 
verbindt de verschillende theoretische benaderingen (transactie-kosten, 
organisationele capaciteiten en institutionele theorie) en resulteert in een gefaseerd 
beslissingsmodel waarin lokale oplossingen worden ontwikkeld. Dit leerproces helpt 
aan de ene kant om inconsistente empirische bevindingen te verklaren, aan de andere 
kant nodigt het uit om ook wetenschappelijk aandacht te besteden aan lokale 
instituties (overheid en zaken-gemeenschap) in China wanneer de eigendoms-
keuzen van buitenlandse ondernemingen worden bestudeerd. De bevindingen in dit 
hoofdstuk bepleiten dat een proces-benadering veel inzichten verschaft voor het 
begrijpen van internationalisering, hetgeen in overeenstemming is met recente 
ontwikkelingen in het vakgebied (bijv. Meyer en Gelbuda, 2006; Tallman en 
Shenkar, 1994). Het toevoegen van een lokale benadering compliceert het proces, 
maar levert veel toegevoegde waarde voor het begrijpen van eigendomskeuzen door 
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buitenlandse ondernemingen en van internationale strategieën in het algemeen 
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). 
      Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt hoe buitenlandse ondernemingen omgaan met hun 
relaties met lokale overheden in China. De bevindingen wijzen in de richting van de 
verschillen in de niet-zakelijke omgeving tussen China en het Westen. In China 
wordt de onzekerheid in de niet-zakelijke omgeving in hogere mate veroorzaakt 
door de lokale overheid, hetgeen gepaard gaat met dubbelzinnigheid ten aanzien van 
beleid en willekeur van officiële kant. Het benadrukt ook de attractiviteit van de 
niet-zakelijke omgeving op lokaal niveau voor buitenlandse ondernemingen in 
China (bijv. Bonardi et al., 2005). De drijfveren voor buitenlandse ondernemingen 
om zich in te laten met politieke activiteiten in China zijn het voorkomen van lokale 
interventies en het verwerven van meer buitengewone behandelingen door lokale 
overheden, en uiteindelijk het veiligstellen van hun operaties op lokaal niveau. De 
lokale benadering van transitionele economieën verrijkt wederom ons begrip van 
internationale politieke strategieën (bijv. Rodriguez et al., 2006). De bevindingen 
tonen aan dat de prestaties van buitenlandse dochterondernemingen op de lokale 
politieke markt worden bepaald door zowel technische middelen als door het sociale 
kapitaal dat zij bezitten (bijv. Frynas et al., 2006). In hun politieke gedrag gebruiken 
buitenlandse dochterondernemingen een relatiegerichte bestuursvorm voor hun 
relaties met de lokale overheden, waarbij partnerschap op macroniveau 
gecombineerd wordt met ‘guanxi’ netwerken (gebaseerd op persoonlijke relaties) op 
microniveau, om zodoende de kosten van handelsovereenkomsten te beperken. De 
macro-micro-koppeling heeft aangetoond een effectieve vorm te zijn voor 
ondernemingen om hun externe relaties te beheersen (Peng and Luo, 2000). Om 
relaties in stand te houden en politieke onzekerheid te beperken doen buitenlandse 
dochterondernemingen proactieve strategische stappen, zoals het verschaffen van 
informatie en stimulansen, maar vaak wel met een afwachtende houding van 
volgzaamheid als toevoeging, hetgeen een uitbreiding is van de zienswijze van 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) ten aanzien van proactieve acties. De bevindingen in dit 
hoofdstuk suggereren dat buitenlandse ondernemingen effectief gebruik moeten 
maken van hun technische mogelijkheden en sociaal ‘kapitaal’ moeten opbouwen op 
lokaal niveau, om zo hun relaties met de lokale overheden in China beter te 
beheersen. 
      Deze dissertatie toont aan dat instituties een beslissende rol spelen in de 
strategiebepaling van buitenlandse ondernemingen in China, daarbij een extra 
dimensie toevoegend aan de strategische besluitvorming. De bevindingen in deze 
dissertatie vormen een zeer positieve respons op de vraag naar wetenschappelijke 
aandacht voor instituties in het onderzoek naar internationaal zakendoen en strategie 
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(Child en Tse, 2001; Meyer en Peng, 2005; Shenkar, 2004; Wright et al., 2005). 
Daarnaast resulteerde de casus-gebaseerde verkenning in inzichten betreffende de 
wisselwerking tussen instituties en organisaties in de strategievorming van 
buitenlandse ondernemingen. Deze inzichten mogen dan specifiek zijn voor China 
voor wat betreft inhoud, we durven te stellen dat ze voor wat betreft structuur 
veralgemeend kunnen worden voor andere economieën.  
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中文摘要 
(Summary in Chinese) 
 
 
 
    中国等转型经济国家的发展越来越引起国际商务和战略研究学者的重视。
这些领域的学者都主张对制度因素给予特别关注（Child & Tse, 2001; 
Narayanan & Fahey, 2005; Shenkar, 2004; Tseng & Foster, 2006; Wright et al., 
2005）。一方面，有必要对现有理论和研究方法的适用范围进行界定，即这些
适用于发达国家的理论和方法在多大程度上也适用于转型经济的社会、政治和
经济环境（Wright et al., 2005）；另一方面，对这种特定环境中的企业进行研
究对于延伸现有的理论知识大有助益（Tsui et al., 2004）。基于此，本论文从
制度的视角出发，探讨制度是如何影响外资企业在中国的战略考虑。 
   本论文集中研究了三个问题：外资所有权形式的同一性变迁、从过程视角
看外资企业的所有权选择、以及外资企业－－政府关系的治理。第一个问题的
分析是基于 1979 年至 2003 年中国批准成立的外资企业的统计数据；其余两个
问题的数据来源于我们在中国六个城市所做的案例研究。本论文的主要发现可
以总结为以下三点： 
1． 基于制度的视角对于理解外资企业在中国这样的转型经济国家的战略
选择极富洞见力。正式制度和非正式制度对外资企业在中国的战略选
择都有直接影响。例如，所有权形式的选择同时体现了效率原则和合
法性原则；外资企业的商业行为受制于政府行为；为了更好地执行市
场战略，外资企业需要有效地治理其所处的非市场环境。 
2． 外资企业的战略选择要经历一个学习过程。外资企业需要敏锐地理解
法律和政策的细微变化，并通过直接的互动和对话获取有关地方制度
（包括非正式制度）的知识。有效的学习过程使得企业的适应性调整
变得平稳。为此，外资企业需要具有相应的学习能力。 
3． 从本地视角出发分析制度的影响很有必要。中国的制度环境在本地层
面上体现着多样性。地方政府和地方商业圈在与外资企业的互动中扮
演着十分重要的角色。因此，外资企业所面对的是一个本地化的制度
环境。从本地视角出发，在研究企业在中国等转型经济中的战略选择
时，对制度的量化解释应当考虑“地方”特性，同时，这也要求外资企
业经理们在经营管理中应当更多地关注他们所处地方的特定条件。 
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第一个问题分析了中国外资企业所有权形式的同一性变迁如何受制度自由
化和企业战略考虑的影响。研究发现，组织的同一性程度随着外资所有权管制
的放松和当地对外资的接纳程度上升而降低。这一发现也验证了制度变化可能
会削弱已经建立的同一性（Oliver, 1992; Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001）。另一发现
是，组织的同一性随着社会对正当的所有权形式的约定俗成的认识（认知力）
发生变化而降低。过去的研究对认知力用一种静态的方式加以处理，我们的研
究则强调了其动态特性（Li et al., 2007）。这一特性表明，认知力对组织同一
性的影响可能比文献中所实证的更为复杂。同时，该研究的发现显示，组织所
有权形式的同一性变迁也反映了外资企业战略考虑的变化。在改革开放初期，
外资企业倾向于建立合资企业来实施学习战略；随着时间推移，外资企业逐渐
倾向于建立独资企业以实施控制战略。更重要的一点是，该研究的发现支持了
市场因素和制度因素在解释组织变化时的互补性假说（D’Aunno et al., 2000; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 1996）。因此，将二者结合对于解释外资企业所有权形式同一
性的变迁具有更强大的说服力。 
第二个问题分析了外资企业在中国的所有权形式选择是如何与地方制度互
动的。通过多个案例的比较分析发现，我们所观察到的所有权形式通常不同于
外商进入中国前所偏好的模式（Gomes-Casseres, 1990），因而支持建立一个
两阶段学习过程解释外资企业在中国的所有权形式选择。这个过程区分了偏好
和调整两个阶段，表明外资企业的所有权形式并不是简单地由国外总部作出的
偏好选择，当外方在中国直接面对地方制度时必然要求对偏好选择进行修正。
虽然外方在评估投资模式偏好时已经考虑了中央政策所可能具有的约束，但由
于地方层面上政策信息的不对称使得外方在建立企业时有必要对偏好作出修
正。过去的研究采用了差异性方法（variance approach），这些研究不能、也
没有解释所有权形式的调整过程。该研究所提出的分阶段学习过程综合了不同
的理论视角（交易成本、组织能力、制度理论）。这一学习过程有助于对过去
研究中不一致的实证结果作出解释，同时提醒学者在研究外资企业的所有权形
式选择时应当关注地方制度（地方政府和地方商业圈）的影响。该研究的发现
也验证了过程方法对研究企业国际化的洞见力，这与该领域最近的研究进展相
呼应（Meyer & Gelbuda, 2006; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994）。另外，研究中增加
一个本地视角使得过程复杂了，但对于了解外资企业的所有权选择和国际化战
略很有意义（Meyer & Nguyen, 2005）。 
第三个问题探讨了外资企业治理与中国地方政府关系的动机和机制。该研
究指出了中国与西方在非市场环境方面的不同。在中国，非市场环境的不确定
性更多是与地方政府相联系的，表现为政策的模糊性和执行中的随意性。这突
显了中国地方层面的非市场环境的特殊性（例如 Bonardi et al., 2005）。因
此，外资企业在中国进行政治活动的动因是为了避免地方干扰、争取地方政府
的特殊待遇，进而确保企业在本地的运营正常进行。这一本地视角丰富了我们
对国际化政治战略的理解（例如 Rodriguez et al., 2006）。研究表明，外资企
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业在本地政治市场上的绩效取决于企业所拥有的技术资源和社会资本（例如
Frynas et al., 2006）。从企业行为来看，外资企业在与地方政府合作时采用关
系治理模式，即通过宏观层面的伙伴关系和微观层面的个人关系网来降低交易
成本。这种宏微观结合的方式被证明在治理企业外部关系上非常有效（Peng 
& Luo, 2000）。为了维持这种关系并降低政策不确定性，外资企业会采取诸
如提供信息和激励此类前摄性战略行动（proactive strategic actions），但是通
常也会同时作出与政府配合的反应式姿态（reactive attitude）作为补充。这一
发现是对过去关于前摄性战略行动认识的延伸（Hillman & Hitt, 1999）。这些
发现进一步建议，为了更好地治理与地方政府的关系，外资企业必须有效地利
用其技术资源，并积极积累在中国本地层面的社会资本。 
        总之，本论文的研究表明，制度对外资企业在中国的战略选择具有非常重
要的影响，是企业在战略决策时必须考虑的重要维度。本文的研究发现对当前
国际商务和战略研究领域所关注的制度问题给出了非常积极的回应（Child & 
Tse, 2001; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Shenkar, 2004; Wright et al., 2005）。此外，针
对外资企业战略制定中制度和组织的互动，基于案例的研究也提出了富有见地
的建议。本文的这些发现虽然就内容而言是针对中国的，但是就制度影响的分
析框架和模式而言，对其他转型经济也是适用的。 
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Strategizing of Foreign Firms in China
An institution-based perspective
China has been assuming a prominent position in the world economy
and one of the most attractive destinations for FDI. However, the
popular press often points to institutional voids and difficulties that
foreign firms face in operation. How foreign firms strategize in
China, therefore, becomes a very important question to both
academics and practitioners. This book offers an institutional
perspective. Based on a detailed analysis of ownership choice and
political activities of foreign firms, the book shows that the
interaction between institutions and foreign firms accounts much for
strategic decisions. In the context of China, it is local institutions,
such as local governments and local business societies, which play a
substantial role in shaping the behaviour of foreign firms. As a
response, foreign firms must “think local”, appreciating the role of
local institutions and fitting their behaviour to local circumstances
within China. Doing so through a process of learning by doing ex post
entry is costly. Therefore, foreign firms need to build up capabilities
to manage formal and informal institutions effectively at the local
level. From a theoretical perspective, the findings in this book
contribute significantly to international business and strategy
research into transition economies by contextualizing the existing
theories and adding a local perspective. 
ERIM
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School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-147-5 
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